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Abstract
CIVILIZING SETTLERS: CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES AND THE COLONIAL
STATE IN FRENCH ALGERIA, 1830-1914
by
Kyle Francis
Advisor: Professor David Troyansky
This dissertation argues that between 1830 and 1914, with increasing intensity
over time, French Catholic missionaries sowed divisions among the European population
of French Algeria. The French government initially welcomed missionaries to cater to
religiously devout Spanish, Italian, and Maltese settlers in Algeria and to foster their
loyalty to the colonial state. Missionaries, however, incited the professional jealousy and
personal animosity of the territory’s generally less devout French population, who saw
Catholicism and missionaries as little different from Islam and the “fanatical” Muslim
population. Throughout this period, missionaries thus occupied a liminal space in the
racialized hierarchy of colonial rule. As such, their presence disrupted colonial
taxonomies that positioned a “civilized” European population as superior to an
“uncivilized” indigenous one.
For their part, missionaries saw Algeria as a blank slate in which to create a
Catholic society they perceived as increasingly foreclosed in a secularizing Europe. At
the same time, in the extralegal space of Algeria, missionaries relied on seemingly “premodern” networks of privilege and patronage to win support. The stress caused by
navigating these dense patronage networks in an increasingly hostile environment created
discord among missionaries. On the most localized level of power, missionaries
competed with each other to carve out their own niches of authority. Male missionaries
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competed to administer sacraments to female missionaries, while the latter sought to
assert their own autonomy by procuring friendly spiritual advisors or secular authorities
who would allow them the most individual latitude. In the end, these political ploys only
undermined their efforts to spread the Catholic faith and to portray themselves as useful
to government officials.
Ultimately, this dissertation reveals that colonial officials of all types framed the
need to govern the settler population as a crucial component of the larger goal of ruling
over the conquered indigenous population. As such, it re-conceptualizes France’s wellknown civilizing mission as directed as much towards this settler population as towards
the indigenous one. At the same time, in showing that colonial officials utterly failed in
their attempt to mold a unified settler community, this dissertation further reveals the
fragility of the bonds that supposedly held the colonial settlers together and the tenuous
foundations of imperial rule in nineteenth-century French Algeria.
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Introduction: Missionaries, Settlers, and the Colonial State
Between 1830 and 1914, with increasing intensity over time, French Catholic
missionaries sowed divisions among the European population of French Algeria and
preoccupied the French colonial government. Although fully European in birth and
nationality – that is, in no way a métis population in the traditional sense of the word –
missionaries occupied a liminal space between European rulers and North African
subjects that further disrupts the notion that a clear racial divide separated colonizer from
colonized.1 Never fully subject to the rule of law, but neither entirely servants to the
arbitrary regime of exception that ruled native Algerians, missionaries floated uneasily in
a contested and ever-changing colonial space, appearing variously as nodes of
communication that either transmitted or subverted expressions of power between the
imperial regime and its diverse subjects, citizens, and functionaries.2
Missionary work in Algeria did not fail to garner publicity. An array of actors,
including the colonial press, the military and civilian governments, lay settlers, and
indigenous subjects, all offered their opinions on the benefits and liabilities of welcoming
missionaries to the territory. The multiple and varied discourses that surrounded and
enveloped these missionaries did little to clarify their potential to facilitate or undermine
1

Recent historiography has portrayed the mixed-race populations in the colonies as the group that most
disrupted imperial taxonomies and hierarchies. See Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial
Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), Owen
White, Children of the French Empire: Miscegenation and Colonial Society in French West Africa, 18951960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Emmanuelle Saada, Les enfants de la colonie: les métis
de l’Empire français entre sujétion et citoyenneté (Paris: La Découverte, 2007), Philippa Levine,
Prostitution, Race & Politics: Policing Venereal Disease in the British Empire (New York: Routledge,
2003), Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family
Life in French and Dutch Colonialism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998).
2
The arbitrary regime of exception was embodied, after 1881, in the law code known as the indigénat. See
Isabelle Merle, “Retour sur le régime de l’Indigénat: Genèse et contradictions des principes répressifs dans
l’empire français,” French Politics, Culture, Society 20:2 (2002): 77-97, and Gregory Mann, “What was the
Indigénat? The ‘Empire of Law’ in French West Africa,” The Journal of African History 50/03 (November
2009): 331-353.
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colonial rule. Throughout the period from 1830 to 1914, the nature of the relationships
between and among missionaries and settlers, as well as the political dangers these
relationships posed to the state, remained remarkably confused; and this confusion and
the anxiety it engendered stemmed directly from the weakness, instability, and
incoherence of the colonial state.
Beginning in the 1830s, the French military government welcomed Catholic
missionaries from France and from the Vatican as part of its effort to encourage European
settlement in Algeria. Officials encouraged missionaries to provide religious services for
Catholic settlers in Algeria in order to tie them and their families to the colony. If settlers
could find sufficient religious resources in their adopted homeland, officials reasoned,
they would have less of an incentive to return to France or elsewhere in Europe. From the
very beginning, though, reality never corresponded to expectations. Unlike in France, the
French population in Algeria constituted a minority of the overall Catholic European
population.3 French colonial officials were thus faced with the dilemma of having to
choose whether to use missionaries to “assimilate” these foreigners (and the minority of
French Catholics) by spreading their universalist ideal of French culture and language or
to allow missionaries to provide for these settlers’ particular needs by fostering their own
religious customs and preaching and ministering to them in their own native languages –
typically Spanish, Italian, and Maltese.4
To complicate matters, French rule throughout much of the nineteenth century
resembled a system of dual power, in which after 1848 civilian officials theoretically
3

For foreign Catholics in France, see Gérard Cholvy, “La religiosité populaire dans la France méridionale:
jalons pour une sociologie historique,” L’Année sociologique, Troisieme série 28 (1988): 169-192.
4
Julia Clancy-Smith analyzes in depth the multi-ethnic population of North Africa, especially Tunisia, in
Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, 1800-1900 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2010).
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administered areas occupied primarily by Europeans while military officials governed
lands where native Algerians constituted a majority.5 Until at least 1880, the military and
civilian regimes remained divided over whether to pursue a policy of assimilation or
association in their attempts to tie settlers to the colonial state. Generally speaking, the
military regime hoped to treat foreign settlers and their religion much like they purported
to treat conquered Algerians and their religion – by allowing them to retain their religious
and linguistic heritage in return for pledging their political loyalty to the state. The
civilian regime too sought to govern the foreigners as it claimed to rule the indigènes, but
it pursued the goal of assimilating outsiders to a universalist conception of French
belonging rooted in the tradition of the Revolution of 1789, while leaving them to their
own devices to fulfill their particular religious needs in the privacy of their own homes
and chapels.6 Either way, officials from each camp applied their respective ideologies
much more consistently and wholeheartedly to the settler population than to the
indigenous one.7

5

See Claude Collot, Les institutions de l’Algérie durant la période coloniale (Paris: CNRS, 1987) and John
Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
1992), 72-76.
6
For policies of assimilation and association towards native Algerians see Osama W. Abi-Mershed,
Apostles of Modernity: Saint-Simonians and the Civilizing Mission in Algeria (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2010). For policies of association and assimilation in the French empire more generally,
see Raymond Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1961). For the universalist expression and legacy of the French Revolution,
specifically of Jacobinism, see Patrice Higonnet, Goodness Beyond Virtue: Jacobins during the French
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Sudhir Hazareesingh, The Jacobin
Legacy in Modern France: Essays in Honour of Vincent Wright (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).
For the limits of French universalism from the Revolution to the present, see Joan Scott Only Paradoxes to
Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997) and Joan
Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1988).
7
David Scott, channeling Michel Foucault, speaks of the emergence in the 1830s of a “colonial
governmentality,” by which colonial rule (specifically in British controlled Ceylon) transitioned from the
administration of territory to the administration of a population; or from the repressive power of territorial
rule to the productive power of forging colonial subjects by producing new forms of individual conduct and
subjectivities. If we apply certain insights of Frederick Cooper concerning the limited and uneven reach of
the imperial state, however, we could argue that such desire to produce colonial subjects often had a very
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Regardless of the policy pursued at any given moment, the extralegal effort to
control missionaries reveals the limits of the supposed juridical assimilation between
France and Algeria, while the arc traced by a history of missionary work correlates little
with the major political and social upheavals that shaped the historical trajectory of
metropolitan France. That arc took shape, rather, according to the unexpected difficulties
the colonial regime encountered in its attempt to govern the diverse European population
of Algeria. Despite the supposed transition to civilian rule in 1848, and the full
assimilation of Algeria to France in 1870-71, the military would continually flout the rule
of law and come to the aid of foreign settlers when civilian officials threatened to
separate them from the religious services the missionaries provided. Only after the
application of the Ferry laws to Algeria in 1883 did the policy of association begin to
give way to the civilian ideal of assimilation.8 Paradoxically, however, the hallmark of
this policy – the law that naturalized foreigners en masse in 1889 – granted actual
political rights to these freshly-naturalized settlers (néo-français) and thus at times
allowed them to enforce their religious will on the ethnically French population (français

fitful application. Rather, the colonial state harnessed the productive (labor) power of certain colonial
subjects while largely ignoring others (except in the realm of tax collection). Drawing from both these
insights, I would argue that Scott’s conception of colonial governmentality permeated the European settler
community much more than the mass of Algerian colonial subjects. In this effort, the colonial state had an
urgent need to actually invest itself in shaping European settler-citizens who in their sensibilities and
conduct differentiated themselves from Algerian colonial subjects. See David Scott, “Colonial
Governmentality,” in Anthropologies of Modernity: Foucault, Governmentality, and Life Politics, edited by
Jonathon Xavier Inda (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 23-49. See also Frederick Cooper, Africa in
the World: Capitalism, Empire, Nation-State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).
8
The Ferry laws of 1880-82 were the creation of Prime Minister Jules Ferry. They mandated that primary
education be free, secular, and obligatory, though families could still opt to send their children to religious
schools. To be sure, the laws’ application to Algeria only pertained to European children, as colonial
officials feared the political repercussions of forcing native Algerians to send their children, especially their
daughters, to French schools. See Antoine Prost and François Mayeur, Histoire générale de l'enseignement
et de l'éducation en France, t. III, 1789-1930 (Paris: Perrin, 2004). See also Peter McPhee, A Social History
of France, 1789-1914, Second edition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 252-255. For the
application of the laws to Algeria see Fanny Colonna, Instituteurs Algériens, 1883-1939 (Alger: Presses de
Science Po, 1975).
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d’origine).9 What was supposed to constitute the pinnacle of colonial assimilation in fact
divided the settler community more than ever before.
The efforts to cultivate the religious sensibilities of the settler population, to
classify their outward manifestations and locate their potential for political subversion,
call to mind Ann Laura Stoler’s observation that imperial rule did not only rely on the
reign of reason, on gifting Enlightenment principles to the irrational peoples of the world;
it also entailed the careful cultivation of affect and sentiment among the supposedly
rational European population.10 Whereas officials in the Dutch East Indies fretted
especially over the affective ties that bound together, or threatened to tear apart, the
mixed-race families that disrupted and confused the imperial hierarchy, officials in
French Algeria sought to monitor the religious sentiments of the Catholic settler
population, all the more so as this group consisted primarily of European foreigners. In
Algeria, religious belief already connoted political subversion in and of itself, as from the
beginning the French classified all conquered Algerians simply according to their
confessional identity as “Muslims.”11 The combination of such religious and political

9

The term néo-français henceforth applied to foreigners who gained French citizenship through the law of
1889. See also Charles Robert Ageron, Les algériens musulmans et la France, 1871-1919, Volume 1
(Paris: PUF, 1968), 577-79. For the law of 1889, see Patrick Weil, How to Be French: Nationality in the
Making Since 1789, translated by Catherine Porter (Raleigh: Duke University Press, 2008), 210-215. For a
detailed discussion of the paradoxes of indigenous citizenship in Algeria see Laure Blévis, “Les avatars de
la citoyenneté en Algérie coloniale ou les paradoxes d’une catégorisation,” Droit et société 48/2 (2001):
557-581.
10
Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
11
Indeed, after 1865 Algerians who hoped to gain French citizenship first had to renounce their personal
status as Muslims and reject their right to Islamic courts of law. See, among many other works, Ruedy,
Modern Algeria, 75-76. The exception to the categorization of all native Algerians as “Muslims” came in
the form of Algeria’s substantial Jewish population (30,000 at the time of the conquest). Although many
Frenchmen in France and Algeria characterized indigenous Jews and Muslims as equally uncivilized, a
large number of Frenchmen, notably Jewish elites in the metropole, actively worked to assimilate Algerian
Jews to French society and culture. This undertaking ultimately led to the Crémieux Decree of 24 October
1870, which extended French citizenship to all Algerian Jews. To be sure, from its inception this law
heightened anti-Semitism among Algeria’s European population, culminating in the anti-Semitic riots of
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anxieties led the colonial state to see faith and religious belief as “especially dense
transfer point[s] for relations of power.”12 Over time, however, officials increasingly
divided over exactly what sentiments they ought to cultivate: whereas the military regime
saw Catholicism as a bulwark of French civilization in the fight against Islamic
“fanaticism,” the civilian regime increasingly identified Catholic with Islamic fanaticism
and saw both as equally subversive. In a society that defined the political enemy
primarily by the religion he professed, any religious sensibility whatsoever threatened to
blur the line between ruler and ruled.
The government initially hoped to use religion to tie settlers to the regime, but
research on missionaries reveals the pluripotency of faith and the unreliability of
harnessing faith for political ends. Although officials hoped missionaries would bolster
imperial rule by fostering unity among a diverse settler population, they more often
sowed divisions. Not only did they divide the military from the civilian regime and
Catholic from anticlerical settlers, but they also engendered discord within the
community of the Catholic clergy itself. Like other European immigrants to Algeria,
missionaries and clergymen saw the territory as a blank slate in which they could inscribe
their own niches of professional and personal authority that remained closed off in the
more rigid confines of the metropole. Because of their precarious financial, legal, and
political positions, however, missionaries had to compete with each other to secure
valuable patrons who could supply moral and financial support, typically Catholic
1898. See Valérie Assan, Les consistoires israélites d’Algérie au XIXe siècle: ‘L’alliance de la civilisation
et de la religion’ (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012); Claude Martin, Les israélites algériens de 1830 à 1902
(Paris: Editions Herakles, 1936); and Michel Abitbol, “La citoyenneté imposée du décret Crémieux à la
guerre d’Algérie,” in Histoire politique des juifs en France: Entre universalisme et particularisme, P.
Birnbaum, ed. (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1990): 196-217.
12
Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley (New
York: Random House, 1978), 103. Foucault here is referring to sexuality.
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bishops, military governors general, or civilian prefects. The strain engendered by the
cultivation of these dense networks of patronage only caused secular clergymen and
missionaries to encroach on one another’s terrain and to denounce one another to
ecclesiastical and secular authorities. In many ways, their story is one of ambition, often
thwarted, and it mirrors that of the settler population writ large.
Finally, although missionaries relied on these seemingly pre-modern patronage
networks to carve out their own realms of autonomy and authority, they still saw Algeria
as a place to forge what they saw as a religious modernity.13 Rather than seeing the
territory as a “laboratory of modernity” whose findings could be transplanted back to the
metropole, missionaries saw the empty space of empire as affording them the opportunity
to forge and implant a religious present increasingly foreclosed in a secularizing France.14
To be sure, their version of modernity looked very much backwards toward a (perhaps
mythical) medieval past. As such, their ideal of modern Christianity correlated closely
with that of metropolitan Catholics described by historians Raymond Jonas and Ruth
Harris. Both historians have shown how nineteenth-century Catholics combined modern
techniques of mass fundraising drives and organized pilgrimages with medieval imagery,
most notably that of the Sacré-Coeur of Jesus Christ, to mobilize support for a Catholic
revival – whether in the construction of the Sacré-Coeur cathedral on Montmartre or the

13

Although I am aware of the critiques, offered most forcefully by Frederick Cooper, of the various uses of
the all-encompassing term “modernity,” I avoid the potential pitfalls Cooper describes by refraining from
attaching any agency to modernity itself. I instead use the term to depict the society that these actors hoped
to create, a society that they described themselves as modern, even if it often took inspiration from the past.
For the critiques of the historical uses of the term “modernity” see Cooper, Colonialism in Question:
Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 133-152.
14
For the laboratories of modernity thesis, see for example, Paul Rabinow, French Modern: Norms and
Forms of the Social Environment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), Ann Laura Stoler, Race
and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Raleigh:
Duke University Press, 1995).
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popularization of the miraculous fountain at Lourdes.15 More recently, literary scholar
Michelle Warren has turned to the colonial world to analyze a phenomenon she terms
“creole medievalism,” or an emerging belief among French colonists in La Réunion that
they occupied a privileged position through which to restore France to its medieval
glory.16 This dissertation repeatedly invokes Warren’s terminology in its contention that
missionaries in Algeria – due both to their distance from metropolitan organs of control
and their proximity to a large European population – saw themselves as uniquely placed
to combat the secular society that they feared threatened to overtake metropolitan France.
Unfortunately for missionaries, not only did they compete with each other to
direct the implementation of a Catholic Algeria, but they also increasingly competed with
French anticlericals who themselves saw Algeria as a place to enact their own version of
a secular modernity that they could not yet achieve in the metropole. Although Algeria
constituted a French territory, it remained far enough from the relatively moderate
policies of Paris to allow more extremist positions on both sides to prevail; and both sides
used the colonists’ tenuous position amidst an overwhelming and menacing Muslim
majority to radicalize their respective visions. Over time, these conflicting versions of
modernity, both secular and religious, past- and future-oriented, would come into direct
15

For the image of the Sacré-Coeur see Raymond Jonas, France and the Cult of the Sacred Heart: An Epic
Tale for Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). For the construction of the shrine
at Lourdes see Ruth Harris, Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age (London: Allen Lane, 1999).
16
This desire to implement a mythical medieval past recurs throughout this dissertation. Here I draw from
the recent work of French literary scholar Michelle Warren, Creole Medievalism: Colonial France and
Joseph Bédier’s Middle Ages (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). Warren defines
“creoles” strictly as fully white, ethnically French settlers on the island of La Réunion. Used this way, the
term aptly applies to the nostalgic vision of missionaries in Algeria. To be sure, Warren focuses more on
the French of Réunion who chose to study medieval French literature as a way to revive the gloriousness of
France’s past in the present. These scholars though also saw the Crusades as an early form of French
colonialism. Although they were not members of the Catholic clergy and they largely supported the Third
Republic, they also continued to claim the Christian identity of Réunion’s elite landowners and they saw
medieval France and its incarnation in Réunion as superior to modern metropolitan France. Warren, xxviii.
139, 164-193.
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and explosive combat with one another. Despite this combat, the goal of constructing a
religious modernity in Algeria remained a distinct possibility until very late in the
nineteenth century.
Historiography
This dissertation bridges two distinct bodies of literature that French historians have only
recently brought into conversation with one another: those on imperialism and
Catholicism. For the former, it builds on the pioneering work of Ann Stoler and Frederick
Cooper that sees European empires as sites of contestation, instability, and anxiety – sites
where the division between ruler and ruled was never as clear as European discourses,
and indeed later historians, portrayed.17 For the latter, this dissertation owes much to the
work of Claude Langlois, Sarah Curtis, and Caroline Ford, all of whom definitively
overturned the depiction of nineteenth-century France as entirely secular and of the
Catholic church as existing merely at the margins of society.18 All of these scholars have
called into question previously accepted historiographical suppositions and brought to the
fore the importance of concepts such as negotiation, unreason, and liminality.
In the last decade, the interventions led by these historians have sparked a
renewed interest in Catholic missionaries in the French empire. Whereas an older
17

Stoler and Cooper, Tensions of Empire; Stoler, Along the Archival Grain; and Stoler, Carnal Knowledge
and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, University of California Press,
2002).
18
Langlois was the first to show that thousands of young women joined religious congregations throughout
France in the nineteenth century, as these congregations provided them with professional opportunities
unavailable in secular life. Sarah Curtis built on this work to show that in the field of education especially
religious teaching congregations educated more children than did secular schools throughout almost all of
the nineteenth century. Caroline Ford too built on Langlois’ work by illustrating how the Catholic faith
often tore families apart, as women tended to become more religious and men less religious. Claude
Langlois, Le catholicisme au féminin. Les congrégations françaises à supérieure générale au XIX siècle
(Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1984), Sarah Curtis, Educating the Faithful: Religion, Schooling, and Society in
Nineteenth-Century France (Chicago: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000), and Caroline Ford,
Divided Houses: Religion and Gender in Modern France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

9

generation of historians tended to view missionaries as simple and obvious extensions of
the oppressive colonial state, historians like J.P. Daughton, Sarah Curtis, and Elizabeth
Foster have complicated the role of missionaries abroad.19 Daughton was perhaps the first
to show that, in the very midst of the wave of anticlericalism that overtook the Third
Republic after 1880, French missionaries spread throughout the world in unprecedented
numbers. Although they often won the support of French colonial authorities if they
agreed to spread French culture in the French language, they could also incite the ire of
the same authorities if they adopted the language and customs (if not the religion) of
France’s indigenous subjects.20 Curtis has shown that the empire especially allowed
female missionaries an escape from the rigid gender hierarchy of bourgeois France.21
Foster, meanwhile, has portrayed the empire as a space where competing religious and
secular “power brokers” sought to assert their own realms of authority and autonomy far
away from overbearing metropolitan superiors.22 Although this dissertation owes much to
Foster’s concept of missionaries as power brokers, it complicates this term by portraying

19

For the historiography that portrays missionaries and colonial powers as working completely in tandem,
see Y.A. Yansané, “The Impact of France on Education in West Africa,” in Double Impact: France and
Africa in the Age of Imperialism, edited by G. Wesley Johnson (London: Greenwood, 1985) and Stephen
Neill, Colonialism and Christian Missions (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966). Philipe Joutard has also
argued that Catholic and secular education throughout the French empire were “more complementary than
competitive and their similarities outweigh their differences.” Joutard, “Preface” to Une France en
Méditerranée: écoles, langue, et culture françaises. Le XIXe -XXe siècles, edited by Patrick Cabanel (Paris:
Creaphis, 2006), iv. Cabanel’s book as a whole sees Catholic missionaries and the French state as working
in tandem abroad.
20
J.P. Daughton, An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism, and the Making of French Colonialism,
1880-1914 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also Daughton and Owen White, eds., In
God’s Empire: French Missionaries and the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012),
and Owen White, “The Decivilizing Mission: Auguste Dupuis-Yakouba and French Timbuktu,” French
Historical Studies 27/3 (Summer 2004): 541-468.
21
Sarah Curtis, Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of French Empire (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
22
Elizabeth Foster, Faith in Empire: Religion, Politics, and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880-1940
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).
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missionaries and other members of the Catholic clergy as in competition more than
collusion with one another.
In studying nineteenth-century colonial Algeria in particular, a handful of
historians have examined the disturbances caused by Catholic missionaries. Other than
Sarah Curtis, all of these scholars have dealt with a single missionary congregation, the
Missionnaires de Notre Dame d’Afrique, better known as the Pères Blancs, due to their
distinctive white robes. As François Renault has recounted, this congregation was
founded in 1870 by the archbishop of Algeria, Charles Lavigerie, who hoped to use the
congregation to convert Muslims to Christianity and then to train an indigenous clergy to
convert the rest of Africa.23 Karima Dirèche-Slimani and Betrand Taithe have both
examined particular attempts by these missionaries in the 1870s and beyond to establish
“Arab-Christian villages” consisting of native Algerian orphans.24 These attempts
typically met with failure, as the orphans ran away or declined to convert. On rare
occasions the orphans did convert, only to meet with a double marginalization from both
Muslim and European societies. Sarah Curtis has examined the fortunes of another
missionary congregation in Algeria in the 1840s, the Sisters of St Joseph of the
Apparition, led by the intrepid Emilie de Vialar, but Vialar quickly fled Algeria for
Tunisia after her disagreements with the bishop of Algiers. To be sure, these
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disagreements represent some of the only documented incidences of infighting among the
Catholic clergy abroad, and this dissertation will expand on such conflict in great depth.25
Because of their relative rarity and their failure to impart any significant historical
consequences, direct interactions between missionaries and Algerian Muslims figure
rarely in my analysis. The works described above have dealt adequately with such
interactions. Further, in the very framing of their questions these works perpetuate the
historiographical dichotomy that posits a clear divide between colonized and colonizer.
This dissertation will complicate such a dichotomous historical picture by building on a
methodological framework recently called for by historian Mary Lewis – one which
“transcends neat oppositions between colonizers and colonized, without denying uneven
distributions in power.”26 Indeed, none of the works described above examine missionary
interaction with a largely forgotten colonial population that nevertheless constituted the
primary object of missionary labor in Algeria: the settlers themselves. Although the
settler community as a collective admittedly held more power than did the colonized
indigènes, vast discrepancies in power existed within the settler community as well; and
the religious beliefs of missionaries and their followers often cast them to the marginal
outskirts of colonial society, or to conceptual and literal spaces that closely bordered
those inhabited by native Algerians.
The settler population in general remains underexplored in the history of French
Algeria, particularly in the nineteenth century. When historians have broached the topic,
two questions have tended to predominate: When did civilian settlers unite to overthrow
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the military regime, and when did the settler community achieve an identity as such, an
identity known colloquially as pied-noir? This dissertation will contribute to both debates
and in doing so it will help to change the periodization of the history of French Algeria.
This periodization owed little, especially in the initial decades, to major political turning
points in the metropole; rather, it depended more on the specific exigencies of imperial
rule, the uneven application of metropolitan legislation, and the individual whims of
ecclesiastical and secular leaders. Despite the division of Algeria into three official
departments of the metropole in 1848, and the supposed institution of full civilian rule in
1871, the military continued to wield ultimate power well into the 1880s due to the
political disenfranchisement of not only the entire indigenous population but also the
mass of the settler population that did not possess French citizenship until 1889.
Historians have posited various dates for the emergence of a relatively unified
settler community in Algeria. Perhaps the most famous thesis comes from Annie ReyGoldzeiguer, who argued that by the late 1860s a powerful civilian population had come
together to stymie Napoleon III’s attempt to use the army – and the detested Arab
bureaus – to create an “Arab Kingdom” that protected native Algerians from civilian
rapaciousness. Goldzeiguer locates this success in the colonists’ ability to ensure that the
senatus-consultes of 1863 and 1865 remained essentially dead letters in the colony.27
Conversely, historians Pierre Nora, David Prochaska, and Charles Robert Ageron have
argued that the law of 1889, which granted automatic citizenship to all the foreign
Europeans born in Algeria, served as, in Ageron’s words, “the birth certificate of the
27
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European people of Algeria.”28 These arguments are all belied by a study of missionaries
in Algeria, as up to the eve of the First World War the settler community remained
wracked by divisions that stemmed above all from ethnically-tinged religious differences
among the colonists.
Archival Sources
This dissertation combines research in the French national archives in Paris, the French
overseas archives in Aix-en-Provence, and a number of missionary archives in Paris,
Lyon, and Rome. Research in the national archives provided material for the basic legal
and political arc of the argument. Specifically, in the national archives, series F19 on
religious congregations and F17 on public instruction proved invaluable for delineating
how the minister of war (and later interior), the governor general, and the various prefects
employed legal and extra-legal means to attempt to control missionary work in the
territory. In the French overseas archives (Centre d’Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer), a
subset of series F80 on the establishment of parish churches in Algeria and series 1U
containing correspondence between Algerian bishops and the governor general and
prefects allowed me to gain a better understanding of the relationship between secular
and ecclesiastical officials in the colony.
This information, however, has with some exceptions only provided the
institutional framework of the overall dissertation. For its primary argument and its
attempt to depict the social and spiritual landscape of missionary life and work, this
dissertation relies primarily on missionary archives. Materials in each of the eight
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missionary archives I visited illuminated crucial insights regarding the relationship both
between secular and religious authorities and amongst missionaries and clergymen
themselves. In many of these archives, no historian had previously looked at the papers
pertaining specifically to Algeria. Their organization varied tremendously, with some
periods well documented and others inexplicably absent from the historical record.
Similarly, the emotional richness of these documents varied from archive to archive and
often changed over time. Whereas the documents in some archives may have provided an
extraordinary level of detail for the decades of the 1830s and 40s only to tail off into
more bureaucratic language after 1850, others only began to prove useful after 1850. As a
general though not uniform trend, however, the richness of the missionary archives
declines after about 1880, and this decline can be traced directly to the centralization of
religious authority under the archbishop of Algiers and with the slow but steady
application of metropolitan law to the territory of Algeria. Both of these events
contributed to circumscribing the realm of the possible in the missionary imagination,
and the narrowing of this imagination is reflected in the increasingly formulaic nature of
missionaries’ letters.
A final word is in order regarding the structure of the missions in Algeria and how
it shaped the archives left behind. Upon arrival in the colony, each congregation
established one or more houses depending on the number of missionaries it staffed.
Typically referred to as a residence, each of these houses had its own superior. This
superior would report to the superior of the entire “province” of Algeria, who took the
title of “visiting superior.” In theory, the visiting superior alone corresponded with the
superior of the congregation who resided in the motherhouse in France or Rome. In
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reality, however, various sub-superiors of the different houses often wrote directly to the
superior in the metropole. On rare occasions, typically in times of personal duress,
individual missionaries who did not possess any position of authority also wrote to either
the visiting superior or the superior of the congregation. Once or twice a year – though
sometimes less frequently – a “visiting inspector,” often also the superior of the entire
congregation, toured all the houses of Algeria and penned a report on his or her findings.
The report would comment on the general conduct, morality, efficacy, and morale of each
of the houses – and often each of the missionaries – followed by suggestions for
improvement, or even outright admonitions.
The frequency of all of this correspondence – at least what remains of it today –
varied widely from congregation to congregation; and the level of detail in the
correspondence depended entirely on the individual personality of the author. Other than
the annual reports penned by the visiting superiors, the archival documents consist
entirely of letters written from missionaries in Algeria to their superiors in the metropole.
That is to say, the archives do not contain the equally frequent letters written from the
superior in the metropole to the visiting superior in Algeria. We can only hear the
distorted voices of these metropolitan superiors in their echoed sentiments found in the
responses penned by missionaries abroad, for instance when these latter responded
directly to questions, reprimands, or advice offered by the former. Presumably these
documents remained in Algeria, where the relatively chaotic state of the missionary
establishments and the paucity of personnel did not allow for the systematized collection
and filing of letters received from Europe.
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For the purposes of this dissertation, the most valuable information by far came
from the archives of the Congregation of the Mission of St Vincent de Paul, hereafter
referred to as the Lazarists, and the neighboring archives of their sister congregation, the
Filles de la Charité, both located in Paris. From 1845 to 1905 the Lazarists directed the
senior seminary at Kouba and, for most of that time, the nearby junior seminary as well.
They also served as parish priests in a number of communes in the territory. Further, the
Lazarist priests served as the spiritual advisors – generally as administrators of
sacraments – to the Filles de la Charité. From 1845 onward, these sisters directed schools
and orphanages and worked as nurses in military (and sometimes civilian) hospitals
throughout the territory, though primarily in the department of Algiers. From their arrival
in the 1840s, these two congregations enjoyed more support from both the secular and
ecclesiastical hierarchy than any other congregation. This support stemmed from their
history of serving the French government at home and abroad and from the paternalist
relationship between the Lazarists and the Filles de la Charité.
The documents these two congregations left behind remain relevant for two
reasons: first, the Lazarist superiors, more than those of any other congregation, enjoyed
the patronage of successive bishops of Algiers; accordingly, the correspondence between
superiors of various houses in Algeria with the motherhouse in Paris reveals the criteria
required for success in Algeria. Second, due to their special and entirely paternal
relationship with the Filles de la Charité, correspondence among and between these two
congregations reveals the gendered dimension of the missionary hierarchy and helps us
understand how female missionaries worked to carve out their own niches of autonomy
within a society and religion structured entirely on patriarchal principles. As such, these
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documents also reveal the limits of both governmental and ecclesiastical control, and how
missionary women capitalized on the particular structures of always-unequal
relationships to creatively manipulate different levers of male authority to their own ends.
Of almost equal importance, especially for the period between 1845 and 1870, are
the archives of the Jesuits, located in Rome. More than any other congregation in Algeria,
the Jesuits spoke specifically and in depth about issues of power and politics. At the same
time, as legally suppressed in France for a large portion of the nineteenth century, the
Jesuits encountered numerous obstacles with the civil and military authorities (though
much more so with the former than the latter). As notorious adherents of ultramontanism
– or loyalty to the pope over the French government – they also sparked the repeated
suspicions of more Gallican bishops and secular clergy of Algiers, who owed their
positions and salaries entirely to the French government.29 Thus, if the documents left
behind by the Lazarists reveal the criteria for success in Algeria, the documents crafted
by the Jesuits shed light on the reasons for failure and, equally importantly, how this
failure took its toll on the personalities, relationships, and piety of the missionaries in
question.
The remaining missionary archives proved useful for specific and circumscribed
purposes. Those of the Soeurs Trinitaires – the most disorganized of all the archives I
29
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visited – first brought to my attention the idea that the church in Algeria did not constitute
a monolithic entity, a conclusion that would have been impossible to draw from the
national archives alone. The Soeurs Trinitaires worked in Algeria, specifically in the
department of Oran, from 1840 until the end of the period covered in this dissertation,
and indeed beyond. The documents exchanged between the headstrong visiting superior
and the superior of the motherhouse in Lyon, France, illuminate how, in the 1840s and
50s, the bishop of Algiers sought to replace the sisters with more docile female
missionaries. The bishop failed in this attempt, however, because the sisters possessed a
powerful patron in the form of the governor general of Algeria. The governor general and
the visiting superior formed a tight emotional bond which resembled that of a father and
daughter and which protected the congregation from the designs of the bishop.
The archives of two other male missionary congregations proved useful for very
specific insights. The Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes, who worked only as primary school
teachers and were not actually priests, arrived in Algeria in 1853 and stayed until the First
World War. Located in Rome, their documents helped illuminate how the transition from
the Second Empire to the Third Republic affected Catholic school teachers of Algeria in
what I will refer to as the “long decade” from 1867 to 1883. In Lyon, the Centre de Jean
Bosco, technically a library rather than an archive, provided crucial background
information on the Salésiens de Don Bosco in Algeria. Further, an internal unpublished
history from 1941 discovered by the librarian during my trip allowed me to flesh out the
details of the story that unfolded during their time in the territory from 1891 to 1914. The
Salésiens, however, left behind a greater presence in the national archives than in their
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own library due to the constant state of suspicion they evoked in the eyes of the
government, which resulted directly from their supposed foreign origin.
Finally, this dissertation draws from the archives of two organizations that did not
constitute missionary congregations as such – the Propaganda Fide and the Propagation
de la Foi. Based in Rome, the Propaganda Fide (today known as the Congregation for the
Evangelization of Peoples) was founded by Pope Gregory XV in 1622 and had as its
stated goal to spread Catholicism to the non-Catholic regions of the world. The
Propaganda Fide was staffed by cardinals of the pope’s inner circle and run by a cardinal
prefect, appointed by the pope. Correspondence sent from missionaries in Algeria to the
cardinal prefect helps illuminate the conflicting visions that the Holy See and the French
state held for the religious fate of colonial Algeria; it also reveals the contempt that most
missionaries from the Vatican had for French appointed clergymen.30 This
correspondence especially sheds light on the decade of the 1830s, when the future of the
faith in Algeria remained completely open ended.
The Propagation de la Foi, meanwhile, collected donations from the faithful in
France in order to channel funds to French Catholic missionaries throughout the world,
especially in their efforts to convert non-Catholics to the Catholic fold.31 Based in Lyon,
the archives of the Propagation de la Foi shed light on the goals of early missionary
establishments and especially the financial hardships they suffered and the difficulty they
had in converting Muslims to Catholicism. The richness of this archive lies essentially in
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the period before 1848, when missionaries still held out hope of converting Muslims and
before the successive bishops of Algiers attempted to bring them entirely under their
authority. After this period the correspondence consists almost entirely of letters from the
bishops of Algeria requesting money for their own ends. By 1870 the Propagation had
largely ceased to provide funds for Catholic works in Algeria for three reasons: the
territory’s nominal incorporation to the metropole; the fact that the metropolitan
government already provided salaries for Algeria’s bishops and parish priests; and the
utter failure of missionaries to make any headway with the native Algerian population.
Chapter Outline
This dissertation includes four substantive chapters that build upon one another and
proceed chronologically. Chapter One spans the period from the conquest of Algeria in
1830 to the arrival of the second bishop of Algiers in 1846. Between 1830 and the
establishment of the bishopric in 1838 the confused state of the Catholic church in
Algeria stemmed directly from a wider state of confusion over the exact purpose of the
newly-conquered territory. With a settler population numbering fewer than 4,000,
Catholic missionaries saw the conquest primarily as offering a chance to convert the one
million Muslims who inhabited the former Ottoman regency and to resurrect the ancient
splendor of the early church in North Africa. At the same time, missionaries sent by the
Vatican competed with ambitious military chaplains appointed by the governor general to
oversee the establishment of the church on a more permanent basis. From the very
beginning they all relied on the patronage of highly placed military leaders to ascend the
ranks of the clergy in Algeria.

21

By the end of the 1830s, the rapid influx of colonists from throughout the
Mediterranean world combined with the religious resistance of the conquered Algerians
to shift the focus of Catholic missionaries away from Muslims and towards (often lapsed)
Catholics. The military regime supported this transition because it quickly began to see
the political dangers in threatening the religious sensibilities of the conquered North
African population. Further, officials feared that what they saw as the notorious
immorality of the early settler population might undermine the supposed racial
superiority of the conquerors. The government thus hoped to use missionaries to moralize
a settler population whose depravity threatened from a very early stage to invert the
colonial racial hierarchy. In order to better control missionaries in Algeria, the French
government established Algiers as an official bishopric in 1838, which under the terms of
the Concordat of 1801 allowed the French government, rather than the Vatican, to
appoint its chosen bishop from among the French clergy.32 This first bishop, however,
proved a great disappointment to metropolitan officials, both for allowing himself to be
manipulated by Jesuits and for bringing the church to the brink of financial ruin. In 1846,
the government replaced him with a much more Gallican and administratively competent
bishop.
Chapter Two spans the tenure of this second bishop, who held his position from
1846 until his death in 1866. This period was marked by the rapid migration to the colony
of both settlers and missionaries. The military government continued to see Catholic
missionaries as a cheap means of providing for the religious and educational needs of
32

Napoleon Bonaparte signed the Concordat with the Vatican in order to end the religious discord that
wracked France following the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790. It proclaimed Catholicism “the
religion of the great majority of the French,” but not the national religion of France. It also allowed the
French government to nominate bishops in metropolitan France and to provide all the clergy in France with
state salaries. See McPhee, A Social History of France, 1789-1914, 79-80.

22

settlers, and it was at this time that it really began to formulate its policy of using
missionaries to help tie these settlers to the regime. This change stemmed from the
recognition of the permanence of the French occupation of Algeria and the need to create
a unified settler community as a bulwark of support against indigenous uprisings. At the
same time, the Revolution of 1848 had two important repercussions for Algeria: it
nominally assimilated the European areas to the metropole as three departments of France
with full political rights and, following the June Days and Louis Napoleon’s coup, it led
to the exile to Algeria of more than 6,000 political radicals. This new system of dual
power between conservative military generals and at times radical civilian leaders
continued until the 1880s. Nevertheless, the fact that French missionaries remained in a
state of legal limbo and that they could repeatedly rely on the extralegal support of
military generals belies the notion that even for the settler population – to say nothing of
the native Algerians – 1848 led to the establishment of the metropolitan rule of law in the
territory.
Secondly, this chapter examines in detail the criteria for missionary success and
failure in Algeria. It uses case studies of the Lazarists and Jesuits to show the importance
of patronage and the power that missionaries could accrue from gaining the support of the
bishop of Algiers or the governor general. It also uses case studies of the Soeurs
Trinitaires and the Filles de la Charité to show the gendered dimension of missionary
work and patronage in Algeria. The bishop of Algiers hoped to replace the Soeurs
Trinitaires with the Filles de la Charité in order to better exert his authority over the
sisters. Whereas the former congregation had a headstrong female superior, the latter had
a Lazarist priest as superior, and the bishop hoped to bestow patronage on the Lazarists in
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order to use them to exert his authority over the Filles de la Charité. In both of these
plans, however, he encountered unexpected difficulties. The superiors of the Soeurs
Trinitaires and the Filles de la Charité both found powerful patrons in the form of
military generals, and the latter congregation even used this patronage to overturn the
gendered hierarchy so that their Lazarist superiors relied on the sisters for their monthly
salaries and their very existence.
Chapter Three begins in 1867, with the arrival of the first archbishop of Algeria,
the imposing Charles Lavigerie, and spans what I will term the “long-decade” of 1867 to
1883, when the metropolitan government applied the republican educational legislation
known as the Ferry laws to Algeria. Lavigerie both built on past precedents and vastly
expanded the authority of his office. He succeeded where his predecessors had failed and
brought missionaries and their work almost entirely under his control and oversight. He
did so by creating his own missionary society, the Missionnaires de Notre Dame
d’Afrique, known as the Pères Blancs, and designating himself as superior. From this
point forward, Lavigerie began to dismantle the complex patronage system erected by
past missionaries and ecclesiastics and funnel all state and charitable resources to his
congregation alone. Despite his renown as the most important Catholic clergyman in
nineteenth-century Africa, Lavigerie’s arrival definitively weakened missionaries’
autonomy in Algeria and thus changed their fortunes for the worse.33
The second set of actors that profoundly changed the status of missionaries in
Algeria consisted of municipal councils – especially that of Algiers – which even before
the proclamation of the Third Republic began a concerted effort to remove missionaries
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from all public teaching roles. This effort to secularize the schools began before any
similar concerted effort in France, and had two causes specific to Algeria. First, many
political exiles of 1848 and 1852 lay low in Algeria during the ensuing decade, only to
gain renewed confidence by the mid 1860s due to their very distance from metropolitan
organs of repression. Algeria in effect provided them an opportunity to enact their
secularizing visions that remained closed off in France. They seized this opportunity in
1867, when the governor general implemented a program to create mixed schools (écoles
mixtes) that provided a universal secular education with time set aside for particular
religious instruction for children of different faiths. The municipal council of Algiers
willfully misinterpreted this circular to remove any religious vestige from their public
schools whatsoever, specifically the Catholic missionary teachers. In doing so, however,
they provoked the protests and petitions (with signatures numbering almost 10,000) of
the city’s Catholic, largely foreign, families.
The battle over the schools would span the entire decade of the 1870s and envelop
nearly all of the municipal councils of Algeria until finally coming to an end with the
application of the Ferry laws in 1883.34 The conflict remains important for three reasons.
First, it shows that despite the official institution of civilian rule in 1870-1, the “civil”
governor general continued to overrule legally elected municipal councils in order to
appease the disenfranchised foreign population of the territory. The colonial government
continued to rule the European population as colonial subjects as much as citizens, as the
political and juridical status of the territory remained mired in confusion. Second, it
shows that the settler population had after forty years of imperial rule in no way taken on
34
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a unified consciousness, as conflicts over religion intertwined with those of ethnicity
continued to divide them more than any other issue. While Catholics and anticlerical
officials both saw Algeria as a place to carve out an alternative modernity, they both
continued to have diametrically opposed visions of what that modernity entailed and how
to go about constructing it.
The fourth and final substantive chapter covers the decades surrounding the law
of 1889, which granted automatic French citizenship to all foreigners born in Algeria
upon reaching adulthood. In the years leading up to the law the practice of Catholicism,
more so than Islam, continued to preoccupy and divide colonial officials and the settler
community.35 In this period, the association of “foreigners” with the religious fanaticism
of the Muslim population only intensified. Officials hoped that the law of 1889 would
stand as the pinnacle of civilian rule and the triumph of the policy of assimilation over
association, but even it did not signal the definitive creation of a cohesive European
community. Rather, by transforming previously disenfranchised foreigners into citizens
newly endowed with political rights the law only increased the insecurities of the
ethnically French colonists. This chapter looks at the department of Oran in particular,
where foreigners, now known as neo-French, continued to outnumber their French
counterparts. These latter no longer necessarily held the numerical majority in the
electorate or the municipal councils, and many commentators worried that Catholics of
Spanish or Italian descent would assert their religious will on more anti-clerical French
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settlers. In the years leading up to the First World War, these fears of a “foreign peril”
only intensified.
Such fears coalesced around a newly installed missionary congregation, the
Salésiens de Don Bosco, which not only had an Italian founder, but also staffed its ranks
with a number of Spanish and Italian missionary priests. The Salésiens thus acted as a
touchstone for larger debates around the danger of foreigners, and their arrival only
intensified the association of foreigners with the Catholic faith. In the period between
1901 and 1905, when the government sought to apply the laws of laïcization to Algeria,
colonial officials persecuted the Salésiens to a much greater extent than any of the other
missionary congregations in Algeria. At the same time, while Algeria increasingly did
constitute a true extension of the metropole (at least for the European settlers), the failure
to fully enforce the secularization laws revealed that this transformation remained
incomplete. After their legal dissolution, a number of Salésiens continued to work with
the youth of colonial Oran due to the support they had from the families of Spanish and
Italian descent. This support continued to preoccupy the colonial regime and divide the
settler population up to the eve of the First World War.
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Chapter One
Algeria: A Land of Opportunity, 1830-1846
“I fear an apostolic vicar chosen from outside a congregation would be animated by a
spirit of personal ambition and self-interest, inclined maybe only to see his mission as a
temporary task or as a means of advancement. Experience has shown that priests who
want to leave their diocese for a far off mission are typically not the most respectable
people.”1
-Letter from the minister of foreign affairs to the French ambassador to the Holy See, 31
December 1835.
“What will become of our women and our children without this priest? Do not leave us
unfortunate colonists without spiritual and temporal aid.”2
-Petition from the Catholic colonists of Algiers to their majesties the king and queen of
France, 1834.
This chapter analyzes the shifting and competing logics that led to the official
establishment of the Catholic Church in Algeria. In the 1830s, both the French
government and the Vatican saw Algeria as an empty space in which to inscribe their
authority. Although the two states disagreed on the purpose of religion they both saw it
as a crucial component of political authority more generally.3 The French government’s
plans for establishing the Catholic Church on a permanent basis in Algeria changed over
time according to contemporary debates over the wider juridical and political relationship
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between France and Algeria. In the early years of French rule the exact purpose of the
colony remained unclear. Ultimately, it was the rather unexpected emergence of a
permanent (and generally far from pious) settler community that led to the establishment
of the diocese of Algiers in 1838 under a French appointed bishop.
At the same time, various plans imposed from above by the government and the
Vatican ran up against the unexpected idiosyncrasies and messy realities of individual
missionaries and settlers from below. While the government hoped a religious influence
would help moralize and civilize a renegade settler community, missionaries sent by the
Vatican just as often competed with military chaplains paid by the French state to carve
out their own niches of professional and spiritual authority as “power brokers” in the
former Ottoman regency.4 At the most localized level of power, missionaries even
denounced one another in order to displace their rivals and extend their influence
throughout the city of Algiers and later into the rest of the nascent colony. Finally,
despite numerous royal ordinances from France and papal decrees from the Holy See,
successful missionaries relied just as much on private patronage of highly placed military
and ecclesiastic officials in Algeria to secure their livelihoods.
The Period of the Apostolic Vicariate, 1830-1833
Prior to the French conquest of Algiers in 1830, a handful of Catholic priests from
congregations such as the Pères de la Merci and the Pères de la Congrégation de la
Mission de St. Vincent de Paul (better known as Lazarists) lived in the city of Algiers and
served the chapels of foreign consuls. They also won occasional permission from the dey
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of Algiers to administer sacraments to Europeans held in prison or sold into slavery.5 The
Lazarists especially had a long history of collecting donations in Europe to fund the
repurchase of “Christian” slaves captured and sold into captivity by Muslim corsairs.6 As
early as 1632, the Vatican had designated the “Barbary Coast” as an apostolic prefecture
and named a Lazarist priest as apostolic prefect with express orders to repurchase
captured European slaves.7 This situation continued more or less unabated up to the
French invasion of 1830.8
Following the French capture of Algiers on 5 July 1830, colonial rule in Algeria
fell under the authority of a military governor general, who received his powers from and
reported to the minister of war in Paris. Over time, the position of the governor general
would emerge as the single most important source of support for Catholic missionaries in
the colony. The governor general held enormous influence over policymaking and could
rule unilaterally by emergency decree. He also controlled a bureaucracy staffed by
subordinate generals who oversaw finances, justice, commerce, police and, notably,
religious affairs, in Algeria.9 During the expeditionary campaign the governor general
had already drafted 17 military chaplains into the army to administer sacraments and
preach mass to French soldiers. Many soldiers experienced extreme homesickness for
5
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their native villages, and military chaplains typically came from the same regions as the
soldiers who composed the regiments.10 On the same day as the fall of Algiers one such
chaplain held the first religious ceremony in the newly acquired territory when he led a
Te Deum in the medieval neighborhood of the Casbah. Although a royal ordinance of 10
November 1830 suppressed these chaplains in their official functions, the governor
general allowed those chaplains who opted not to return to France to continue to travel
with the army in an unofficial capacity or to remain in the city of Algiers to administer
sacraments to local Europeans and give last rites to dying soldiers in the increasingly
crowded military hospitals.11 These priests often continued to receive salaries directly
from the funds of the governor general according to their perceived level of public utility.
Immediately after the conquest military and metropolitan authorities remained
divided over the future of their newly acquired territory.12 This situation owed much to
the revolution that unfolded in Paris directly following the fall of Algiers. Although the
Bourbon King Charles X had used the invasion to distract from his unpopularity at home,
his overthrow on 30 July 1830 did not signal an immediate withdrawal from North Africa
(though to be sure a large minority of commentators supported such a measure). The
establishment of the July Monarchy and the ascension of the Orléanist Louis Philippe to
the throne as “King of the French” actually led to an increased focus on Algeria as the
king and his sons saw the new colony as a place to prove their worthiness as “citizen
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soldiers” and leaders of the new regime.13 Two of the king’s sons, the Duc d’Aumale and
the Duc d’Orléans, would serve as governors general of Algeria (and the latter would
even die there). Thus, with longer-term – if not permanent – occupation appearing
increasingly likely the ministry of the king opened negotiations with Pope Gregory XVI
and the Vatican’s official missionary organ, the Propaganda Fide (also known as the
Sacred Congregation), to establish the Catholic Church on a solid and more permanent
foundation in the new territory.
Between 1830 and 1838 these efforts repeatedly foundered in the face of
continued disagreements between the Vatican, the French government, and the
missionaries chosen for this task. In this respect, religious policy in these early years
differed little from policy over the conquered North African population. Historians agree
that the 1830s generally constituted “a period of disorder” regarding France’s relations
with its conquered subjects.14 Religious policy was no different, and the general state of
confusion pertained not only to France’s new colonial subjects, but also to its new
colonial citizens. Three primary sources of tension arose over the establishment of the
church in Algeria: whether to constitute Algeria as an apostolic vicariate or a bishopric;
whether the French government or the Vatican would have the right to appoint the
spiritual leader over this jurisdiction; and whether the necessary priests should come from
the secular clergy or from missionary congregations.15 The answers to these questions
changed over time and depended largely on conflicting visions of the wider purpose of

13

Sessions, By Sword and by Plow, 83-96.
Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 12.
15
The term “secular clergy” denotes Catholic clergy salaried by the state and who, unlike missionaries, did
not belong to religious orders, or congrégations.
14

32

the territory of Algeria, its broader juridical relationship to France, and the population to
be targeted by the Catholic Church.
The Vatican preferred to designate Algeria as an apostolic vicariate because this
legal status would allow the pope, rather than the king, to appoint his chosen apostolic
vicar. By definition an apostolic vicar worked in the midst of “infidels,” not in a land
composed predominantly of Catholics, with the goal of achieving enough conversions
that the vicariate could eventually give way to a diocese under the jurisdiction of a
bishop. Further, an apostolic vicariate constituted by definition a missionary land, and
priests appointed there worked in the official capacity as missionaries, not as members of
the secular clergy.16 In sum, by designating Algeria as an apostolic vicariate the Vatican
and the French state would tacitly recognize that the role of the Church in Algeria was to
convert Muslims to Catholicism. Recognition of an apostolic vicariate thus attached less
importance to the existing European settler community – which numbered about 3,000 in
1831 – than to the much larger and seemingly more permanent Arab and Berber
populations.17
In the weeks and months following the conquest, however, confusion continued to
reign over the purpose of an expedition that “lacked an ideology.”18 The Holy See’s
hopes of converting Muslims threatened to undermine the peace treaty of 5 July 1830,
which stipulated that “the exercise of the Mohammedan religion will remain free.”19 At
the same time, many of the leading generals in the Armée d’Afrique were themselves
16

For a full explanation of an apostolic vicariate see William Fanning, "Vicar Apostolic," The Catholic
Encyclopedia, Vol. 15 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912).
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15401b.htm>.
17
For the population of Algiers, see Sessions, By Sword and By Plow, 217.
18
Brower, A Desert Named Peace, 10. See also John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and
Development of a Nation (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 51-55.
19
Quoted in Brower, 11.

33

devout Catholics and envisioned spreading the faith throughout Africa on the heels of the
French army. In August 1830, the Comte Albert de Retz, officer of the army’s thirtyseventh regiment, wrote to the French ambassador to the Holy See that “our conquests
are almost finished, the Crescent is humiliated and will soon cede the throne to the
Cross.”20 By 1831 de Retz had developed his views further and wrote, “I see the
colonization and civilization of this country by conversion to the Catholic religion as a
very beneficial act and it should be French policy to send missionaries here.”21 In the end,
the French government reneged on the treaty’s promise of religious toleration, just as it
did regarding the agreement to respect indigenous property and persons. On 19 December
1830 a royal ordinance established Algeria as an apostolic vicariate with an apostolic
vicar appointed by the Holy See after nomination by the French government.22
From the beginning, the holder of this position relied for his authority on private
patronage; and de Retz had months previously begun to maneuver to secure the
appointment of his personally chosen nominee. In August 1830 de Retz asked France’s
ambassador to the Holy See (who also happened to be his brother) to use his influence
with the pope to win the appointment of one Father Collin. This priest, a native of
Brittany and likely in his 50s, had served as military chaplain in de Retz’s regiment, and
de Retz saw him as the ideal man to oversee the spread of Catholicism to Algeria’s
conquered subjects. Collin’s “zeal and education” gave him “the ability to work for the
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conversion of peoples, a conversion which remains extremely difficult.”23 De Retz
succeeded in his aims and the same royal ordinance that established Algeria as an
apostolic vicariate also named Father Collin as the first apostolic vicar of Algiers.
This appointment set a precedent that continued throughout the nineteenth
century, as private patronage from highly placed military officials served as the primary
determinant of the success or failure of individual missionaries. In this and many other
aspects the daily lives and “little tactics of the habitat” employed by missionaries in
Algeria differed little from those of their secular colon counterparts.24 In addition to
revealing missionary reliance on private patronage and ad hoc policy, then, viewing early
colonization through the lens of religion helps uncover the habits, motivations, and fears
that animated the larger settler community in the 1830s – a community whose experience
“remains the least known aspect of the decades of the conquest.”25 In the early and
tumultuous years of French rule in Algeria, policy toward European missionaries and
settlers differed little from policy toward the conquered North African population. As
Benjamin Brower has written in regard to the latter policy:
The new regime did not plan to rule based upon affirmation and consent, law and
legitimacy, institutions thought to be typical of the modern state. Instead, it
prepared a specific set of institutions for colonial rule inspired by the most
unsophisticated forms of power.26
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This “unsophisticated” policy toward missionaries and the wider settler community
continued until the 1880s even if, to be sure, it remained conquered colonial subjects who
felt its effects in their most oppressive and violent manifestations.27
Unbridled ambition quickly emerged as one of the primary traits of missionaries
in early French Algeria. The new apostolic vicar, Father Collin, saw the territory largely
as a “blank slate” on which he could inscribe a degree of personal authority deprived him
in Europe. In doing so, he set another precedent that would continue to hamper the
religious policy of France and the Vatican in Algeria throughout the nineteenth century.
Collin’s ambitions repeatedly destabilized the sanctity that authorities felt his position
must entail. Further, Collin incited the ire and jealousy of other missionaries who aspired
to his position and who engaged in constant intrigue to disgrace him in the eyes of the
Vatican and the French government alike. Throughout the nineteenth century, these
repeated religious scandals only undermined the moral authority of the Church in the
eyes of the settler community as well as, authorities feared, the gaze of an indigenous
population which, as one historian has written, “whether invisible or visible, [was]
always present.”28
Word of Collin’s impiety began to spread almost immediately upon his
appointment. In March 1832, the Propaganda Fide dispatched two French missionaries
from the Missions Etrangères de Paris – Fathers Banvoy and Cayens – to take stock of
the situation and report back to the congregation. Immediately upon his arrival, Cayens

27

Writing on a later period, between 1880 and 1940, Elizabeth Foster has argued that political policy
towards missionaries in colonial Senegal also resembled “Old Regime” or “pre-modern” forms of power.
Foster, Faith in Empire.
28
Oissilia Saaïdia and Pierre Soumille, “Algérie et Tunisie: le repli en terre d'islam?,” in Le grand exil des
congrégations religieuses françaises, 1901–1914, edited by Patrick Cabanel and Jean-Dominique Durand
(Paris: Le Cerf, 2005), 333.

36

wrote to the prefect of the Propaganda Fide, Cardinal Pedicini, to complain that, while
the French authorities had shown them goodwill, “unfortunately we cannot say the same
for our [apostolic] prefect; M. Collin is rarely at the chapel and always about town.” The
two missionaries further complained that Collin refused them lodging so that they had to
take refuge with a military chaplain in a tent at the nearby garrison. They accused Collin
of failing to perform marriages, baptisms, communions, or burials and of “only [doing]
things that can bring him some immediate gain.”29 The following month Cayens wrote
that “If [Collin] is not replaced disorder will reign throughout Algeria…He exceeds his
authority and he believes himself soon to be pope.”30
A rift soon arose between Collin and Cayens, as both appeared to covet the
position of apostolic vicar. In August 1832 Collin himself wrote to the Propaganda Fide
to complain of Cayens’ insubordination. He demanded that the congregation “increase
my authority to rule over the ecclesiastics in this country” and he accused Cayens and
Banvoy of acting against his orders “in many grave circumstances.”31 In response to
Collin’s rebukes, the missionaries told him that “they brought from Rome powers above
my own and that these powers place them outside of my surveillance and my orders.”32
Despite Vatican and French hopes of using the apostolic vicariate to bring order to the
newly acquired French territory, the missionaries specifically designated for this task
only sowed further disorder.
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Unsure of whose story to believe, the Vatican responded by sending yet another
priest, Father Muller, to ascertain the reality of the situation. To ensure that Collin
received Muller better than he did the previous two missionaries, the pope himself sent
Muller in the official capacity of apostolic missionary with powers equal to those of
Collin (including the ability to engage on his own with secular authorities). Upon arriving
in Algeria, however, Muller followed the precedent set by the other three missionaries
and immediately worked to carve out his own niche of authority by displacing both
Collin and Cayens. In January 1833, Muller wrote to Cardinal Pedicini that “religion still
goes very poorly and it is all because of the poor ecclesiastics that we have here.” Muller
worked to cultivate his relationship with the governor general, Anne Jean Marie René
Savary, the Duc de Rovigo, who “is well disposed towards us” and allowed Muller to
convert “the most beautiful mosque in the city” into the Church of Saint Philippe.33 This
relationship reached the point that, in the words of another general, the governor general
“calls [Muller] often to his home and promises him his protection.”34 Muller hoped to
cultivate this relationship to claim the position of apostolic vicar as his own.
Muller’s arrival also coincided with a decisive shift in French religious policy in
Algeria. In January 1833 he informed the Propaganda Fide that the governor general had
asked him “as soon as possible to replace the ecclesiastics here…to put an end to the
scandals and the lack of faith that there is among the Europeans” [emphasis added].35
Indeed, despite the designation of Algeria as an apostolic vicariate, changing political
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policy and a total lack of interest among the Muslim population had led Algeria’s clergy
to reluctantly shift their focus to the European community. This shift also reflected the
growing fear among colonial authorities that a failure to extend proper moral guidance to
the European settler population would render Algeria a lawless land populated by
vagabonds and criminals.
Unsure over the future and ultimate purpose of the vicariate, the Vatican began to
consider that the patronage Muller enjoyed from the governor general necessitated that in
the short term Muller replace Collin as apostolic vicar. Rather than appease Father
Cayens, who also despised Collin, this move prompted his passionate protest. It seems
professional aspirations motivated Cayens at least as much as any pious ones. Cayens
coveted the position for himself and wrote to Rome that with Muller as vicar “all our
difficulties will remain the same.”36 He asked if he must remain “entirely under his
authority, [and if he] can do nothing without his orders?” Cayens alleged that Muller’s
youth, inexperience, superficial personality, and weak theology had left people “stunned
that you have confided such a responsibility to such a feeble character.”37 Unlike Muller,
however, Cayens lacked a powerful patron in the colony. As a result, the Propaganda
Fide had him recalled to Paris, from where he wrote numerous letters seeking permission
to return to the colony. After multiple rejections, Cayens sought a new adventure in
Brazil.
In Algeria, the constant disagreements between missionaries soon became an
object of embarrassment for both the colonial regime and the Vatican. On 3 June 1833, a
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royal ordinance removed Collin from his position and abolished the apostolic vicariate.38
At this point tension arose between the French government and the Vatican over the
future of the faith in Algeria. Misunderstanding the full extent of the royal ordinance, the
Vatican simply replaced Collin with Father Muller as pro-apostolic vicar. The French
government, however, had grown distrustful of the entire set up and saw little difference
between Collin and Muller. Further, the minister of war had recalled the Duc de Rovigo
to Paris upon hearing news that Rovigo had murdered several tribal leaders after luring
them into supposedly peaceful negotiations and had undertaken the virtual extermination
of the Al'Ouffia tribe earlier in 1833.39
Without a patron, Muller began to suffer persecution from less friendly
authorities. The civil intendant, Genty de Bussy, complained to the minister of war of
Muller’s constant visits to the military hospital and his harassing of sick and wounded
soldiers. Further, the French ambassador to the Holy See expressed his fear that “acting
as he has done, M. Muller has perhaps been guided by the hope of getting himself named
in place of M. Collin; this conjecture seems at least justified by the little intrigues he has
made against Collin.”40 By October 1833, the minister of war wrote to the governor
general that Muller must cease all religious functions in the colony and that he could no
longer receive any salary from the state. Indeed, rather than accept a new vicar, the
ambassador informed the Holy See that France would review the question “at a more
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opportune time when a system of administrative organization for Algiers will have been
definitively adopted.”41
In addition to creating a rift with the Holy See, this failure to define a coherent
religious policy led to the beginning of a conflict between state-appointed secular clergy
and members of missionary orders that would span the rest of the century. In late 1833,
the colonial regime simply returned to the practice of employing military chaplains to
serve the military and civilian communities in the new territory. At the same time, a
number of missionaries sent by the Propaganda Fide continued to work independently in
Algiers. Immediately upon his removal, Father Muller complained to the Propaganda
Fide that the colonial regime had replaced him with an army chaplain, Father Spitz,
whom Muller accused of orchestrating his downfall. Muller claimed that the government
called Spitz “to create the new church of the French” but that “by his conduct he has
revealed himself as the secret enemy of all ministers of the Catholic religion who have
come to Algiers. He has always worked to divide them and unfortunately he has always
succeeded.”42
Finally, Muller found a base of support that would continue to sustain
beleaguered missionaries throughout the nineteenth century: the colony’s devout and
largely non-French settler population (examined in greater depth in Chapter Two). To be
sure, the settlers who actively practiced their religion constituted a distinct minority of the
overall population; they did, however, make their wishes known. In a petition to the king
and queen of France, a group of settlers wrote, “for 18 months we had asked Rome for a
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French priest who spoke the Italian and German languages.”43 Father Muller had fulfilled
these duties admirably and without him “the Italians and Germans…would be the most
miserable colonists.” The petitioners further asked, “What will become of our women and
our children without this priest?,” pleading with the royal couple “not to leave us
unfortunate colonists without spiritual and temporal aid.”44 In a nearly identical petition
to the pope the settlers added only that the French government’s “blindness and weakness
for the indigènes has sought to destroy our holy religion rather than protect it.”45 In both
petitions the writers divided their signatures into columns labeled French, Italian,
Spanish, German, and Maltese, reflecting the diverse makeup of the early settler
population and presaging the identity politics that would so divide the settler community
later on in the nineteenth century.
These petitions also mark the emergence of a new voice into this cacophony of
competing interests in the nascent colony: the settlers themselves. The decades of the
1830s and 40s saw the significance the colonial regime attached to this population
transform from a virtual afterthought with little-to-no importance into the primary
purpose of the entire colonial venture. I argue in subsequent chapters that the government
applied the ideologies of both assimilation and association to this settler population more
zealously than it applied them to the indigenous population.46 The heterogeneous nature
of this colon community would especially preoccupy policy makers in metropole and
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colony alike. At this moment in the history of the colonization of Algeria, however, such
petitions remained relatively rare, and the fact that they apparently did not receive a
response from the governor general or metropolitan officials reveals the continued lack of
importance attached to the settler population and the confusion that still reigned over the
ultimate purpose of the colony. Only in 1834 did the initial phase of the conquest give
way to a period of so-called “occupation restreinte,” or restricted occupation. Not until
22 July 1834 did a royal ordinance even give the colony an official name: Les
Possessions françaises du Nord de l’Afrique.47 And it would take a new round of warfare
that led the army deeper into the interior of Algeria, away from the coastal cities, for a
period of full conquest and occupation to “add momentum to plans for a settler colony.”48
Only then would the colonial regime truly recognize the need to establish the Catholic
Church on a definitive foothold in Algeria via the establishment of a bishopric and the
employment of secular clergy to cater specifically to the settler community.
But the petitions by the colonists are revealing for a second reason. The
accusation that the French government possessed “weakness for the indigènes” indicates
the shift in religious policy that occurred shortly after the conquest in 1830. Despite the
initial desires of some Catholic-minded generals, the colonial regime decided it was poor
policy to meddle with the religious sensibilities of what it saw as a fanatically devout
Muslim population. As the minister of war wrote to the governor general as early as 27
November 1832:
While totally desiring that dissemination of the principles of Christianity
accompany our efforts for the progress of civilization, I cannot warn you
strongly enough against the dangers of propaganda that is spread and supported
publicly by the government. It could only alienate us from the Muslim
47
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populations, which are too attached already to their beliefs for us to bother with
establishing a foreign religion in their midst.49
This about-face in the logic that informed religious policy also explains the ministry of
war’s decision to abolish the apostolic vicariate and to replace Vatican-appointed
missionaries with its own, more trusted, military chaplains. As we have seen, by its
definition the apostolic vicariate aimed to convert non-Catholics. Once this policy began
to conflict with the exigencies of colonial rule its abolition proved inevitable. From this
point forward, the state would work to ensure that Catholic clergymen focused their
efforts on the European settler community. To do so, the colonial regime sought to better
control the number, character, and activity of Catholic clergymen (and female
missionaries) in their burgeoning settler colony. To be sure, the regime would still
undertake a number of failed efforts before it succeeded in establishing the Church on
any firm foundation, and a number of competing power brokers still hoped to insert
themselves into the political equation while colonial religious policy remained mired in
confusion in the minds of metropolitan and colonial officials.
A Lazarist Vicariate?
In 1834, the French government again set about to establish the Catholic Church in
Algeria on a definitive foundation. The apostolic vicariate had presented a host of
difficulties. Not only did the appointment of apostolic vicar come from the Vatican rather
than the French state, but this nomination also did not provide for any unity of action
among the clergy as a whole. The incessant conflict between missionaries Collin, Muller,
Cayens, and Spitz led the French government to consider alternative solutions. To
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promote clerical unity, the government could either confide religious authority to secular
clergy, as in France, or it could call on a single missionary congregation, as it would later
do, for instance, in colonial Senegal.50 Secondly, it still had to decide if the new clergy
should administer Algeria as an apostolic vicariate or as a bishopric akin to those in the
metropole. The answer to this question would determine the church’s official purpose in
Algeria and it hinged upon the wider relationship between Algeria and France. Whereas a
bishopric constituted a tacit recognition of the permanence of the settler community, not
to mention France’s very presence in Algeria, an apostolic vicariate indicated a more
transient settler community in what remained above all a missionary land (pays de
mission). In a bishopric the clergy served the faithful; they did not convert infidels.
Ultimately, these decisions would help determine the larger juridical future of Algeria as
a land of European settlement fully assimilated with the metropole or as an official
colony of exploitation in which the military continued to rule over a conquered North
African population, if it ruled at all.51
At this point, a consensus remained illusory among church and government
officials alike. Writing to the Propaganda Fide in August 1833, one Father Sabatier
observed:
Obviously [the mission in Algiers] differs from ordinary missions since there
exists already in this city a Christian and Catholic population coming from the
French garrison and from the numerous colonies belonging to different nations
and from commercial speculators who are called here.52
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This large “Christian” population led Sabatier to reluctantly recommend that the
Propaganda Fide relinquish the spiritual needs of Algiers to French secular clergy under
the authority of a bishop. The French government showed itself no less uncertain in this
regard. Despite the obvious benefits to France of a bishopric, the minister of war
expressed his concern in September 1833 that “we are not yet established enough in
Algiers to send a bishop there.”53 He recommended maintaining the apostolic vicariate
but staffing it with secular clergy the French government felt it could better control,
rather than with more unpredictable members of missionary congregations. The foreign
affairs ministry, however, feared that an apostolic vicar chosen from among the secular
clergy “would be animated by a spirit of personal ambition and self-interest, inclined
maybe only to see his mission as a temporary task or as a means of advancement.” He
further observed that priests who willfully left their dioceses in favor of a far off mission
“are typically not the most respectable people.”54
A final option consisted of constituting Algeria as an apostolic vicariate but
staffing it with members of a single missionary congregation that had its motherhouse in
France and employed priests trained exclusively in French seminaries. To be sure, this
option too presented difficulties. Coming so soon on the heels of the French Revolution
and the Bourbon Restoration all congregations, even French ones, remained suspect in
the eyes of many government officials and much of the larger public. Revolutionaries had
shuttered most congregations in the 1790s, and well into the nineteenth century many
feared that congrégationistes harbored ultramontane sentiments and provided places of
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refuge for the dreaded Jesuits, who had been expelled from France in 1764, reestablished
in 1814, and then partially expelled again in 1828 (only to be again reinstalled in 1850
and expelled again in 1880).55 As the foreign affairs ministry noted in 1835, “it would not
be without problems to place this administration in the hands of a congregation, when the
congregations of men have been generally suppressed in France.”56 In the waning months
of Charles X’s reign, the liberal opposition reanimated this sentiment by depicting the
king as led by “priestly” and “Jesuitical” ministers and the new King Louis-Philippe
doubtlessly hoped to avoid similar accusations himself.57
The various French ministries arrived at a potential solution in the form of the
Lazarists. In 1835, the minister of war announced a plan to reconstitute Algeria as an
apostolic vicariate and to confide all clerical positions to Lazarist priests. The Lazarists
possessed many attributes that rendered them particularly suitable to the mission in
Algeria. Unlike nearly all other French Catholic congregations, the Lazarists had
survived the Revolution intact. They won official authorization by a Napoleonic decree
of 7 Prairial XII (27 May 1804) and again by royal ordinance of 3 February 1816. They
also had a long history of loyalty to the French state. As the minister of foreign affairs
remarked, “the Lazarists have not shown in their conduct or opinions the spirit of
ultramontanism that the Jesuits have shown.”58 Despite the government’s decision to
maintain an apostolic vicariate, it still believed the Lazarists would place loyalty to
55
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France over loyalty to the pope. Further, the Lazarists’ history of working in the Levant
rendered them “especially suitable…due to their knowledge of the morals and the
languages of Turks and Arabs.”59 Again, the very fact that the ministry desired that
priests possess a knowledge of these languages reveals its continued uncertainty over
exactly which community constituted the ultimate object of religious aid and the purpose
of the Catholic religion in general. For despite approving of their knowledge of native
languages, the minister of war wrote in the same letter that the Lazarists, “by their
irreproachable morality, their enlightened tolerance, their submission to established
authorities, and their very old relationship with the French government, give us
guarantees that it would be difficult to find with other congregations.”60 Not least of these
guarantees would be their agreement not to undertake outright and overt proselytism
towards unwieldy and potentially rebellious Muslims.
The Lazarists’ very history of loyalty to the French government, however, also
threatened to create difficulties with the Vatican. Informed of this plan by the minister of
war, the French ambassador to the Holy See worried that “the Congregation of the
Propaganda [Fide] does not always seem satisfied in its relations with the Lazarists.”61 As
it happened, the chaotic state of the faith in Algeria worked in favor of the Lazarists and
encouraged the Vatican to consider this proposition. Pope Gregory XVI expressed
particular worries over the fact that many priests in Algeria had begun to perform
sacraments, notably marriages, without officially recognized authority as curés, thus
rendering these marriages null and void in the eyes of the church and establishing any
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resulting children as conceived out of wedlock. According to the minister of foreign
affairs, “the Holy Father attaches the highest importance to end this affair as soon as
possible [so that] spiritual aid be set up in a permanent and suitable manner for the
numerous Catholics who live or temporarily reside in Algiers and its surroundings.”62 On
3 July 1835, the French ambassador to the Holy See wrote that the two states had reached
a tentative agreement to send the Lazarists to Algiers and to appoint a Lazarist superior as
apostolic vicar.63
This tentative agreement, however, encountered unexpected difficulties when the
Lazarists set about drafting a constitution for their new establishment in Algiers. First, the
Propaganda Fide took offense at stipulations that allowed the French government to
determine the number of missionaries to work in the colony at any given time and to
retain ultimate authority over the appointment and removal of these missionaries in
consultation with the Lazarist apostolic vicar alone. Essentially the Vatican worried that
this constitution removed it from the political equation entirely. In response the Lazarist
superior, Father Etienne, protested to the Vatican that in giving this authority to the
government he wanted above all “to fix the legal foundation of this establishment so that
the missionaries can enjoy all necessary independence.”64 Rather than allotting more
authority to the government, Etienne saw the constitution as ensuring that the government
could not remove missionaries without first consulting with the apostolic vicar.
Moreover, by agreeing with the government on the number of missionaries to work in the
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colony, Etienne claimed that he desired only to ensure that each missionary would
receive a state salary.65 He concluded:
We have not wished at all to restrain the authority of the Holy Congregation
….[but] it is easy to understand that a religious establishment founded in a
country ruled by the French government, one founded, organized, and funded by
that government, can never be entirely independent of its authority. And thus it
is indispensable to set the rules of this dependency, in order to as much as
possible avoid all collisions and difficulties.66
The Holy See had hoped that by retaining an apostolic vicariate and confiding it to a
missionary congregation it could increase its authority over the clergy of Algeria. This
assumption, however, proved unfounded as the French colonial government sought to
solidify its own religious authority in the colony.
The Propaganda Fide proved especially recalcitrant over article four of the
proposed constitution, which stipulated that it would only have the right to nominate its
chosen Lazarist as apostolic vicar, but that the ultimate approval would rest with the
king. Such a regulation went against established protocol for establishing apostolic
vicariates and reversed the process by which Father Collin had ascended to the position
of apostolic vicar in 1830. To add further insult article four also specified that the
superior general of the Lazarists could change the apostolic vicar after consulting with
the king alone. As a confidential note in the foreign affairs office in Paris stated on 31
December 1835, “the pope would never consent to this [article], as he jealously guards
the rights of the Holy See. He is so inflexible in his pretensions and moans even when he
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is forced to recognize the right of the king over the nomination of bishops.”67 This
disagreement over who possessed the authority to appoint the apostolic vicar ultimately
proved fatal for the entire enterprise. With the Vatican and the ministry of foreign affairs
unable to reach an agreement, the religious situation in Algeria returned to the chaotic
status quo ante.
A Diocese of Algiers for a Depraved Settler Community
Almost immediately following the breakdown in negotiations between the Holy
See and the French government, the same problems resurfaced as missionaries competed
with each other to carve out their own realms of authority in a territory that still lacked
any real religious order or any recognized spiritual leader. In 1836, the Vatican
unilaterally appointed the Jesuit Father Montera as apostolic prefect, though his authority
remained unrecognized by the French government, which nonetheless allowed him to
stay in the colony in an unofficial capacity. Montera immediately complained to the
Propaganda Fide that the war ministry had granted ecclesiastical authority to the old
military chaplain, Father Spitz, who continued to “exercise parish sacraments…outside of
his authority” and inspired “little confidence in the hearts of the faithful.” Montera also
noted that another rogue priest without any recognition from either the French
government or the Vatican had taken it upon himself to come to work in Algiers after the
bishop of Nancy had expelled him from his diocese. Montera observed that this priest’s
conduct “correlated with his shameful past” and complained that the administrative chaos
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had led to “the degradation in which our religion has for a long time wallowed in this
country.”68
Like other missionary priests examined here, Montera sought to further his
temporal as much as his spiritual authority, or at least saw them as complementary and
mutually reinforcing. He complained to the Propaganda Fide:
Being the only ecclesiastic equipped with legitimate powers, it is also only I
who can administer the sacraments and fill all the other ecclesiastical functions;
and yet I have had to see these functions, these sacraments of marriage and
sometimes even confession, filled by two ecclesiastics without the authority
required to do so, without an approved mission, while I have no way of
suppressing this state of disorder.69
When Montera brought this complaint to French officials, they informed him that he
could continue to administer sacraments but that he should not expect a salary from the
state nor should he impede the work of other ecclesiastics recognized by the state.
At the same time, however, the steady stream of colonists that continued to pour
into Algiers and the other large cities of the colony began to render more urgent a
definitive religious ruling in the colony. The European population of Algeria grew from
3,228 in 1831 to 11,251 in 1835 and would reach nearly 30,000 by 1840.70 As Jennifer
Sessions has noted, the oft-commented-upon immorality of this population began to
challenge “the racialized assumptions on which the settler colonial order was based.”71
Sex, alcohol, and slovenliness constituted the daily lives of many colonists. Despite
efforts by French authorities to tightly control the number of liquor distributors in the
colony, drinking establishments quickly emerged as the primary business in the areas of
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European settlement. In the words of historian John Ruedy, “a typical European who
came to Algeria expecting to become a farmer might well end up opening a bar to serve
wine and absinthe to French soldiers.”72 Further, due to the disproportionate numerical
superiority of men over women, prostitution appeared ubiquitous in the major cities.73
Finally, whereas metropolitan officials did their utmost to create a colony of small
agricultural proprietors, colonial officials constantly complained that the majority of
Europeans arrived only as transient and idle land speculators. In sum, the colonial regime
began to fear that European settlers deprived of religious guidance would assume the
traits of hyper-sexuality, laziness, and debauchery that it associated with the defeated
North African population. Although the morality of the colonists had probably changed
little between 1830 and the latter part of the decade, the colonial regime’s newfound
preoccupation with this morality reflected the growing importance that it attached to the
settler population for the future and potential permanence of colonial rule.
Missionaries themselves did not fail to connect this immoral and ignorant society
to a lack of proper religious guidance and to insert themselves as potential disseminators
of civilization. Writing in 1836, one Jesuit informed his superior in Rome that “the
corruption of moeurs here has reached its limit…libertinage and money, these are the two
divinities that are the passions of the inhabitants of the French possessions of North
Africa.”74 Another Jesuit wrote that “religious observance on Sundays [and] on holy days
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is virtually unknown” in Algeria,75 while another missionary complained, “I have seen
people who were previously pious but who today no longer practice; I have seen others
here who were previously indifferent but now actively disrespect the faith.”76 It is likely
that, separated from the watchful eyes of their neighbors and families, settlers no longer
felt bound by the traditional moral codes and religious practices that governed rural life in
the metropole; and secular and religious leaders felt this moral depravity all the more
acutely as it threatened to undermine the emerging ideology of the civilizing mission that
justified imperial rule in the first place.
Rather than spread civilization to North Africans, then, many missionaries feared
that the lives of European settlers began to mirror the “savage” habits of their conquered
subjects. In 1841, the representative of the Lyon-based Propagation de la Foi in Algiers
expressed the conception that Europeans and North Africans differed little in their levels
of civilization. His first impressions of the colony are worth quoting at length:
What a city this city of Algiers!…To say nothing of the 1,500 prostitutes that line
the streets…Around 8.45 in the morning on the banks of the sea a negress,
accompanied by Jewish and Moorish women, after lighting many candles and
burning incense, slit the throat of a chicken and drank its blood. While emitting
piercing cries each of the women received from the hand of this priestess a cup
from this sacred fountain in order to be delivered from the malevolent spirit that
torments them... I have said nothing of all the ridiculous and sacrilegious
superstitions of the notorious Europeans to the shame of our holy religion.77
In another letter this priest recounted the native belief – perhaps in a misunderstanding of
the Catholic belief in transubstantiation – that the French practiced cannibalism and that
French surgeons “cut cadavers into pieces in order to cook them and from this broth they
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get the remedies to heal the sick.” The priest immediately added, “fanaticism here has
reached its limits, our so-called colons are not very enlightened themselves.”78 In 1843,
another missionary expressed his fear that unruly settlers could completely reverse the
hierarchical dichotomy between colonizer and colonized, as he remarked that “the
majority [of indigènes] have habits of sobriety which would make our Europeans
blush.”79 All of these missionaries understood the government’s growing desire to
differentiate the European from the indigenous population and they saw the issues of
immorality and ignorance as ones they could capitalize on in order to secure their own
positions of professional and spiritual authority in Algeria.
Although the above reports date from the early 1840s, they doubtless reflect the
overwhelming sentiment of the government in 1838, when it decided to constitute
Algeria as an official bishopric identical to those existing in the metropole. The
undeveloped state of Catholicism that resulted from the impasse with the Vatican
combined with the flagrant immorality of the ever-growing settler community had
reached the point that it threatened the very legitimacy of colonial rule itself. Under the
terms of the Concordat of 1801, France, rather than the Vatican, had the authority to
nominate and salary its bishops, who in turn appointed secular clergy to serve the
different parishes in their diocese.80 Since 1801, the French government had used the
Concordat to ensure that it could appoint bishops with Gallican, rather than ultramontane,
sympathies. At the same time, confusion continued to reign over whether the government
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could constitute Algeria as a French bishopric without legally assimilating Algeria to
France on a wider political and juridical basis. As the minister of foreign affairs wrote:
As long as our possessions in Africa are not consolidated as French departments
and placed under the laws of the metropole in the same situation as Corsica, the
Holy See will never admit that these areas should fall under the regulations of the
Concordat.81
The minister feared that only by incorporating Algeria into France as a department of the
metropole could the government then force the Vatican to recognize the conditions of the
Concordat that held in France. This legal assimilation would allow the government to
appoint its own bishop to oversee the spiritual development of the new territory.
Although calls for the full legal assimilation of Algeria began in the 1830s and
increased throughout the 1840s, these calls emanated from a vocal minority, primarily
consisting of wealthy settlers who sought to protect their business interests in Algeria by
winning legal representation in the French legislature.82 This outcome would eventually
come to pass, though not until the Revolution of 1848 toppled the July Monarchy and
replaced it with the Second French Republic.83 In the uncertain years of the 1830s,
however, the call for the full assimilation of Algeria made little headway. As a result,
King Louis Philippe opted to ignore the Vatican entirely and unilaterally constitute
Algeria as a bishopric parallel to those existing in France despite the absence of the full
juridical and political assimilation of the colony. It appears that the Vatican ultimately
acceded to this move simply to bring some religious order to the colony’s growing
European population.
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On 10 February 1838, the French ambassador to the Holy See wrote to the prefect
of the Propaganda Fide, now Cardinal Lambruschini, that the king had “deemed it
suitable to replace [this provisional state] with a definitive organization analogous to that
which exists in France,” adding that “the intentions of the government are to institute a
bishop whose seat is in Algiers, and it no longer requires the consent of the Holy See to
accomplish this project.”84 On 25 August 1838, a royal ordinance declared that the French
possessions of North Africa would form a diocese with an episcopal seat in Algiers. This
same ordinance designated Antoine Louis-Adolphe Dupuch (in office 1838 to 1845), a
priest of the diocese of Bordeaux, as the new bishop, while a papal bull of September
1838 recognized this bishop by canon law. On 9 November, Dupuch was sworn in at the
Tuileries before King Louis-Philippe. He arrived in Algiers on 6 January 1839 and took
residence at the old palace of Azizo-Bey, with an annual salary of 12,000 francs. The
minister of war also granted him 50,000 francs for fees of installing and paying his
clergy, which included one curé, two vicars, two chaplains, and six incumbents.85 Only
months previously, a separate royal ordinance had changed the official name of the
colony from “Les Possessions françaises dans le Nord de l’Afrique” to the more concise
term “Algérie.”86
Bishop Dupuch and the Origins of the Jesuit Mission, 1838-1845
The story of the relatively short tenure of Bishop Dupuch – his two successors
held their positions from 1846-66 and 1866-92, respectively – has been partially
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recounted by historian Sarah Curtis. Curtis described the power struggle that erupted in
the period from 1838 to 1840 between the bishop and the strong-willed Emilie de Vialar,
superior of the Sisters of St-Joseph de l’Apparition. This struggle ultimately resulted in
the expulsion of Vialar and her congregation, which took refuge in neighboring Tunisia
under the patronage of its leader, Ahmed Bey.87 Dupuch replaced the Sisters of St Joseph
with the Filles de la Charité, who he hoped would prove more docile and amenable to his
authority. As this chapter has already shown and as subsequent chapters will explore in
greater detail, rather than serving as an aberration this struggle continued previous
practices of Catholic clerics who used their positions of authority in Algiers to achieve
levels of power unavailable to them in the metropole. Secondly, it also set a precedent
that successive bishops would build upon in an attempt to solidify their authority over
secular clergy and missionary societies alike. To be sure, the fact that Dupuch did not
consolidate his authority as would his successors resulted primarily from his own
incompetence rather than a lack of ambition, although it appears that despite his struggles
with Vialar he was seen as generally pious. As Curtis recounts Dupuch was forced to
resign in 1845 because of his catastrophic mismanagement of resources and the state of
financial ruin that he brought to the newly created diocese of Algiers.
It is important to note that it was during the tenure of Dupuch that secular clergy
began to trickle into the colony. Because this still small number of state-salaried clerics
could not alone meet the needs of the growing settler population, it was also during this
time that most of the missionary congregations that would continue to populate Algeria
throughout the nineteenth century arrived in the colony. These religious orders included
87
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the female congregations the Filles de la Charité, the Soeurs de la Doctrine Chrétienne,
the Soeurs du Bon-Pasteur, and the Soeurs du Sacré Coeur as well as the male
congregations of Lazarists, Jesuits, Trappistes, and an offshoot of Jesuits who founded
the Society of St. Regis for the Rehabilitation of Marriages. The arrival of the Frères des
Ecoles Chrétiennes in 1853 completed the list of the numerous congregations that plied
their trade in Algeria during the nineteenth century (the Salésiens de Don Bosco arrived
in 1891 and will be discussed in the last chapter). In the following chapter, I will examine
the conflicting fortunes of each of these congregations in greater detail.
The remainder of this chapter will look in depth at the politics behind the
relationships between Bishop Dupuch, the Jesuits, Governor General Thomas-Robert
Bugeaud (in office 1840-47), and the war ministry in Paris.88 Despite legal restrictions in
France and in Algeria, missionaries could best win support through securing the
patronage of either the bishop of Algiers or the governor general of the colony. Far away
from politicians in Paris, private influence and political expedience trumped metropolitan
ideologies and legislation. The Jesuits took advantage of this situation to oversee a
number of educational establishments in Algeria despite, as we have seen, the royal
ordinance of 18 June 1828 having prohibited them from doing just this. They owed their
success to Bishop Dupuch, who unlike his successors saw the Jesuits as useful allies, and
Governor General Bugeaud, who preferred the Jesuits for their moralizing influence on
what he saw as the mass of debauched settlers. Ultimately, this section contributes to the
larger argument that the change in fortune of missionaries in Algeria throughout the
nineteenth century did not correlate with the major political upheavals of the metropole –
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the Revolution of 1848 for example – but rather to the successive changes of bishops and
military patrons in the territory.
After assuming power in 1838 Dupuch began to outline plans to establish a junior
and senior seminary in Algiers to train the future clergy of Algeria.89 A royal ordinance of
6 August 1842 created the junior seminary, which provided secondary education to
capable students regardless of their plans for a future vocation. After a failed attempt to
use secular clergy, Dupuch confided the seminary to the Jesuits, giving them an
institutional foothold in the colony. In 1844 the Jesuits then paid 120,000 francs to
purchase 86 hectares of land on which stood an abandoned cavalry garrison in the village
of Ben Aknoun, about eight kilometers from Algiers. They spent a further 100,000 francs
on this property making repairs and constructing additional facilities to turn the garrison
into an orphanage. Much of the funding for this enterprise came from the Propagation de
la Foi, but Bugeaud himself provided the necessary manpower to help with the repairs
and to establish a working farm on the property.90 As administrators of the orphanage, the
Jesuits received a subvention directly from the governor general for overseeing “an
institution of public utility.”91 As official teachers of the junior seminary, the Jesuits
received their salaries from Bishop Dupuch, whose own funds came from the minister of
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war on the express recommendation of the governor general. Despite the flagrant
illegality of both these establishments, one Jesuit father wrote to the Propagation de la
Foi in 1844 that “the civil and religious authorities have been so content with the
amelioration introduced by Father Brumauld [the Jesuit superior in Algeria] that they
have become entirely devoted to him.”92 In both instances, then, the Jesuits relied on the
good will of private patrons rather than formal legal protection for moral and financial
support.
This protection did not fail to raise the suspicions of metropolitan officials. In
March 1845 the secretary of the minister of war wrote to his superior to inform him that
“the Jesuits, as a congregation not legally authorized to teach in France, have very much
discovered that in [Algeria] their prohibition has not been possible.”93 The secretary
blamed the “impudence” of the bishop, who had shown “an unfortunate lack of foresight”
in confiding the orphanage to this congregation. Although the Jesuits claimed to train
children as artisans and tradesmen, “to this is always joined a certain degree of primary
education…[which cannot] be left to religious congregations that are not legally
established in France.” Although the secretary admitted that the orphanage served a
valuable purpose for the colony he warned:
Everywhere the [Jesuits] appear becomes a permanent foyer of intrigue, as
they always keep hidden agendas under a façade of good works… It is too easy
to recognize that behind a useful establishment at the head of which one finds a
Jesuit, is hidden a question of legality and social order, which one day or another
will become the most formidable political question.94
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Even before Algeria’s legal assimilation to France in 1848 then, the secretary viewed the
political and legal standing of Algeria as analogous to that of France. In a period of near
constant workers’ strikes, revolutionary upheavals, and anticlerical agitation, the
secretary worried that ultramontane Jesuits posed a threat to the stability of the colonial
regime itself.95
Ambitious settlers also capitalized on metropolitan fears in an effort to displace
Jesuits who occupied positions of power that they coveted as their own. In 1844 a local
lay teacher published accusations against the Jesuits in the Parisian broadsheet Le Journal
des Débats in an effort to displace them from a new secondary school they had just
opened in the Algerian town of Oran. Drawing on longstanding beliefs about Jesuits in
France, he alleged that these missionaries had hatched a “Carlist and Legitimist
conspiracy” to overthrow the colonial government.96 The governor general, however,
immediately leapt to the defense of the Jesuits. In a confidential letter to the minister of
war, Bugeaud wrote that “political parties being powerless in Algeria, only a very tiny
number of insurrectionists could dream of conspiring against the state.” The European
community comprised a minority of the population of Algeria while “the Arabs constitute
the principal force of the country and…seeing as though they will not make themselves
either Jesuits, Carlists, or Republicans…they would take the opportunity of a Jesuit
conspiracy to quickly assert revenge on France.”97 Unlike many metropolitan officials,
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Bugeaud saw the political problems confronting Algeria as distinct from those in France
and he used this distinction to refrain from applying metropolitan laws to the colony.
Rather than fearing a Jesuit plot, Bugeaud saw the Jesuits as serving a useful
purpose by providing a moral upbringing to the colony’s ever-growing community of
orphans. He wrote, “I see no danger in leaving a very small number of Jesuits to exercise
a charity all the more useful to a colony where we are not able to do it ourselves.”98 He
praised the Jesuits for imparting the principles of religion, morality, and utility to children
who “according to all appearances have been abandoned in the streets to a life of crime,
[but] now become artisans useful to the colony.” Bugeaud admitted himself that the
government had neither the resources nor the willpower to undertake such a useful work.
He asked the minister of war if “we must destroy an establishment so important for the
future of the colony because some jealous imbeciles take umbrage at it?”99 For Bugeaud,
Algeria possessed no political similarities to France, as metropolitan political alliances
counted for little in the colony and the primary threat to the colonial regime came from
the rebellious indigenous community.
Further, Bugeaud supported the Jesuits and indeed other religious congregations
due to their supposed similarities to the military. In a conversation with Father François
Régis, the superior of a house of Trappiste monks in the nearby town of Staouëli,
Bugeaud stated:
My opinion is that colonization can only succeed by militarily organized
populations. And nothing approaches more a military organization than a
religious organization. The monk and the soldier have great relationships with
each other; they are submitted to severe discipline, accustomed to deprivations
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and to obey passively, they both work for the community and they are directed by
a single will (une seule volonté).100
This opinion matched Bugeaud’s larger outlook, as he saw the influx of civilians and
especially civilian rule as a potential detriment to French control over Algeria.101 We
should note that it was Bugeaud in his capacity as governor general and commander of
the Armée d’Afrique who orchestrated the most brutal phase of repression in the
campaign against Abd al-Qadir and other rebel groups between 1840 and 1847.102 As
Benjamin Brower has written, “Bugeaud is correctly understood as one of the most
dangerous men ever to have set foot in Algeria.”103 Bugeaud’s brutality did not fail to
incite criticism from government officials in both France and Algeria, and Bugeaud
interpreted the traditional alliance between the Catholic Church and the army as a reason
to offer support to religious congregations that he saw as obedient to his will.104
There is in fact no archival evidence that missionaries ever criticized Bugeaud’s
“war of extermination” against the tribes. Such violence only received any mention
whatsoever when missionaries noted in passing that the most recent razzia (or “raid”
against the tribes) had produced a number of new orphans for them to house and had thus
increased their public utility.105 This lack of empathy is evident in a letter written by a
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representative of the Propagation de la Foi in Algiers noting that an orphanage run by the
Dames of Charity (a secular organization in the colony staffed largely by nuns) was
composed of “European children whose parents have been decimated by misery and the
deadly climate of Africa and other children in a greater number [who] have been carried
off from Arabs following razzias.”106 In sum, then, in this early phase of colonization the
military and religious congregations served as institutions of mutual support, and
missionaries thus received the invaluable patronage of military commanders like
Bugeaud.
Conclusion
By the mid 1840s an alliance had developed in the colony between the military and
religious congregations. At this time in the shifting politics of colonial rule, private
patronage trumped legal rulings, a development that allowed the Jesuits to thrive in
Algeria. With this support, other missionary congregations and secular clergy began to
expand throughout the colony. The establishment of a bishopric ensured the colonial
regime a measure of independence from the Vatican, which by 1840 had lost the struggle
for authority over the new church in Algeria. It also, for a time, rendered the military
authorities more trustful of the Catholic clergy. As the parish priest of the newly-settled
town of Tlemcen wrote on 27 August 1845, “on the first Sunday of July the Catholic
religion was established in this town in presence of all the military authorities, who are so
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supportive of our religion.”107 Whereas in 1830 the military leadership had seen
missionaries as a means of spreading civilization to conquered Muslims, by the 1840s
they now supported the clergy as long as they directed their supposed civilizing mission
toward the growing European population, rather than the indigenous one (barring, in rare
cases, indigenous orphans).
The next chapter will show how, by the end of the 1840s, widespread support for
missionaries among highly placed officials began to wane. Although support by military
authorities continued more or less unabated, the settler population only grew in numbers
and confidence, and proponents of civilian rule began to equate both the military and
missionaries with brutality and fanaticism – two traits incidentally also linked with the
conquered North African population. At the same time, the ever-growing number of
missionaries and secular clergy began to compete with each other to secure a dwindling
supply of patrons. The next bishop of Algiers would go far beyond Bishop Dupuch in his
efforts to consolidate his rule over the growing number of missionaries in the colony. In
doing so, he gave financial and moral support to his own parish clergy at the expense of
more independent missionaries. Missionaries began to compete with each other to secure
the patronage of military and ecclesiastical authorities. As part of this competition, they
often exhibited scandalous behavior that undermined their very purpose of moralizing the
European population. To be sure, missionaries still saw Algeria as a land of opportunity
and, in the wake of the Revolution of 1848, they increasingly saw it as a land in which to
construct an alternative religious modernity that rejected the secular modernity emerging
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in the metropole. To do so, they sought to cultivate the alliances of the minority of the
settler population that retained their religious beliefs: the so-called foreigners.
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Chapter Two
1846-1866: A “Golden Age” for Catholic Missionaries in Algeria?
“We must keep Father Girard in Algiers. He is the pivot around which our entire work
turns. His influence is such around town that the priests and the clergy fear him and
would never engage in a struggle with him.”1
-Letter from Lazarist Father Damprun to his provincial superior in Paris, 28 June 1848.
“One can never make a society that does not even have a half-century of existence
resemble effectively one whose origin stretches back centuries. If a mission consists of
moving from ordinary conditions of Christian society into extraordinary conditions based
on dates rather than distance, then we are certainly in a missionary land. The proof is in
the repugnance of a great number of our Jesuits to even come to this country. Many ask if
they have been sent here by punishment.”2
-Letter from Jesuit Father Reynaud to his provincial superior in Lyon, 18 August 1858.
The previous chapter illustrated how the colonial government came to rely on
missionaries to provide a religious education to Algeria’s orphaned or abandoned
children in order to civilize a population that many people saw as dangerously degraded
and idle – two characteristics traditionally associated with the colony’s Muslim subjects.
In the period between 1846 and 1866, the French government also supported missionaries
because it saw missionary work as a cheap method of molding a diverse settler
community into a loyal unit that would offer support in the face of indigenous uprisings.
And yet, in spite of the government’s quest to use missionaries to cultivate the loyalties
of this diverse colonial population, missionaries just as often sowed divisions: among the
settler population, between the military and civil regimes, and even within the Catholic
1
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clergy itself. By viewing colonization through the lens of missionary work we see that by
1870, and indeed much later, the vision of a cohesive settler community in Algeria
remained a complete chimera.3
Further, often detested by colonists to a greater extent than their Islamic
counterparts, Catholic missionaries occupied a liminal space between European rulers
and North African subjects, and their presence thus disrupted the racialized taxonomies
on which imperial rule depended.4 Like other settlers, missionaries viewed Algeria as an
empty space in which to carve out professional opportunities and personal authority that
remained denied to them in the metropole. In this period, missionaries began to see
Algeria in particular as a place in which to forge what I will call a “religious modernity”
that appeared increasingly unrealizable in a secularizing Europe. In this endeavor,
however, missionaries often incited the ire and jealousy of competing secular and
religious power brokers who hoped to shape the nascent colony to suit their own visions
of the future.5 These visions repeatedly came into direct conflict with each other and
missionaries had to navigate this hostile terrain by cultivating dense networks of privilege
and patronage with military and religious authorities. Their story thus reveals the
cultivation of privilege as at least as integral to modern structures of power as any
impersonal or bureaucratic rule of law. It also complicates the depiction of colonies as
simple laboratories of modernity, as sites of experimentation whose findings could then
3
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be grafted back on to metropolitan society.6 Rather, for missionaries and settlers alike, the
colonies served in themselves as sites in which to implement modern potentialities. In
this way, colonial actors began to see Europe as more provincial than the colonial
periphery it supposedly ruled over.
Finally, missionaries’ ability to forge this alternative modernity was undermined
by their competition for useful patrons and the state salaries they could provide. This
competition often caused missionaries to denounce one another, challenge each other’s
authority, and ruin the best-laid plans of the government and missionary superiors alike.
Secular clergy accused missionaries of encroaching on their territory, while missionaries
jockeyed with each other in an effort to secure a limited amount of financial resources
and to climb the ranks of the internal hierarchies of their congregations. Further, although
historians have shown that the colonies could offer females missionaries in particular an
escape from the male-dominated metropole, this chapter demonstrates that they too at
times relied on powerful male patrons for their financial and spiritual existence.7 While
colonial territories could indeed offer women a refuge from bourgeois notions of
secularism and patriarchy, they could also provide marginalized men the opportunity to
reassert a gendered hierarchy that they perhaps felt unable to uphold in a rapidlychanging Europe.8 To be sure, female missionaries could at times retain a modicum of
independence by venturing outside ecclesiastical patronage networks and winning
support and protection from secular, especially military, authorities.
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Assimilation, Association, and the Paradoxical Place of Foreign Settlers
It was during the period covered in this chapter (1846-1866) that the colonial
government began to place great emphasis on monitoring and policing the European
community of Algeria. This emphasis only intensified throughout the nineteenth century.
This shift in policy resulted from the increasing realization of the permanence of the
French occupation of Algeria and from the unrelenting stream of settlers that continued to
pour into the colony. By 1848, 115,000 Europeans lived in Algeria, compared to a mere
3,000 in 1831.9 In the mid 1840s, the colonial regime began to undertake the twofold
endeavor of imparting a sense of shared identity among the colonists and fostering these
colonists’ loyalty to the colonial state. To be sure, these two goals often conflicted with
one another, not least because the French identity that stood as the desired paradigm itself
remained highly fluid and contested, and it changed over time as the sources of
immigration to the colony also changed. French radicals exiled to Algeria after the
Revolution of 1848 had a much different conception of Frenchness than did Alsatian
refugees resettled on Algerian farms after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
To complicate this situation, unlike much of the imperial world in the nineteenth
century, Algeria from the beginning had a diverse settler population of Italian, Spanish,
and Maltese speaking families who in many communes outnumbered the French until the
1880s. In cities like Oran, Spanish speakers continued to outnumber the French almost
until the turn of the century (a situation mirrored by the Italian population in
Constantine). As Julia Clancy-Smith has shown, the non-French population of Algeria
came to comprise the “lumpenproletariat” of Europeans that increasingly settled on the
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southern shores of the Mediterranean – they came as casual laborers in search of work, as
dispossessed farmers in search of land, and (less often) as political dissidents in search of
refuge.10 Rather than assimilate into a cohesive, monolithic French community, this
motley array of often devoutly religious Europeans clashed with their less faithful French
neighbors, and their adherence to the Catholic faith could divide them from the French
more than any other issue. In the words of historian François Renault, although most
French settlers had lost their faith, “foreigners, like Spaniards, Maltese and Italians,
continued for the most part to practice their religion, but they had no voice in ruling
circles.”11 Indeed, until the naturalization law of 26 June 1889, these non-French
Europeans could neither elect nor serve in the city councils of Algeria, and archival
documents reveal the constant tensions engendered by these religious, political, and
ethnic divisions.12
Anthropologist Andrea Smith has argued that colonial societies “were based on
extreme power differentials and the rule of the many by the few…Division between
colonists within such a society could prove fatal to the entire enterprise.”13 For this
reason, the imperial state in Algeria preferred French settlers; nevertheless, it reluctantly
welcomed other Europeans in order to compete with the overwhelming numerical
superiority of its indigenous subjects. As early as 1843 the minister of war, Marshall
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Jean-de-Dieu Soult, complained of the “poor policy of letting hordes of foreigners invade
Algeria.”14 He worried that if another European power attacked Algeria then the
government could not count on the loyalty of these non-French Europeans. At the same
time, the French military confronted two larger problems. First, it faced an ongoing
struggle to subdue indigenous uprisings, the largest of which was led by Emir Abd alQadir; and second, despite official encouragement for French farmers to emigrate to
Algeria, death and disease ensured that one way or another most of these settlers returned
to France shortly after their arrival.15 As a result, Soult wrote, “if we welcome foreigners,
it is with the thought that the substitution of Christian for Arab blood…guarantees us
more support than from the indigenous population…[and] if the Arabs rise against us,
[the foreigners] will unite with us for our defense.”16
Until at least 1880, metropolitan and colonial officials remained divided over the
best policy for securing the loyalty of these so-called foreigners.17 This division stemmed
in part from the strained relationship between military and civilian authorities in the
territory. The Revolution of 1848 marked a decisive shift in the juridical status of
colonial Algeria and resulted in the first tentative steps towards civilian rule. In
September 1848, French colonists in Algeria won the right to elect representatives to send
to the Constituent Assembly and participate in the creation of a new constitution for the
Second French Republic. On 12 November 1848 this constitution declared Algeria an
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official part of the French metropole and divided it into three departments – Oran,
Algiers, and Constantine – themselves subdivided into communes and arrondissements.
Each department also won the right to elect local departmental and municipal councils,
presided over by prefects and mayors, respectively, and to send elected officials to the
French National Assembly to represent the interests of the colonists.18 This assimilation,
however, only entailed areas of European settlement, as since 1839 the government had
divided Algeria into “full communes” (communes de plein exercise), mixed communes
(communes mixtes), and military communes (communes militaires).19 In full communes
European residents outnumbered indigenous ones, and in 1848 French citizens in these
communes theoretically won political rights equal to those of metropolitan citizens. In
military communes Europeans remained in the minority and a military governor general
assisted by the notorious Arab bureaus (bureaux arabes) continued to rule over
indigenous subjects.20 As European colonization progressed it was hoped that military
communes would pass through an intermediary stage as mixed communes (with mixed
populations), before gaining the political rights of full communes.
In practice, however, this division was not so clear cut. Even in full communes
non-French citizens had few political rights.21 As a result, the minister of war and the
18
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governor general retained ultimate authority over politically sensitive issues like
education and religion even in these communes. This system of dual power prevented
officials from ever adopting or enacting an official policy or legal framework to govern
the foreign settler population in European communes. Nevertheless, although such
policies remained unarticulated and inchoate, governmental tactics towards the foreign
population of Algeria most closely resemble the policies of association and assimilation
traditionally associated with the conquered indigenous populations.22 Government
officials, in fact, applied these concepts much more vigorously towards the settler
population than the indigenous one.
In broad outlines, civilian authorities in the European communes in this period,
and increasingly over time, tended to work towards assimilating the foreigners to French
culture by imparting French education in the French language; what exactly this culture
consisted of varied from commune to commune based on the composition of local
municipal councils. At the same time, the military retained ultimate authority over
politically sensitive issues and governors general tended to work towards associating
foreigners to the imperial state by providing for their particular and presumed cultural,
educational, and religious needs. In this period, the military turned to missionaries to
fulfill this goal and offered them protection from at times hostile civilian authorities and
anticlerical colonists. Ultimately, religion played a pivotal role in the conception and
application of both policies.
To be sure, in the 1840s and 50s officials remained uncertain over how to use
religion to tie these colonists to the imperial regime. In 1845, Governor General Bugeaud
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decided to provide for the religious needs of the colonists by assigning a single church
building to serve both Protestant and Catholic settlers in the city of Algiers. Writing in
1845, Minister of War Soult warned Bugeaud, “because of the superstition which the
Spanish as well as Maltese attach to religion it appears to me that such a measure could
spark the most profound unrest.”23 Rather than offend this religious “superstition,” Soult
sought to appease these settlers’ religious sensibilities; to do so, he hoped to use Catholic
missionaries to cultivate the loyalties of these families by providing for their particular
religious needs. Two years later, however, the director of civil affairs for Algeria voiced
his fear that missionary schools would compete with public schools that the state created
specifically “to give a national education that is above all necessary in Algeria, where
there are a great number of foreign parents who will not teach it within their
households.”24 Generally speaking, military authorities like the minister of war continued
to support idiosyncratic policies of association while civilian authorities proved more
dogmatic in their desire to assimilate foreigners to what they saw as French secular
customs. Increasingly throughout this period such assimilation connoted less and less the
practice of Catholicism, especially among the handful of radical French settlers that later
ascended the political ranks in some communes of Algeria.25
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For the time being, however, an unforeseen imperative often helped reconcile
civilian authorities to military designs: the need to minimize expenses. Once they realized
that missionaries worked for less than half the salary of their secular counterparts, many
civilian authorities quickly cast their assimilationist tendencies aside. The bishop of
Algiers recognized as much when he wrote to the superior of the Frères des Ecoles
Chrétiennes that “here the entire question is reduced to material expenses: salary, rent,
furnishing.”26 Indeed, teaching frères from this congregation received an annual salary of
750 francs throughout the 1850s and 60s, compared to as much as 1,800 francs for
secular teachers.27 The bishop’s opinions were seconded by the minister of public
instruction, who wrote as early as 1847 that “a purely lay organization of our hospitals,
our schools, our nurseries in Algeria, with a double or even quadruple expense, only
produces far inferior results to those obtained with the aid of religious communities.”28 At
this still early stage of colonization, cities often lacked secular teachers and healthcare
workers entirely. Missionaries could thus help tie families to the colony in order to give
them an incentive not to return to France or elsewhere in Europe at the first sign of
distress. Governor General Bugeaud voiced this fear directly when he warned that “many
fathers would hesitate to come to Africa and to settle there if they are not assured of
finding for their children the educational resources that exist in the largest French
cities.”29
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These fears continued throughout the 1850s and 60s and settler petitions proved
such anxieties to be well founded. Between 1856 and 1859, for instance, the inhabitants
of the Algerian port town of Cherchell sent numerous petitions to the governor general in
Algiers, the minister of war in Paris, and, ultimately, Emperor Napoleon III himself in an
effort to allow missionary sisters to open a local primary school for girls. The petitioners
worried that their children “were left free throughout the day and that this inaction
allowed them to abandon themselves to regrettable habits.” Only the sisters, they
contended, would “inspire in our children first the principles of our religion.”30 They
further complained that the lack of a Catholic school “had already forced fifteen fathers
to impose on themselves the enormous sacrifice of separating from their little girls to
send them to other cities or villages.”31 In a similar instance, the division commander of
Oran, Jean-Jacques Pélissier, expressed his support for Jesuit secondary school because
the lack of a Catholic school had previously imposed a “heavy burden” of forcing parents
“to send their children far away to receive the benefits of an education.”32 He feared that
families who could not establish roots in the colony would most likely return to the
metropole rather than defend their territory. In this sense, the future of French rule and
France’s presence in Algeria depended on the state’s ability to meet the religious and
educational needs of its settler population. The administration hoped to use Catholic
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education to keep families together and thus to tie the nuclear family to the colonial
state.33
The Jesuits in particular understood the fine line between providing religious aid
and cultivating loyalty to the French state. They hoped to capitalize on this double
imperative in order to cement their own position as power brokers in the emerging
colonial order. To do so, they actively worked to cultivate the loyalties of the non-French
population in Algeria. Citing the 20,000 Spanish settlers in Algiers who “languish in
profound ignorance and flagrant immorality,” one Jesuit father wrote to Rome in 1851 to
request a new Spanish priest who “knows France and loves the French.”34 In a separate
letter, he also asked for a “French nationalized Italian” to work in the school at Oran.35 In
1852, another Jesuit taught himself enough Spanish so that he routinely filled the
cathedral of Algiers with Spanish parishioners; but at the same time he claimed to teach
those parishioners to support the French authorities. Although historians have shown that
French missionaries could most often cultivate favor with colonial regimes by spreading
French culture and language, the Jesuits, and indeed the military government, understood
that the diverse settler population of colonial Algeria necessitated a slightly altered
approach.36 The state could win the loyalties of the non-French settlers by providing for
33
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their spiritual needs in their own language, so long as they also taught a love of France
and of French rule.37
To win the support of the military regime that governed Algeria, missionary
congregations had simply to fulfill three requirements: they must remain reasonably
solvent, they must allow periodic government surveillance over their establishments, and
they must refrain from large-scale and overt proselytism towards the indigenous Muslim
population.38 In 1849, the governor general devised a plan to assign each of the three
newly created departments of Algeria to a different congregation of missionary sisters:
Oran to the Soeurs Trinitaires, Algiers to the Filles de la Charité, and Constantine to the
Soeurs de la Doctrine Chrétienne. Two additional congregations did not make the cut:
although the Dames du Sacré Coeur helped run a successful orphanage in Mustapha, their
reputation for a lack of submission worked against them. Indeed, the governor general
remarked that “these women seem to want to escape all administrative control.”39
Similarly, the Soeurs du Bon Pasteur, who ran a boarding school at El Biar, lacked
enough resources to gain government support. In 1848, the minister of war remarked
unfavorably on the “precarious and disturbing financial situation of this religious

with indigenous populations and not with European settlers. Conversely, Claude Prudhomme has written
that “a focus on the linguistic dimension risks hiding the fact that the French, religious or laic, promoted a
common culture to their students.” See Prudhomme, “Catholic missions and cultural rivalries in the Eastern
Mediterranean: 1870-1914,” in Une France en Méditerranée: écoles, langue, et culture françaises. XIXeXXe siècles, edited by Patrick Cabanel (Paris: Creaphis, 2006), 51.
37
This process of attempting to impart French (i.e. Parisian) culture to France’s peasant population only
occurred after 1870 in France, or much later than it did in Algeria. See Eugen Weber, Peasants into
Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).
For a longer-term process see David Bell, “Lingua Populi, Lingua Dei: Language, Religion, and the
Origins of French Revolutionary Nationalism,” The American Historical Review 100/5 (December 1995):
1403-1437.
38
For a discussion of the handful of native Algerians, mostly Kabyles, who did convert to Christianity, see
Karima Dirèche-Slimani, Chrétiens de Kabylie (1873-1954). Une action missionnaire dans l’Algérie
coloniale (Paris: Editions Bouchène, 2004).
39
CAOM F80/1629. Letter from the governor general to the director of civil affairs for the province of
Algiers, 4 December 1847.

80

establishment.”40 These failings ensured that neither congregation received government
patronage to expand their works in any of the newly created departments.
The colonial government sought to better control the three remaining
congregations not by subjecting them to the metropolitan rule of law, but rather by
leaving them in a state of legal limbo. A royal ordinance of 14 July 1834 forbade the
establishment of any missionary congregation in Algeria without the approval of the
governor general. Nevertheless, even upon approval the administration refrained from
granting official “authorization” to any of these congregations in Algeria. Rather, since
1843 it had pursued a policy of mere “toleration” for congregations. This strategy ensured
that if any congregation focused too much on proselytism towards the indigenous
population then the government could expel it from the colony with a mere decree from
the minister of war.41 Although the governor general supported missionaries’ work of
education and moralization with the European population, he feared that proselytism
towards Algeria’s Muslims would only turn them against the French. As the minister of
war wrote in 1846, “the Arabs see in their religious belief the very principle of their
nationality, and are no more disposed to renounce one than the other.”42 The minister
expressed his fear that the application of the laws of the metropole to the congregations in
Algeria could “unleash in our colony the most unfortunate consequences…[but] by
leaving things in this provisional state the government will retain an absolute liberty of
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acting, such as for the repression of different religious communities.”43 These
congregations would remain in their provisional state until the 1901 law of associations
forced them to apply for authorization (see Chapter Four).
To further solidify control over missionaries and education in Algeria, the
minister of war ensured that the French educational laws of March 1850, known as the
Falloux laws, remained unapplied in Algeria. This reluctance to apply the laws of the
metropole in Algeria, even towards the European population in full communes, reveals
the limits of the juridical assimilation of Algeria with France. Under the Falloux laws and
later amendments, municipal councils could nominate their local public school teacher,
who only needed approval from the superintendent (recteur).44 In Algeria, however, the
minister of war and the governor general retained complete authority to appoint
schoolteachers. Although they originally intended this stipulation to prevent colonists
from forcing unfriendly teachers on the indigenous Muslim population, it also allowed
the governor general to appoint Catholic missionary teachers desired by Spanish, Italian,
or Maltese settlers, who, lacking French citizenship, had no voice in local municipal
councils. Indeed, these councils at times proved most resistant to missionary teachers and
often attempted to force secular teachers on the Catholic population under their
jurisdiction. As we will see in the next chapter the issue over who exactly had the right to
appoint schoolteachers would nearly spark a settler revolt in the early 1870s and served
as a touchstone for debates over the broader shift to full civilian rule.
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To round out their control over missionaries in Algeria, the minister of war and
the governor general made a distinction between government funding of congregations as
a whole and the funding of missionaries as private actors who proved beneficial to the
colonial state. In 1848, the minister of war wrote that the government must “abstain from
any measure which would lead congregations to believe that the state is disposed…to
give them its patronage.” He clarified this position by continuing:
The government only sees the members of these corporations as individuals,
agents with a specific ability who engage in aid for a particular and predetermined
service. For the government, the Lazarists are only auxiliary priests, the Sisters of
Charity and the Sisters of the Christian Doctrine are only teachers. The
administration maintains establishments of public utility: schools, hospitals, and
nurseries. It does not fund religious congregations.45
Taken together, the policy of official “toleration” (rather than “authorization”),
the abstention of applying the Falloux laws, and the restriction of funding to “individual
actors of public utility” all ensured that missionaries had to rely completely on the
patronage of individual military generals or the bishop of Algiers in order to secure
support. As a result, individual missionaries competed to win favor and state salaries for
their work as teachers, preachers, and nurses. These salaries came directly from the
governor general, who inscribed them in municipal or departmental budgets at his will, or
they came from the bishop of Algiers, whose own funds came from the minister of war
upon recommendation of the governor general. In sum, the government’s policy towards
missionaries differed little from what historian Osama Abi-Mershed has described as its
policy towards the colonized North African population. For Abi-Mershed, “historical
context [and] political expedience…more than any ideological clarity, held sway in
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determining the orientation of French policies in Algeria.”46 Although Abi-Mershed does
well to expose the lack of ideological coherence in French colonial policy on the ground,
he overlooks the integrality of extralegal measures not only to the governance of the
conquered and colonized population, but also of the European settler population. The
government’s strategic use of missionaries reveals that it focused its efforts (alternately
and haphazardly) of colonial assimilation and association on European settlers more than
on native Algerians.47 Although it feared missionaries could disturb the religious
sensibilities of the Muslim population, in the period between 1840 and 1870 it also saw
missionaries as crucial in cultivating a settler community that pledged allegiance to the
French state.
Settler Opposition to Catholic Missionaries
The government’s quest to use missionaries to mold a unified and loyal settler
population, however, proved elusive.48 Writing in the 1960s, a sister from the women’s
congregation the Filles de la Charité referred to the period from 1850 to 1870 as “the
golden age for missionaries in Algeria.”49 Reading the primary documents, however, the
historian is hard pressed to arrive at the same conclusion. Only when gauged against the
overtly anticlerical policies implemented after 1870 does this earlier period appear as a
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time of harmony. Rather, a study of missionary work in Algeria reveals what AbiMershed has described as “the uneasy and uncertain relationship between the civil and
military powers in North Africa” in the period before 1870; but the strains in this
relationship resulted not only from conflicting visions over the place of North Africans in
French Algeria.50 Documents in the missionary and national archives attest to the constant
external threats, internal divisions, and struggles for power that beset missionary
establishments in this period. One of the two principal sources of opposition to Catholic
missionaries came from anticlerical settlers and civilian authorities (the other, more
surprisingly, came from the Catholic bishop and his appointed clergy in Algeria).
In the early years of French rule, Europeans saw Algeria as a blank slate on which
they could carve out their own niches of professional or personal authority; or, as AbiMershed writes, as “a vast, unspoiled canvas on which to create fresh social realities.”51
At the same time, conflicting visions over how to create these realities often led to
resentments between competing power brokers. As we saw in Chapter One, certain
settlers had already begun to express their disdain for missionaries by citing the political
dangers they supposedly posed to Algeria. In the instance examined above, a lay teacher
accused Jesuit missionaries of plotting “Carlist and Legitimist” conspiracies to overthrow
the colonial regime. Bugeaud, for his part, saw this accusation as a ploy by this teacher to
carve out his own professional opportunity by displacing the Jesuits from their secondary
school. As a result, Bugeaud succeeded in protecting the Jesuits despite their illegal status
as a congregation not recognized in France itself.
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Such accusations only increased throughout the middle of the century.
Repressions following the Revolution of 1848 and Louis Napoleon’s coup d’état on 2
December 1851 resulted in the exile of 6,258 political dissidents to Algeria.52 Although
many of them would return to France within a decade, many also chose to stay in Algeria
and use the colony to enact the secular reforms that remained unfulfilled in France. In
large and newly-enfranchised communes like Algiers a number of self-styled republicans
ran for and won elections as municipal councilors and mayors, and they sought to use
their positions of power to enforce anticlerical legislation on, at times, a religiously
devout (but politically powerless) community of foreign settlers. As one Lazarist
missionary wrote in 1857, “the mayor [of Algiers] shows us increasing hostility. The
employees of the mayor and the prefect act the same way and use all their power against
us…everywhere officials are hostile, apart from 1 or 2 of every 20.”53 The divisions
caused by this anticlerical turn among the civilian authorities threatened to undermine the
religious aims of the military governor general and minister of war.
To be sure, the republicanism of French exiles soon adapted to the peculiar
imperial situation of colonial Algeria. As Ruedy has written many “republican” settlers
“were far from being republicans in the liberal mold of the 1848 revolutionaries… Their
republicanism was a means to end arbitrary military rule” and extend their authority over
an indigenous population they saw as unfairly protected by the military and the Arab
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bureaus.54 These settlers continued to associate military rule not only with undue respect
for Muslims and their religion, but also with undue respect for the so-called foreigners
and their religion. Although many exiles already had anticlerical sentiments, these
sentiments combined with and were exacerbated by the association of any religion with
the fanaticism of the detested Muslim subjects. And this disdain for religion extended to a
disdain for those who provided financial and moral support to religious congregations
and, theoretically, native Algerians: the military generals.
The petition for a missionary school at Cherchell mentioned above, for example,
may have won the support of the military government, but it also incited the ire of the
civilian administration and a portion of the settler population. In 1858, the prefect of
Algiers informed the director of civil affairs that “the petitions [for missionary sisters]
stem entirely from the intrigues of a local priest” and that the presence of the missionary
sisters “was not only useless but also dangerous.” The prefect claimed that the petitioners
were “persons little esteemed,” who have for years been “slandering the local lay
institutrices [female teachers] and submitting them to public insults.”55 The military
regime thus found itself in a bind. It could accede to the demands of the Catholic families
and help tie these families to the colony, but in doing so it risked offending the
anticlerical sensibilities of the local French civilian government in what was, after all, a
French territory.
Such situations would play out across Algeria throughout the Second Republic
and Second Empire. They reveal the tensions that beset colonial rule and belie the
simplified dichotomy that separates European colonizer from African subject.
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Anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler has argued that “[colonial] statecraft was not opposed to
the affective, but about its mastery.”56 In this case, affective ties between parents and their
children in a religiously divided settler community threatened the very legitimacy of
colonial rule. How could settlers trust a colonial state that could not even keep families
together? These families, as mentioned above, faced “the enormous sacrifice of
separating from their little girls to send them to other cities.”57 Conversely, how could the
military administration overrule the local civilian government in a commune that
supposedly had the full political rights of the metropole?
Throughout this period, the state repeatedly found itself torn between Catholic
settlers who relied on free moral education provided by missionaries, and religiously
indifferent or even hostile settlers who saw the missionaries as sowing divisions within
the European community or monopolizing professional positions they coveted
themselves. In this period, the military regime most often sided with the missionaries and
against anticlerical, largely French, civilian municipal councils (though by no means
were all municipal councils anticlerical, nor were their policies unchanging over time).
Again, it did so in the hopeless aim of unifying a pan-European community into a
cohesive unit of national defense. But it did so by spreading a facet of French culture –
Catholicism – for which most French in Algeria cared little, and some downright
detested.
Bishop Pavy, Female Missionaries, and Clerical Conflicts
Reading the documents in the national archives, one is left with the impression that the
religious divisions that afflicted colonial Algeria stopped here. There is little mention in
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the archives of anything other than the secular clergy and religious orders working in
tandem.58 An examination of missionary and Vatican archives, however, reveals that
these divisions cut much deeper. Missionaries in Algeria encountered staunch and
consistent opposition from the Catholic bishop of Algiers and his local parish priests.
This situation stemmed directly from the liminal space Algeria occupied after 1848 as not
a colony in the strict sense of the term and at the same time not fully part of the
metropole.
As we have seen, in 1838 the French government opted to unilaterally incorporate
Algeria into France as an official bishopric of the metropole. In doing so, it appointed a
French bishop, Bishop Dupuch, who in turn began to appoint secular clergy to serve the
parishes throughout his diocese. In this respect, even before 1848 the legal framework for
the Catholic Church in Algeria was analogous to that in France. At the same time,
however, unlike in France the bishop of Algiers did not have nearly enough secular
clergy to serve his diocese. As a result, the period after 1838 also saw missionary
congregations arrive in Algeria en masse. To an even greater extent than in France, not to
mention other imperial settings, the Catholic Church in Algeria relied on both secular and
religious clergy to serve the faithful; and, while nearly four times larger than France, the
territory often seemed too small to accommodate both sets of clergy. If the first bishop of
Algiers was forced to resign in 1845 due to his catastrophic mismanagement of resources,
his successors proved much more adept at spreading their authority throughout the
diocese of Algiers. They did so by ruling authoritatively over potentially independent
missionary congregations and bestowing patronage on those missionaries who displayed
58
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the most loyalty and docility to episcopal authority. To better secure their own
professional and spiritual footholds in Algeria, these bishops also worked to align their
interests with those of metropolitan and colonial authorities as much as possible.
In the early 1840s, the metropolitan government had watched with dismay as
Dupuch and Bugeaud allowed the Jesuits to spread themselves throughout the colony in
spite of their tenuous legal position in France. The war ministry and the ministry of cults
thus moved to ensure that a more Gallican bishop succeeded Dupuch to rein in the more
ultramontane Jesuits. In 1846 the government appointed Louis Antoine Augustin Pavy (in
office 1846-1866) as bishop of Algiers.59 Pavy hoped to displace Jesuits and other
renegade missionaries by increasing the number of parishes in Algeria in order to
populate the colony with his own appointed parish priests (who received their salaries
directly from him). During his tenure the number of official parishes in Algeria increased
from 29 to 187 and the number of diocesan priests from 48 to 273.60
As members of religious orders, however, male and female missionaries drew
their authority from their motherhouse in France rather than from the French government
or the bishop. As a result, the Gallican bishop and his clergy from the outset saw
missionaries as competition to their authority and as dangerously independent and
unpredictable, but at the same time as necessary for the spread of the Catholic faith.61
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Historian Gérard Cholvy has written that after the French Revolution many new
congregations adopted ultramontanism as a means to protest the Concordat.62 Whether or
not this assertion applied to Algeria, the bishop at least showed himself cognizant of this
possibility. As late as 1862, a representative of the Propaganda Fide complained that “the
very little sympathy Pavy has for the religious congregations deprives them of aid which
would be more useful here than anywhere else.”63 Because he could not afford to rid the
colony of religious orders completely, Pavy worked to play different congregations off
against each other in order to better exert his authority over all of them.64
Pavy’s maneuverings around the Soeurs Trinitaires and the Filles de la Charité in
particular reveal his obsession with cultivating obedience to his authority. Both
congregations were financially solvent and equally pleasing to the military regime. For a
number of reasons, however, Pavy favored the Filles de la Charité over the Soeurs
Trinitaires and quickly moved to replace the latter with the former. As female
congregations, each order relied on male priests to administer the sacraments of
confession and communion – affirmations of faith that these sisters took very seriously.
The Soeurs Trinitaires, distrustful of the secular clergy, relied primarily on local Jesuit
missionaries to administer their sacraments and serve as spiritual advisors. The Filles de
la Charité, in theory at least, relied for their sacraments exclusively on their brother
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congregation, the Lazarists.65 As we saw in the first chapter, the Lazarists had a history of
friendly relations with the French government and secular clergy. As a result of the
Gallican tendencies of their male confessors, Bishop Pavy thought he could better ensure
the loyalty and submission of the Filles de la Charité than he could the Soeurs Trinitaires.
Further, the spiritual and indeed temporal authority of the Lazarists over the Filles
de la Charité ensured that a traditional gender hierarchy remained intact and that Bishop
Pavy would not have to deal with less predictable female superiors. In Algeria,
missionary sisters relied heavily on individual men for their success; and sisters who fell
under the direct authority of a male superior found it easier to succeed than did those with
a female superior. Indeed, Bishop Pavy sought to marginalize the Soeurs Trinitaires
because they procured their own (Jesuit) confessors and relied ultimately on the authority
of a female superior. Conversely, Pavy helped draft the regulations of the Filles de la
Charité in Algeria specifically to ensure that only their male superiors interacted with
local authorities (though this stipulation did not always correspond to reality). Father
Girard, the head of the Lazarist mission in Algiers, worked closely with Pavy on drafting
the regulations for the sisters in Algeria. The resulting constitution established a fiveperson council that met once a week “to ensure good order and discipline in the houses”
of the Filles de la Charité. The council included three sisters, who served an advisory
role, and two Lazarist priests, who monopolized executive functions. Article five of their
constitution stipulated that “the sisters composing the council must avoid communicating
together outside of the council about anything which should be discussed in the council,”
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while it included no such stipulation for the priests. Similarly, article eleven ruled that
“the [Lazarist] visiting superior alone, or in his absence the director, will interact with the
authorities, whether ecclesiastical or civil.”66 As a result of this gendered hierarchy,
Bishop Pavy and the Lazarist Father Girard developed a close relationship that redounded
to the benefit of the Lazarists and, to a significant if lesser extent, the Filles de la Charité
alike.
The Soeurs Trinitaires, who worked primarily in and around the city of Oran, did
not enjoy this support; and their independent and assertive mother superior, Sister
Aloysia Bilhot, worked tirelessly to maintain her congregation’s chosen Jesuit confessors.
In 1851, Bishop Pavy moved to rein in the sisters by replacing their Jesuit confessor with
his own appointed parish priest, Father Avit. Pavy hoped thus to displace the Jesuits, who
owed no loyalty (or state salary) to Pavy. For his part, Father Avit saw his new position
as an opportunity to carve out his own niche of authority as a new power broker in
colonial Oran. As such, he quickly moved to close the chapel the sisters created in the
local hospital to force them and their patients to attend his own church, whose attendance,
the military commander of Oran later noted, “was hardly considerable.”67 When the
sisters refused, Avit wrote to the bishop and called Sister Aloysia a “rogue and
insubordinate.” He went so far as to nullify any confession these sisters made to a Jesuit,
telling Aloysia that she and her sisters “may as well have confessed to a dressed-up
cat.”68 He got to the heart of the matter when he complained to Pavy that by going to the
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Jesuits the sisters had “constantly diminished his authority.”69 While this example reveals
the power that male clerics could exert over their female counterparts, it also highlights
the fragility of male authority. Father Avit himself relied on the missionary sisters to prop
up his authority and to justify the moral (and ultimately financial) support he received
from the bishop.
The sisters resisted this assertion of male clerical authority as much as possible
within the constraints of a religion and society shaped by patriarchal networks of power.
In perhaps the ultimate form of female Catholic resistance to male clerical authority, two
sisters mortally ill with typhoid preferred to die without receiving their last rites rather
than receive them from Father Avit. Sister Marie-Françoise commented on her deathbed
that “it is bad enough to be forced into confession while one is healthy, at least in dying
leave me the consolation of having another priest, whoever he may be.”70 For women
who desired confession multiple times per week and saw it as the ultimate profession of
faith, renouncing this sacrament on one’s deathbed constituted an extreme, if desperate,
form of political resistance and a powerful assertion of individual autonomy.
In other instances, sisters sought to cultivate alternate secular sources of
patronage. In 1851, Sister Aloysia made the trip to the local headquarters of the division
commander of Oran (and future governor general of Algeria), Jean-Jacques Pélissier.
Himself a devout Catholic, Pélissier criticized the government in France for appointing
bishops and secular clergy based solely on political, rather than religious needs. Pélissier
told Aloysia that the whole Algerian clergy constituted the riffraff of France, and that
they garnered no respect among the settler population, “not only as priests, but even as
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men.”71 Conversely, he expressed his support for the disciplined and devout Jesuit
missionaries. “It is the bishop,” he wrote, “who wants to expel the Jesuits from your
house in order to put you entirely under the hands of his clergy.” Pélissier further
contended that since the Revolution of 1848 Pavy had sought to curry favor by showing
republican sympathies and had even “degraded himself to the point of blessing the tree of
liberty.” He reassured Aloysia by writing, “Am I not your father? I am there to protect
you.”72 In this instance, Aloysia ensured the continued existence of her congregation by
appealing to a devout military general to defend her order against a Catholic bishop who
garnered political support from authorities in the metropole.
Pélissier proved an equally valuable patron for the Jesuits’ secondary school in
Oran. Bishop Pavy saw the Jesuit school as a direct threat to the Lazarist seminary that
Pavy himself established in Algiers. Although the Falloux laws of 1850 had stipulated
that the Jesuits could again run teaching establishments in France, Pavy issued an order in
1852 that forbade Jesuits from teaching secondary classes and accepting boarding
students in Algeria. In doing so, Pavy hoped to force students in Oran to come to Algiers
to attend schools over which he had direct oversight. Again, however, General Pélissier
came to the Jesuits’ aid because he saw Pavy’s decision as a danger to the entire colony.
Pélissier understood Pavy’s intentions, but countered that:
The population of Oran has no relation with that of Algiers. All its relations are
with Marseille or the cities of the Midi [in France]. Not finding in Oran any
means to raise its children it will direct them towards France, and thus Algiers
will not profit any more than Oran from this prohibition.73

71

ST, ORAN Saint Louis 1841/1972 2 M F 1-1. Conversation between Marshall Pélissier and Aloysia
Bilhot, [no date] 1852.
72
Ibid.
73
ARSI, Fonds Algérie 1001. Quoted in an anonymous letter from a Jesuit to his superior, 3 July 1852.

95

The Jesuits thus won this battle with the bishop because their aims dovetailed with those
of the military administration. They provided a cheap and efficient means of tying
children to their families and in turn of tying families to the colonial state. Although the
school in Oran continued to struggle under pressure from Bishop Pavy, the school’s
administrator assured his superior in 1852 that “once Pélissier is named governor general,
as everybody expects, our secondary school will not be forgotten.”74
Lazarists, Filles de la Charité, and the Gendered Dimension of Patronage
Throughout the 1840s and 50s, the Lazarists expanded their works in Algeria by
cultivating favor with the bishop, who preferred them to the Jesuits due to their lack of
ultramontane traits and the supposed control they exerted over the Filles de la Charité.
Indeed, the Lazarist visiting superior for all of Algeria, Father Girard, accrued immense
power from securing the patronage of the bishop. Directly after Pavy was named bishop
in 1846, Girard wrote to his superior in Paris:
Things are going so well for us here due to our new bishop…He tells me of his
most intimate affairs and asks for advice as though he were one of my fellow
priests. As much as he supports the Lazarists, he is equally against the Jesuits
whom he nonetheless appeases because they are very powerful. We are helping
the bishop to reorganize the diocese and you will see, I dare say, prosperity come
to our houses.75
Such support yielded dividends in 1848, when Pavy appointed the Lazarists to replace the
Jesuits in the junior seminary and to manage the newly created senior seminary in Kouba,
nine kilometers from Algiers. The seminary by canon law fell under the control of the
local bishop, as it trained secular priests to serve the diocese. By maneuvering to get
Girard named head of the seminary, Pavy brought the recruitment of new priests under
74
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his own control, but also ensured Girard and his fellow seminary teachers annual salaries
of 1,800 francs, thus giving the Lazarists significant advantages over other male
congregations, notably the Jesuits. As one Lazarist priest wrote to his superior in Paris,
“we must keep Monsieur Girard in Algiers. He is the pivot around which our entire work
turns. His influence is such around town that the priests and the clergy fear him and
would never engage in a struggle with him.”76
The Revolution of 1848 revealed the importance of this patronage, as newly
installed civilian authorities often expressed overtly anticlerical sentiments. In November
1848 the Lazarist superior of the residence in the Algiers neighborhood of Mustapha,
Father Dufour, wrote to his superior in Paris: “you would not believe how many
difficulties we have undergone. The civil authorities have proved very little
accommodating [and Girard] thinks it better to have recourse to the bishop.”77 The antimissionary backlash spread to the press as well, with an article in the moderate journal
Akhbar accusing the sisters of the Filles de la Charité of sexual impropriety with the
Lazarist priests. Dufour – who as we will see was no friend of the missionary sisters –
admitted himself that the sisters took carriage rides to the Lazarist seminary in Kouba far
too often, writing in February 1849, “I strongly desire that the public not be wrongly
informed about these trips. If this keeps up our indiscretion will cost us!”78 Despite this
anticlerical agitation from members of the municipal council and organs of the press, one
Lazarist affirmed in March 1849 that “the incendiary articles written against us have only
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excited everywhere general reprobation…they have not done us great harm.”79 At this
still relatively early stage in the history of French Algeria, anticlerical politicians could
not rally the support of a large segment of the settler community, who remained largely
indifferent to anticlerical agitation.
To be sure, many settlers remained equally indifferent to the brand of civilization
missionaries hoped to impart. The most successful missionaries were those who could
cater specifically to the more religious foreign population of Algeria. In December 1848,
Dufour informed his superior that one Lazarist taught two catechism classes to “a large
number of Spanish and above all Catalans… [and] he will soon have more work than he
can handle.”80 For the non-Spanish or Italian speaking Lazarists, however, work was
harder to come by. In July 1849 Dufour wrote that “even though the bishop is on our
side…there are so few people of faith in this city.”81 Moreover, even many people of faith
contested the power of the Lazarists. Although they may have won the support of the
bishop, this support did not always extend to other members of the secular clergy, who
jealously guarded their domains of religious authority. As one Lazarist informed his
superior, the congregation found itself “surrounded by clergy that is so hostile to us and
the other male communities that there is no hope of finding sufficient work [in
Algiers].”82 It was only the continued patronage and salaries provided by the bishop that
allowed the Lazarists to expand outside of the colonial capital and to serve villages not
yet staffed by parish priests.
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Although this patronage had its origins in the Lazarists’ ability to control the far
more numerous sisters of the Filles de la Charité – who largely eluded the jealousy of the
secular clergy – even this desire to implement patriarchal relationships from the
metropole proved more difficult to achieve in colonial Algeria. On the most localized
level of power, the juxtaposition of so many missionaries from so many congregations
allowed the sisters to flout the designs of the bishop and resist their assigned spiritual
directors, a situation which Father Dufour protested to no end. The sisters often used the
struggles between and among male missionaries and clergymen as opportunities to play
different priests against each other and to carve out their own realms of autonomy in the
schools and hospitals they staffed. Within an admittedly very circumscribed domain, such
minute political tactics allowed female missionaries to assert a modicum of independence
and overturn the gendered hierarchy of their congregation.
We can see an example of these political tactics through an examination of certain
sisters of the Filles de la Charité, who worked as nurses in the civil hospital of Algiers
and who nominally fell under the authority of the Lazarist Father Dufour. Despite the
rules of their congregation, however, the sisters often sought out Jesuits to administer
sacraments such as confession and communion. In August 1848 Dufour complained that
“the confidence the sisters hold for our priests at the hospital is very limited…[and] the
Jesuit father is held above us in the hearts of the Filles de la Charité.”83 The head of the
mission in Algeria, Father Girard, began to maneuver to have the bishop remove the
Jesuits from the hospital; he told Dufour, however, that the Jesuits had pushed the sisters
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to “delay the move indefinitely.”84 Nevertheless, by 1850 Girard and Dufour had
succeeded in displacing the Jesuits from the hospital and allotting their state salaries to
other Lazarists. Following this substitution, Girard reminded Dufour that “the bishop
would like the Lazarists to recognize the favor he did them by removing the Jesuits from
the hospital in order to replace them with Lazarists.”85
On other occasions, sisters ironically used their very gendered identity to go over
the head of their male superior and cultivate favor outside of official ecclesiastical
patronage networks. In 1850, Dufour again bemoaned his continued lack of power over
the sisters and confided to his superior in Paris that “here, people in high places love
women, the women of our community above all. The numerous visits that are made to
them, the caresses they are enveloped in, the daily compliments that they are the object of
are a real test for them.”86 Dufour complained that their insubordination actually
overturned the sexual hierarchy so that the Lazarists “find themselves bound to the dress
of a Fille de la Charité, as here [in Mustapha] our existence depends on her, our work is
given to us by her; she throws it to us out of charity like a morsel of bread.”87 Indeed, the
patronage the sisters enjoyed from a local military general allowed them to procure
funding for their local primary schools independently of both the bishop and their male
superior. And only once their schools received this funding would the sisters then call on
the Lazarist priests to serve as confessors for themselves and their students.
In part, the sisters proved more useful than male missionaries for the government
because capable laywomen remained so rare in Algeria during the middle decades of the
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nineteenth century. Military generals and often even civilian officials desired very much
to confide various works of education, healthcare, and poor relief to the sisters as
“individual actors of public utility.” Lazarist priests, on the other hand, existed solely to
provide for the spiritual needs of the sisters and thus served no secular purpose. Many
Lazarists sought out other professional opportunities by working as members of the
parish clergy and responding to the needs of colonists who founded new European
villages outside of the major urban centers of the territory. As Dufour wrote in 1849, “If
we do not find work outside [of Algiers] we will be annihilated. Our sisters are expanding
without us and they will soon have closer relationships with the Jesuits, who are
everywhere.”88 Indeed, during the cholera epidemic of 1848-9 in particular the minister of
war chose to send Filles de la Charité to far off “agricultural colonies” to serve sick
settlers.89 He even inscribed in the colonial budget a salary of 700 francs per sister for this
task plus funds for travel and lodging.
Because of their usefulness to the colony the sisters began to supersede the
Lazarists in the eyes of the government. Following the creation of the agricultural
colonies, Dufour bemoaned the fact that “the hopes of our rulers seem to rest in this
moment on the Filles de la Charité.”90 He was not far off, as in April 1850 the minister of
war wrote:
The sisters have made themselves respected and loved… The local authorities
have lauded their great results, and the population would be very upset to see
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them leave…The governor general has taken the resolution to substitute them in
all agricultural colonies for the existing secular teachers and nurses.91
Father Girard actually complained that the administration gave more support to the sisters
than the Lazarists because colonial officials interacted more with the sisters than the
priests on a day-to-day basis, a situation that directly undermined the rules of the
constitution which Girard himself had helped to draft. He suggested to his superior in
Paris that “maybe it would be advantageous if we had more frequent relations with our
governor and our prefect,” adding that, “in the house of Algiers we are under the
protection of the sisters, who go often to the office [of the governor general]
themselves.”92
The increasing independence and autonomy of the sisters ultimately threatened to
elevate them above the Lazarists in the hierarchy of colonial power brokers. The
Lazarists began to fear that this newfound sense of autonomy had given the sisters an
elevated opinion of themselves, with one priest complaining that the sisters “only respect
and esteem you in proportion to the degree of authority that you have.”93 In 1851, the
superiors in Paris dispatched a visiting inspector to Algeria in order to institute reforms in
the composition of the missionary council and hem in the independence of the sisters.
Although the details of these reforms remain unclear, it appears that the inspector
removed the sisters even from their advisory role on the provincial council, a move that
Dufour heartily endorsed. In March 1851, Dufour wrote that the new reforms
“completely bound (enchainé) [the sisters] in every action, they can no longer move
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without the consent of the Lazarists.”94 Further, Dufour wrote that the female superior in
Algeria now found her authority over her fellow sisters “completely limited,” adding that
“I alone am their spiritual director [while] Girard is their temporal director.”95 Dufour
hoped that the new composition of the provincial council would finally “bring peace” to
the mission.
Even this new effort to subordinate the sisters, however, did not end the continued
strife between male and female missionaries. Four years later, Dufour still complained
that the female visiting superior (visitatrice) “shows the coldest indifference towards my
authority.” He attempted to reprimand this sister, but bemoaned that “she had no
intention of ceasing her actions and [said] that she would act according to her own
conscience.” He further alleged that she had “incited [her fellow sisters] to revolution.”96
To bring an end to this continued flouting of the sexual hierarchy Dufour recommended
the extreme measure of abolishing the position of female visiting superior altogether and
placing the houses of the sisters directly and completely under the authority of the
Lazarist superior alone. The administration in Paris showed itself both displeased with
the insubordination of the sisters and upset at Dufour’s inability to alleviate the escalating
tensions. In 1856, the motherhouse acted on Dufour’s recommendation and removed the
position of female visiting superior entirely. It also opted to recall Dufour to Paris and
place a new superior over the houses of the Lazarists and Filles de la Charité in the cities
of Algiers and nearby Mustapha.
These measures seem to have restored a modicum of stability to the houses.
Periodic complaints continued throughout the 1860s, but none as vehement as the
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protests voiced by Dufour. Both the Lazarists and the Filles de la Charité continued to
expand their works as the settler population spread throughout Algeria. Despite their
internal discord, these missionaries owed their success to the patronage they enjoyed
from the military and ecclesiastical authorities. Their story reveals the “little tactics of the
habitat” that female missionaries could employ to gain independence from their male
superiors.97 It also demonstrates the limits of these tactics, as male missionaries
constantly worked to uphold the gendered hierarchy inscribed in both the regulations of
the congregation and the larger and more fundamental organization of the Catholic
Church. To understand the benefits that continued to accrue to these missionaries despite
their disagreements, it is helpful to examine in detail the plight of a missionary
organization that for a variety of reasons found it increasingly difficult to secure powerful
patrons.
The Jesuits in Algeria: A Mission Unravels
The Jesuits present an interesting case study because their story further
demonstrates that by zooming in we can uncover fractures and fragmentations underneath
a seemingly seamless missionary façade. The Jesuit missions unraveled largely because
different Jesuit missionaries could not get along with one another and viewed each other
with suspicion as competing power brokers in this land of opportunity. Further, the
Jesuits struggled to define the very nature of the mission in Algeria. The Jesuit hierarchy
in Lyon and Rome – like the civilian government in Paris – saw Algeria as a simple
extension of the metropole, and as such wanted to run Jesuit establishments there from
afar. Conversely, the missionaries themselves – like the French military – saw Algeria as
97
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a land apart and wanted the freedom to run their mission independently of their superiors
in Europe. Indeed, the liminal state of the mission stemmed directly from the liminal
space that Algeria itself occupied in the larger imperial landscape.
The Jesuits understood well the need to curry favor with the bishop and they
hatched ambitious schemes to win his support. By 1848, the congregation had a residence
of priests in Algiers that ran two nearby orphanages at Bouffarick and Ben Aknoun as
well as a secondary school at Oran. Initially, the Jesuits thought the political changes
brought by the Revolution of 1848 would allow them to expand their works in the colony.
The visiting superior for all the missions in Algeria, the affable if timid Father Reynaud,
hoped that the new French constitution would deny state salaries to official clergy and
thus render the Jesuits “eminently useful, [as] Monseigneur [Pavy] would lose the
greatest portion of his clergy, and as for many of them…he would not lose anything
important.”98 Another Jesuit who oversaw the residence in Algiers, Father Jordan, also
understood the necessity of cultivating favor with the bishop. “In France,” he wrote, “one
does not understand enough that everything is for us based on these intimacies and
relations with the bishop.”99 Jordan worried that the head of the two Jesuit orphanages,
the domineering and assertive Father Brumauld, tried to remain too independent of the
bishop and to “fight the power of the bishop with his own power” (recall that in the mid1840s Brumauld had enjoyed the patronage of Governor General Bugeaud). Jordan put
the matter at its bluntest when he wrote, “I am nothing without the bishop. And when I
say ‘I,’ I mean the entire mission plain and simple.”100 Jordan thus hatched a scheme to
win the bishop’s patronage by presenting him with a donation of 10,000 francs that he
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received from the Propagation de la Foi to fund an “Arab seminary” in Constantine.
“Such an act would leave [Pavy] grateful to the Jesuits forever,” he reasoned, adding that
“if we dare take such a decisive step Algeria will be ours.”101
The Arab seminary, however, proved a great disappointment. The government
tolerated it at first because the Jesuits agreed only to recruit indigenous orphans who had
lost both parents. Its failure, rather, stemmed from internal disagreements among
competing Jesuit superiors. Apparently the Propagation de la Foi thought the seminary
had already begun functioning. Jordan wrote to his superiors in Rome to ask how to
respond to the Propagation. “Of the 1,000 embarrassing questions,” he wrote, “where is
the seminary? Who are the seminarians? Where have the funds gone?” He accused the
Jesuit superior of the two orphanages at Bouffarick and Ben Aknoun, Father Brumauld,
of siphoning the money for his own works and of sabotaging other Jesuit establishments.
Jordan further explained that he could not tell the Propagation that “the men designated
by the superior cannot get along with Father Brumauld…that the Arab seminary consists
of an Arab coffee shop with a couple of Jesuit fathers…that while we await results the
10,000 francs will be used to pay the debts of [the orphanage at] Ben Aknoun.”102 By
1853, Brumauld had succeeded in transplanting the handful of indigenous “seminarians”
to his own orphanages and thus shuttering the misbegotten venture entirely. Within a year
the remaining indigenous orphans had left his establishments and returned to live with
their extended families.
After having alienated the Propagation de la Foi, Brumauld moved to gain
financial support for his orphanages from the French government. He did so by switching
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the focus of his civilizing mission – away from potential Arab seminarians and towards
European children themselves. Brumauld initially opened the orphanages by
transplanting 200 orphans from Paris to Algiers “to aid in the colonization of Algeria.”
To replenish his orphanages Brumauld devised a strategy to round up additional orphans
across France and resettle them in Algeria.103 In 1854, he wrote a letter to Emperor
Napoleon III in which he asserted that the climate of Algeria had rendered the original
200 orphans “robust, as they never would have been in Paris,” especially in agricultural
labor.104 He claimed that the glut of would-be proprietors in Algeria combined with the
shortage of day laborers put the colony “in a veritable and dangerous state of crisis.” The
administration had granted so many land titles, he claimed, that the grand proprietors
could no longer find day laborers to cultivate their fields. Brumauld added that the
smaller proprietors typically had no idea how to run an estate. He thus proposed to rid
France of its costly orphans to “change the destiny of Algeria and provide it with a large
working and farming population.” Ultimately, Brumauld claimed his plan would
transform these orphans “from dangerous and ruinous dregs into precious citizens.”105
Brumauld spent three years lobbying the government unsuccessfully to fund his scheme.
In the meantime, attendance at the orphanages continued to decline. Other Jesuits
blamed Brumauld’s personality for this failure. One Jesuit lamented that “for two years
we have done [the orphans] very little and superficial good that contact with the world
would have soon brought itself.”106 Father Reynaud accused Brumauld of being “overly
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authoritarian towards his inferiors, which is also the cause of our difficulty with the
administration.”107 In 1858, the Jesuits dispatched a visiting inspector, Father Gautrelet,
to ascertain the situation. Gautrelet had little sympathy for any of his fellow Jesuits in
Algeria and wrote that the children “think we exploit them for our profit [and] do not like
us much.”108 (Indeed, another Jesuit claimed that “our house has taken the aspect of a
prison and we have become the guards.”109) Gautrelet accused Brumauld of prioritizing
the exploitation of land and labor over the moralization of children. In a passage of
extreme candor, he confided to his superior:
The orphanages have lost their reputation. Brumauld has exhausted his influence:
bad with the governor general, bad with the prefect and the municipal councils,
seen in Paris as a utopian, he can hardly even give to the orphans the minimal
service he has rendered up until now. He is too rude, too imperious, and too
exaggerated in his requirements. He is hardly better with the bishop than with the
civil administration. He is more feared by our own personnel than he is esteemed.
Reynaud does not dare to resist him and weakens before this iron will.110
Gautrelet recommended that the Jesuits abandon the orphanages entirely. He also
questioned the prudence of Brumauld’s plan to resettle French orphans in Algeria, asking
if “the mother country really wants to colonize Africa by means of its orphans.”111 In this
instance, the success of the two orphanages declined precipitously because their superior
failed entirely to meet any of the requirements for securing patronage in Algeria: he lost
the support of the military, civil, and ecclesiastical authorities; he lost the support of his
own superiors; and he failed to maintain a good reputation for his establishments in the
eyes of the settler population.
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This failure of leadership engendered a discussion over the very nature of the
mission in Algeria. Gautrelet criticized the missionaries by writing that “religious spirit
and orderly discipline are more or less lacking in all our African houses; there is hardly
any morality.”112 He then argued that, just as Algeria constituted an extension of France
and could be run from the metropole, the Jesuits too could run the Algerian mission from
Europe. He went so far as to question whether the establishments in Algeria even
constituted a mission. A true mission, he argued, must procure its own resources rather
than rely on funds from its motherhouse, while true missionaries “devote themselves to
the mission for life” and do not depend on the motherhouse to replenish their personnel
every year. The proximity of Algeria to Europe rendered the mission a revolving door for
curious Jesuits. In this sense, he asserted, “Africa for us is not in the rigorous sense of the
word a mission.”113
For Reynaud, on the contrary, Algeria constituted a missionary land plain and
simple. Of course, as superior of the mission in Algeria Reynaud’s status as a power
broker depended entirely on this assertion. He chided his superiors for thinking they
could “know how to direct our affairs as easily as one can do for the affairs of a
[metropolitan] province.” He summed up his position by stating:
One can never make a society that does not even have a half-century of existence
resemble effectively one whose origin stretches back centuries. If a mission
consists of moving from ordinary conditions of Christian society into
extraordinary conditions based on dates rather than distance, then we are
certainly in a missionary land. The proof is in the repugnance of a great number of
our Jesuits to even come to this country. Many ask if they have been sent here by
punishment.114
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Reynaud cared less about the physical distance between Algeria and Europe and more
about the temporal and developmental lag between the two localities. In this sense, his
argument mimicked that of the European settlers, who saw native Algerians as too
underdeveloped to enjoy the political rights of the metropole; at the same time, however,
Reynaud saw the European population of Algeria as equally underdeveloped and in need
of a civilizing mission.
Indeed, Reynaud blamed the underdeveloped state of the settler community on the
failure of French colonial rule writ large. “We follow step by step the progression of a
colony,” he wrote, “a difficult work in its own right, more difficult still when it falls into
the hands of a nation which does not have a taste for it.”115 He then compared the Jesuit
superiors in Rome to Emperor Napoleon III, who wanted to govern the country at his
whim based on an idealized vision that did not at all correspond to reality.116 In doing so
the emperor constrained the authority of the governor general, who had far better
knowledge of the situation on the ground. In the same way, the metropolitan superiors
constrained Reynaud from effectively running the mission on his own. Reynaud accused
the Jesuit superiors in Europe of “no longer having the taste for this slow and patient
work of Christian colonization just as France does not have the taste for contributing to
the material development of Algeria.”117
In this sense, again, Reynauld built upon existing settler critiques of the overreach
of metropolitan officials in their hapless effort to govern Algeria. Historian Gavin
Murray-Miller has recently argued that “the colonial administration’s supposed disregard
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for the needs and interests of the settler community became a centerpiece of colon
opposition as reformers held the government accountable for the colony’s sluggish
economic development.”118 In their effort to secure independence from metropolitan
authorities, missionaries, like their secular colon counterparts, portrayed themselves as
uniquely positioned to use their more intimate knowledge of local conditions to work for
the benefit of Algeria, though, to be sure, an Algeria in which the native population
remained conspicuously absent. Finally, if missionaries closely resembled civilian settlers
in their desire for autonomy and the competition they engaged in with one another to
secure this autonomy, they still differed from the rest of the settler population in the
ultimate vision that they held for the French territory. Missionaries alone preached a
brand of the civilizing mission for which Catholicism proved the most salient
characteristic.
By 1865, the Jesuit mission constituted a mere shadow of its former self: Reynaud
had lost his battle and been recalled to Marseille; the mission had abandoned hopes of
establishing a secondary school in Algiers; it had closed the orphanage at Bouffarick and
transferred the remaining orphans to Ben Aknoun; and enrollment at the school in Oran
had plummeted and its closure seemed imminent. The Jesuits still had enough priests to
staff their residence in Algiers, but, in an ironic twist that brings this chapter full circle,
the residence began to suffer from internal divisions that split the congregation along
lines of ethnicity. On his tour of Algeria in 1866, Reynaud, now a visiting inspector,
remarked that the Jesuit priests had grouped into competing factions between the Spanish
Confrérie de la Vierge and the Italian Confrérie de St Joseph. “The diverse nationalities
118

Murray-Miller, “Imagining the Trans-Mediterranean Republic: Algeria, Republicanism, and the
Ideological Origins of the French Imperial Nation-State, 1848-1870,” 309.

111

in the house enter into excessive rivalries,” he wrote, adding that they “appear ridiculous
in the eyes of the people.”119 The head of the residence reported that the Italian faction
had nearly come to blows with the Spanish faction after the Italians proposed to hold
separate collections in mass for the Spanish and the Italian parishioners. The Spanish
rejected this plan due to their less numerous followers (and thus their smaller collections).
The superior noted that in Algeria above all “we have a great need…to encourage unity
[while] the factions only create rivalries, divisions, and hostilities.”120 Indeed, the Jesuits’
attempt to win the favor of the military administration by using Italian and Spanishspeaking priests to unify the settler population had actually backfired and only sown
divisions within the congregation itself. Not only did the Jesuits fail to assist the
administration in tying foreign colonists to the French regime, they also only accentuated
ethnic rifts for all the settlers to see. In doing so, they revealed the potential dangers
inherent in the military’s policy of using Catholic missionaries to cultivate a cohesive
settler community. When the Second Empire fell in 1870, and a civilian government
replaced the military regime in Algeria, missionaries would increasingly find their
position under threat.
Conclusion
In the end, if the Jesuits failed, many other missionary congregations succeeded in
spreading their schools and hospital services throughout the colony in the period before
1870. The reasons behind the successes and failures of missionaries reveal much about
the larger position and purpose of Algeria within the European colonial imaginary during
the period of the Second Empire. First, as the missionary archives make abundantly clear,
119
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many missionaries came to Algeria for the same reason as other colonists did: to establish
themselves as power brokers and to carve out positions of authority that remained closed
to them in the metropole. It was not least this desire that ultimately led to competition and
division between missionary congregations and within individual missionary orders. The
missionaries who achieved the greatest amount of success were those, like the Lazarists,
who won the support of highly placed patrons. Female missionaries, meanwhile, were
more likely to find patrons outside of traditional ecclesiastical networks of authority. By
appealing to secular or unauthorized religious authorities they could secure their own
niches of autonomy that overturned the gendered hierarchy of Catholic religious orders.
Secondly, as the language exchanged between missionaries and metropolitan
Jesuits makes clear, Jesuits in Algeria, like their more successful Lazarist counterparts,
not only struggled with one another and with hostile colonial officials; they also worked
to assert their autonomy from metropolitan organs of control, most notably their own
motherhouses. This autonomy was important and even necessary, they came to argue,
because the metropole lacked the critical know-how for navigating the cultural
particularities of Algeria – a colony they framed as exceptional and distinct from France.
Notably, Algeria’s distinctness from the metropole was borne not of the cultural
difference between indigenous and European populations. What made Algeria so
particular and missionary work so urgent was the need to create difference between
populations whose dissimilarities were not yet clear enough. After failing to make
headway in their attempts to assimilate native Algerians to European cultural norms,
missionaries changed strategies and positioned themselves in the vanguard of a

113

movement to spread civilization to the European settler population alone, a move which
would actually better distinguish Europeans from their colonial subjects.
Further, and at the same time, missionary success depended on mimicking the
strategies employed by the wider community of settlers, who struggled either to work on
the outskirts of metropolitan legal confines, within what Frederick Cooper has described
as the “crevices of [colonial] authority,” or to justify their importance to metropolitan
officials by touting their superior knowledge of Algeria and its inhabitants.121 Although
all of these settlers relied on seemingly premodern networks of patronage to climb the
colonial hierarchy, they also hoped to use these networks to create their own version of
modernity as an alternative to the ones they perceived as developing in the metropole.
For missionaries, as the next two chapters show in great detail, this aim entailed the
creation of a Catholic modernity that they saw as increasingly foreclosed in a
secularizing France.
In the end, however, Algeria’s very demographic peculiarity allowed a number of
competing actors to envision vastly divergent plans for the colony’s future, with male and
female missionaries, settlers, and metropolitan officials all struggling to implement their
own visions for French Algeria, a relatively new colony in this period and one whose
central importance to the hexagon was still in the making. As these case studies of
Catholic missionaries reveal, competition among ambitious settlers over the exact type of
modernity they hoped to create in Algeria proved the rule, and cooperation the exception.
It was perhaps this competition that ultimately undermined visions of colonial
assimilation, not only those directed towards the native Algerian community, but also
121
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those that aimed to create a supposedly civilized and acculturated settler community – a
fiction, as we have seen, but a goal that nevertheless remained central to the legitimacy of
empire.
To be sure, despite its many unintended consequences, the military’s unofficial
policy of colonial association through missionary work, while not a total success, neither
proved a total failure. Missionaries did provide for the spiritual needs of a number of
foreign colonists who continued to practice their religion, and in doing so they typically
further tied these colonists and their families to the colony on a permanent basis. We
must keep in mind, however, that in this effort missionaries also further divided the
Catholic foreign population from their largely religiously indifferent, and increasingly
anticlerical, French neighbors. The onset of civilian rule in 1870-71 and the shift in
emphasis towards assimilation as an anticlerical French paradigm would lead to
widespread unrest and threatened to tear apart the diverse settler population. Vocal
protests came especially from the foreign population that remained excluded from
positions of political power. Missionaries and settlers alike would return to the themes of
moralization and the fears of vagabondage and idleness in order to plead their case to
metropolitan and colonial officials.
Even throughout the 1870s, however, missionaries found willing patrons in the
form of the civil governor general, who rather confusingly continued to be chosen from
among the ranks of the military until 1877. Only after this time would the civilian rule of
law slowly begin to trump extra-legal military rule when it came to the administration of
missionaries and foreign settlers. Finally, over the course of the 1870s missionaries also
progressively lost the patronage of their most important ally: the new archbishop of
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Algiers. This archbishop succeeded in bringing his chosen missionaries completely under
his authority by taking the unprecedented step of founding his own missionary
congregation created specifically for Africa and run entirely by the archbishop himself.
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Chapter Three
The Decline of Patronage and the “Long Decade” of 1867-1883
“Our freedom of belief must not be trampled under foot in Algeria in the presence of the
Muslims… as here more so than elsewhere Catholicism must be the national religion of
France.”1
-Letter from the archbishop of Algeria to the minister of war, 19 December 1870.
“The children of foreign colonists will only truly become Frenchmen through the
institution of the school, and they will only go to schools where their parents can find
their religious sentiments satisfied.”2
-Petition from the archbishop of Algeria to the Government of National Defense,
December 1870.
“I told [the governor general] with tears in my eyes that we all as Frenchmen feel deeply
humiliated by his conduct… because he is the highest authority in the colony and he has
allowed his most formal orders to be vilified, spat upon by a horde of demagogues, and
that in my eyes this is the ultimate degradation of my unhappy country… But he said very
painfully that he could not set the country ablaze and spill blood over the question of
schools.”3
-Letter from the visiting superior of the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes to his provincial
assistant, 4 May 1872.
In the years surrounding the proclamation of the Third Republic in 1870,
metropolitan and colonial leaders continued to struggle over how to govern the European
population of the colony as much as the conquered North African population. The
religiosity of the European foreigners provided the main impetus for metropolitan
officials to refrain from fully assimilating Algeria to France on a juridical level and from
dispensing entirely with the quintessentially imperial position of governor general, even
1
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after the supposed switch to civilian rule in Algeria in 1870-71. This hesitancy stemmed
both from the foreigners’ perceived importance for consolidating the hegemony of the
settler community and from their continued lack of political rights.4 Because they could
not express their will through democratic institutions, the governor general took it upon
himself to use his own authority to ensure foreigners could continue to rely on him as a
more personal, extralegal outlet through which to ensure their religious sentiments were
met.
To compound matters, the definitions of and discourses surrounding the concepts
of assimilation and association in this period rose to unprecedented levels of confusion as
political upheavals in the metropole and the colony rendered increasingly opaque what
exactly it meant to be French and, after 1870, to be republican.5 Gavin Murray-Miller has
recently described “the dearth of scholarship examining the relationship between French
republicanism and the colonies prior to the Third Republic.”6 Murray-Miller highlights
the fact that republicans who applied democratic ideals inclusively in France easily
adapted these principles to exclude Muslims in Algeria. At the same time, by eliding the
fact that most foreigners also remained excluded from Algerian politics, Murray-Miller in
a way perpetuates the dichotomous conception of colonial society that he seeks to break
down – one that posits a clear division between colonized and colonizer.
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In Algeria, moreover, it was church officials before and after 1870 who argued for
the more inclusive definition of French republicanism, one that invited all believers
regardless of citizenship status into the democratic fold. If Catholic foreigners won
representation in local assemblies, church officials reasoned, then they could work
democratically to stifle the anticlerical policies championed by the French minority. In
the end, however, self-defined radicals ultimately succeeded in applying their own
conception of republicanism in a more narrow and exclusive manner – one that
disenfranchised roughly 98% of the total population in the territory (and roughly 75% of
the European population, including foreigners and women). This struggle over who held
the discursive and political authority to legitimately articulate republican belonging in
Algeria began even before the fall of the Second Empire and had causes completely
separate from those in the metropole.7 It derived rather from the particular exigencies of
imperial rule and, specifically, the diverse religious and racial demographics that defined
Algeria.
The period 1867 to 1883 witnessed two crises that profoundly shook the territory
of French Algeria. First, in 1867 the greatest famine in Algerian history caused and
combined with a cholera outbreak to kill as many as one million native Algerians. No
sooner had the epidemic subsided than on 4 September 1870 the Second Empire fell to
the Prussian army and a Committee of National Defense in Paris proclaimed the advent
of the Third French Republic. By 1871, prodded by French-Algerian deputies in the
newly elected National Assembly, officials in the Republic moved to institute full civilian
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rule in Algeria. This transition above all entailed the replacement of a military governor
general with a civil governor general, who would work to facilitate the policies of the
colonists and implement a full transfer of power from military to civilian officials.
For many historians, this transfer of power signaled a decisive shift in the history
of French Algeria. Osama Abi-Mershed expresses a general consensus among historians
when he writes that “the uneasy and uncertain relationship between the civil and military
powers in North Africa was not effectively resolved until 1871.”8 An analysis of the
political conflict over missionary work, however, reveals that even in the decade after the
advent of the Third Republic civilian leaders in Algeria remained unable to completely
cast off the yoke of military rule due to continued divisions over the ultimate purpose of
the territory and the best way to go about governing its vast and diverse European
population. What emerged in the 1870s did not resemble a transfer of authority so much
as the failure to create a consensus over who actually held authority in the colony and on
what legal foundation this authority was based.
In addition to having to negotiate their way through these two critical events,
missionaries in Algeria now had the delicate task of appeasing two new sets of actors that
emerged on the colonial scene in this period: Archbishop Charles Lavigerie and the
radical municipal councils of Algeria. Both of these power brokers saw Catholic
missionaries as capable of either transmitting or subverting their own authority in Algeria
and they accordingly worked to bring missionaries completely under their own control.
To be sure, they hoped either to use or dispense with missionaries in order to enact
entirely conflicting visions of modernity in colonial Algeria. Whereas Lavigerie thought
8

Abi-Mershed, Apostles of Modernity, 56. Julien too wrote that “the hostility to the regime of the sword did
not cease to grow until the civil insurrection of 1870.” See Julien, La Conquête, 221.

120

he could harness specific missionaries to transmit his own religious authority throughout
the territory, the municipal councils saw missionaries as sources of religious subversion
that only hindered the extension of their authority as newly-installed secular power
brokers in Algeria.
The first of these new actors, Charles Martial Allemand Lavigerie (1825-1892),
arrived in Algiers on 27 March 1867 following the death of Bishop Louis Pavy. On 25
July 1866 the government in France transformed the bishopric of Algeria into an
archbishopric that now oversaw subordinate bishoprics in Constantine, Oran, and Algiers.
Perhaps best known for his crusade to end the slave trade throughout Africa, Lavigerie
originally inherited an archdiocese that contained 187 parishes, 273 diocesan priests, 54
missionary priests, 70 missionary brothers, and 800 missionary sisters.9 He held his
position until his death on 25 November 1892, by which time he would also oversee, now
as Cardinal Lavigerie, the apostolic vicariate of the new French protectorate of Tunisia,
with its seat in Carthage.
Lavigerie both built on past precedents and vastly expanded the authority of his
office. Most importantly, he succeeded where his predecessors had failed and used his
domineering personality to bring missionaries and their work almost entirely under his
control and oversight. He accomplished this aim by immediately creating his own
missionary society, the Missionnaires de Notre Dame d’Afrique (better known as the
Pères Blancs due to their distinctive white robes), which he hoped would lead the crusade
against Islam and paganism throughout all of Africa. Although Lavigerie would
periodically support other missionary orders in Algeria in the face of government
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opposition, he also ensured that all funds coming from the government and outside
organizations like the Propagation de la Foi and the Propaganda Fide went entirely to his
own congregation. In doing so, Lavigerie ultimately proved a poor patron for all other
missionaries and did little to ameliorate the situation of those persecuted by increasingly
anticlerical authorities. To be sure, he did at times offer some congregations, most
notably the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes (FEC), moral and (however fleetingly)
financial support.10
Secondly, missionaries encountered consistent opposition from radical municipal
councils throughout the territory. This opposition began in 1867, when the municipal
council of Algiers willfully misinterpreted a circular issued by the governor general – a
circular that had as its intent religious toleration – in order to expel missionary teachers
from all public schools in the city. Following the proclamation of the Third Republic on 4
September 1870, this offensive against missionary teachers spread to all the other major
European cities of Algeria.11 An analysis of the ensuing, decade-long struggle between
missionaries and municipal councils contradicts the notion that the onset of the Third
Republic marked the final transition to civilian rule and the full assimilation of Algeria to
the metropole; it also proves that well into the 1870s a unified settler community with a
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common vision for the future of Algeria had yet to emerge.12 By analyzing religious and
educational policies (or lack thereof) we see that into the 1880s the political and juridical
status of the territory remained mired in confusion. Further, while Catholics and the
anticlerical laity both saw Algeria as an area in which to construct an alternate modernity,
they had vastly differing ideas of what that modernity entailed and how to go about
constructing it.
The Arab Orphanage and the Competition for Patronage
The famine of 1867-68 and the ensuing cholera epidemic created one of the largest
demographic catastrophes in Algerian history. Annie Rey-Goldzeiguer estimated that
500,000 people lost their lives over this two-year period, while the geographer Djilali
Sari puts the figure at more than one million.13 In the short term, Algerians’ susceptibility
to cholera in 1868 resulted from widespread famine and starvation, themselves caused by
a combination of the invasion of hordes of locusts and one of the worst droughts in
recorded history. Over the longer term, however, scholars have traced the causes directly
to French imperial policy. Decades of war had ravaged the countryside, while colonial
speculators had snatched up what remained of the best farmland. Although Napoleon III
drafted the sénatus-consulte of 1863 to designate and protect tribal lands from the
rapaciousness of French speculators, in reality disgruntled colonists ensured that the
ruling remained largely unapplied throughout the remainder of the Second Empire.14 As a
12
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result, tribal groups had for years desperately resorted to emptying their silos just to
survive. At the time Europeans proved all too eager to blame the famine on Muslims’
alleged indolence, but as Kamel Kateb has written, “the existence of the silos
demonstrates that…the famine did not stem from the ‘legendary lack of foresight’ in the
indigenous society. These reserve silos were a means specifically of reducing the impact
of drought, locusts, famines, and epidemics.”15
An analysis of the religious policies surrounding the famine and epidemic reveals
how Archbishop Lavigerie moved from bestowing patronage on an already existing
missionary order to withdrawing his patronage from this same order when he succeeded
in establishing his own congregation and installing himself as superior. This maneuver
set a precedent that continued throughout the next two decades of his tenure. Lavigerie’s
correspondence with FEC superior Frère Aimarus and the frères’ correspondence with
one another demonstrate the great lengths to which missionaries went in their attempts to
appease the archbishop. As such, this correspondence testifies to the extent of Lavigerie’s
power, even during the early years of his 25-year tenure in Algeria.
The famine carried off entire families and left thousands of indigenous orphans
and abandoned children in its wake. As historian Bertrand Taithe has written, “no one
knew where the refugees came from nor where they might go but, every morning, corpses
were discovered in the villages near Algiers and in the suburbs of all the colonial
cities.”16 Lavigerie saw the famine as an opportunity to begin the long-desired project of
converting Algeria’s Muslims to Catholicism. The situation proved especially promising
15
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because orphaned children had no living parents to protest their conversion. The move
also came at a propitious time in the history of the colony, as the new governor general
and future first president of the Third Republic, Patrice de MacMahon (1808-1893),
arrived with the (rather utopian) vision of mixing indigenous and European children to
achieve the gradual “fusion of the races,” though not necessarily by conversion to
Catholicism.17
By the spring of 1868 Lavigerie had collected 800 orphans to raise in his own
orphanage. The military had originally housed these children in tents around military
barracks, but their ever increasing number and their high mortality rates in the camp
(1,000 children had already died after three months) rendered the authorities more than
willing to pass them and their expenses onto the new archbishop, who raised funds from
the faithful and even succeeded in setting up an “adopt an orphan” campaign to gain
further resources from charitable Catholics in France.18 To oversee these orphans
Lavigerie initially solicited the help of the FEC. These frères had arrived in Algeria in
1853 after a presidential decree of 24 July 1852 granted them permission “to found and
direct schools in the French possessions of North Africa.”19 The FEC appealed in
particular to Lavigerie and his secular clergy because, as teaching frères and not priests,
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these missionaries could not themselves administer sacraments and thus did not incite the
jealousy of other missionaries or priests in the territory. Indeed, like missionary sisters,
the frères too relied on religious or secular priests to administer the sacraments to them.
This lack of competition encouraged their expansion in the colony and by 1860 they had
opened primary schools for boys in every major European city of Algeria, where they
educated an estimated 4,500 students at no tuition cost, rendering them especially
appealing to the territory’s impoverished foreign population.20
Lavigerie initially hoped to use the frères to marginalize the work of another
group of missionaries: the Jesuits. In this respect, Lavigerie continued the anti-Jesuit
stance of his predecessor, telling his two subordinate bishops in 1868 “not to have
anything to do with the Jesuits, [for] they will take everything and leave you with nothing
but the shirt on your back.”21 Lavigerie largely succeeded where Bishop Pavy had failed,
as over the course of the next decade ecclesiastical and state persecution resulted in the
Jesuits losing control of their last remaining establishments in Algeria.22 Indeed,
Lavigerie saw the Jesuits’ foundering orphanage at Ben Aknoun, with its large alreadyexisting workshops, 17 hectares of vineyards, and 30 hectares of arable land, as the ideal
spot to found his “Arab agricultural orphanage.” In February 1868, Lavigerie proposed
that the FEC purchase the property from the Jesuits for 50,000 francs. Lavigerie promised
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that by teaching the orphans to harvest the vineyards the FEC would easily recoup the
expense.23
Despite Lavigerie’s desire to bestow the work of the Arab orphanage on the FEC,
the visiting superior, Frère Aimarus, initially appeared reluctant to accept the offer. In
addition to the FEC’s already precarious financial situation and their unfamiliarity with
the Arab language, Aimarus feared that work with indigenous orphans could incite
charges of proselytism from unfriendly secular authorities, who feared the political
repercussions that could result from religious affronts to Muslim parents. This accusation,
as we saw in the last chapter, could lead to their expulsion from the colony completely.
Further, a handful of municipal councils in Algeria had already begun to express openly
their anticlericalism, and Aimarus worried that assuming control of such a visible public
project would only exacerbate these sentiments. In this respect, Aimarus perceived
correctly that most settlers in Algeria attached little import in the project of spreading
European values to North African children.
Ultimately, however, Aimarus saw more benefits than drawbacks in accepting
Lavigerie’s offer. First, despite anxieties over proselytism, Governor General MacMahon
had already approved Lavigerie’s orphanage and his proposal to staff it with the FEC.
Second, fear over rising anticlericalism among civilian authorities in fact led Aimarus to
see the orphanage as a way to bolster the FEC’s presence in Algeria if the municipal
councils succeeded in expelling the frères from public primary schools in the European
cities of the territory. As he wrote to his superior in Paris on 2 March 1868, “an
establishment of this type is perhaps the only certain way…of saving our communal
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schools.”24 Aimarus went so far as to tell his superior that “it seems to me that this
question is one of life or death for us in Algeria [as] our communal schools only hang by
a thread.”25 If they did lose control of their communal schools, the orphanage could offer
them an alternative source of public utility in the eyes of the military and allow the frères
to continue to work in the territory and to receive salaries directly from the colonial
budget.
Equally important, Aimarus saw the orphanage as a perfect opportunity to secure
the patronage of the new archbishop. Indeed, when the municipal councils did attempt to
secularize the public schools, Lavigerie’s support would prove decisive. At the same
time, Lavigerie had a reputation as a domineering personality with a short temper. When
Aimarus told Lavigerie that he would have to ask the advice of his superior in Paris
before accepting his offer, Aimarus wrote that “Lavigerie left me in a wretched state, as
he wants the matter to be decided right now,” before adding, “the fact is that he appears
to have all of Algeria in his hands.” Aimarus told his superior that Lavigerie possessed
enormous influence both with the emperor and the Vatican and that he:
has too much generosity to abandon those who put themselves in his hands, but
the least defiance or the smallest deviation from his will infuriates him…[The
orphanage’s] failure would not leave any stain on our reputation [but] if
Monseigneur succeeds without us his opinion of the need he has for us will
likely be significantly modified.26
It was this need to secure such a valuable patron in view of current and potential future
battles with secular authorities that ultimately swayed the superior in Paris to accept a
modified version of Lavigerie’s offer and assume control over the new orphanage. In the
end, Lavigerie himself leased the property from the Jesuits for 15,000 francs (with the
24
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hope of purchasing it entirely in the near future) and ordered the Jesuits to send their
handful of remaining European orphans to other establishments in Algeria and France.
Two Jesuits alone remained at the orphanage to administer sacraments to the frères.27
On 13 April 1868, 12 frères from the FEC arrived at the new Arab orphanage at
Ben Aknoun to, as Aimarus phrased it, “contribute to the regeneration of this bastardized
race.”28 Lavigerie allotted each frère the paltry salary of 400 francs per year, while again
assuring them that soon the products of the children’s labor and agricultural work would
more than suffice to ensure their existence.29 Despite the small salary, Aimarus confided
to his superior that “in the material aspect we lack nothing” and that their lodging and
board were superior to what was found in all the other missions of the colony. They
enjoyed a glass of wine and coffee in the morning, a plate of meat in the afternoon, and a
full dinner in the evening. As Aimarus wrote, “Monseigneur understands that breathing
the same air as the Arabs requires more substantial nourishment.”30 In April 1868 the
orphanage counted 320 children, and by June this number had almost doubled. The
children, one frère remarked, exhibited “a submissiveness that our French children would
not recognize whatsoever,” a comment that likely reflected the children’s fragile
emotional state after the loss of their parents and subsequent displacement.31 The frères
divided the children into groups of 200 (though 400 were soon too sick to work) and gave
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them two hours of education per day with the rest of the day devoted to work in the
gardens, vineyards, or workshops.32
Aimarus’ hopes that meeting the demands of Lavigerie would bring the FEC
success and security, however, proved unfounded. Two factors combined to lead to the
dismissal of the FEC from the orphanage in 1870, just two years after their arrival. First,
the Franco-Prussian War sapped the donations that Lavigerie received from the
metropolitan faithful (he had received nearly 100,000 francs in aid in 1868-9). On 1
September 1870, in the midst of the Battle of Sedan and three days before the
proclamation of the Third Republic, Lavigerie wrote Aimarus that “the increasingly
detrimental impact that the war in France has had on the donations to our orphanage
forces me to restrain all expenses,” adding that “it has become impossible for me to
provide the salaries and the maintenance of your frères and I am forced to reject their
continued aid.”33 He informed Aimarus that the FEC would have to leave the orphanage
by the end of the month.
If geopolitical events proved necessary to separate the FEC from the Arab
orphans, however, they did not prove sufficient. By 1870 Lavigerie had begun to
organize his own missionary society, the Pères Blancs. Despite claiming a lack of funds,
Lavigerie did not abandon the orphans; he simply withdrew his patronage from the FEC.
Over the summer of 1870, Lavigerie had begun to move the orphans and the frères to the
vast estate that housed the Pères Blancs’ new novitiate at the nearby Maison Carrée.34
Once this novitiate had produced a sufficient number of its own missionary priests,
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Lavigerie made the decision to dismiss the FEC and use his missionaries alone to
continue raising the Arab orphans. In this effort, the FEC had merely served as a stopgap
until the Pères Blancs’ novitiate had established itself on a permanent basis.
The fate of these orphans after 1870 has been recounted by Bertrand Taithe and
Karima Dirèche-Slimani.35 Lavigerie instructed the Pères Blancs to found two “ArabChristian” villages, Saint Cyprien and Saint Monique, where they raised the orphans as
Catholics with the ultimate goal of using them to convert the rest of the Algerian
population and ultimately all of Africa. Although the orphans did largely convert to
Catholicism, this conversion only alienated them from Muslim society, and most ended
up marrying Europeans. Further, the handful of these children who went on to receive
higher education – at least one would attend medical school in France – found all
professional avenues blocked to them in the metropole and had to return to Algeria,
where they remained marginalized from European and native Algerian societies alike. As
such, Taithe concludes that “the collective venture proved to be a failure.”36
Regardless of its success or failure, this episode is important for the precedents it
set for the remainder of Lavigerie’s tenure. In addition to acquainting missionaries with
Lavigerie’s authoritative personality, this experience hinted that the archbishop, while
expressing nominal support for other missionary orders, would in the future funnel nearly
all funds – whether from his parishes, from the Propagation de la Foi, or from the
Propaganda Fide – into his own missionary society. Indeed, the FEC’s experience of
marginalization recurred repeatedly with the Lazarists as well, with one priest writing in
35 Taithe, “Algerian Orphans and Colonial Christianity” and Karima Direche-Slimani, Chrétiens de
Kabylie (1873-1954). Une action missionnaire dans l’Algérie coloniale (Paris: Bouchène, 2004). DirecheSlimani’s account does not deal directly with these orphans, but rather with Arab Christian communities set
up by Lavigerie and the Pères Blancs in Kabylie.
36
Taithe, 254.

131

1870 that “Monseigneur proposes to give us work when in reality he negotiates to have it
for himself [i.e. his own missionary congregation].”37 In doing so, Lavigerie succeeded
where his predecessors had failed by forming his own missionary society with himself as
superior and thus ensuring that he exercised total control over these missionaries.
As mentioned previously, Church historians like François Renault have portrayed
Lavigerie as the single most important Catholic clergyman in nineteenth-century Africa.
In the end, however, his self-aggrandizing maneuvers only hindered the development of
the Catholic faith in Algeria by diverting funds from the already-existing Catholic
European population into his own pet projects for conversion – projects that largely failed
and that at the same time made ministering to the European population more financially
unfeasible. The resulting deprivation of funds only exacerbated the difficulties that
missionaries increasingly encountered from civilian authorities. By 1880, valuable
patrons, whether in the form of the bishop of Algiers or the governor general, became
increasingly hard to secure.
Governor General MacMahon and the Proposal of Mixed Schools
At the same time that the frères assumed control of the orphanage at Ben Aknoun, they
also began to find their positions as teachers in Algeria’s communal schools under threat,
especially in Algiers. By 1867, the FEC educated 2,313 students in the capital city alone
with 16 frères receiving annual salaries of 750 francs each from the budget of the
municipal council. The frères taught three times more students than did the city’s secular
schools, whose enrollment in Algiers totaled 835 students, even while lay teachers
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received as much as 2,500 francs per year from the communal budget.38 By the late
1860s, however, a handful of municipal councils in the larger cities of Algeria had begun
to push for widespread secularization of public schools. In many of these municipalities
political exiles of 1848 had recently won elections as city councilmen. As Yvonne Turin
has recounted, these exiles “played a more noticeable role in the second half of the
Empire” than in the first, as they initially lay low to avoid the suspicion that had led to
their deportation to begin with.39 By the 1860s, however, the liberalizing Second Empire
had relaxed its organs of political repression and, in far-off Algeria especially, radicals
felt freer to express their republican sentiments.40
Chief among these sentiments was anticlericalism, which the republicans of 1848
had inherited from the Jacobins of the French Revolution. Although this anticlericalism
remained latent throughout the early years of the 1860s, a circular issued by Governor
General MacMahon on 14 October 1867 gave the municipal council of Algiers the
opportunity to overtly attack the city’s missionary teachers. As it happened, MacMahon
did not intend the circular to apply to the territory’s European schools. Rather, he issued
it to stem Lavigerie’s continued attempts to convert to Catholicism the indigenous Berber
population in mountainous Kabylie east of Algiers. This effort resulted from Lavigerie’s
belief in the widely disseminated “Kabyle Myth,” which posited that due to their
supposedly insufficient Islamicization, their lighter skin color, and their sedentary
lifestyle the Kabyles would more likely accept European culture and religion than the
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supposedly more fanatical, lazy, and nomadic Arab population.41 With this thought in
mind, Lavigerie assigned a number of Pères Blancs and two Jesuits to travel to the mixed
commune of Fort Napoleon to begin their work of proselytization. This effort, however,
only met with failure. As one tribal leader would later write to MacMahon, “we would
prefer to see all our children die than to have them convert to Christianity.”42
It was at this point that MacMahon, worried about the political repercussions of
Lavigerie’s actions, issued his circular of 14 October. The circular had two mutually
reinforcing goals: first to protect the religious sentiments of the Muslim population and
second to bring about the “gradual fusion of the races” (mentioned above). The circular
thus ordered the generals commanding the provinces and the civilian prefects to establish,
where the size of the indigenous population merited, mixed schools (écoles mixtes)43 for
Europeans and North Africans in which “the education…will remain essentially French,
without any bias for religious education, which will be given to children of different
faiths by a minister of their religion: priest, pastor, taleb, or rabbi.”44 The circular aimed,
then, to allow indigenous students to benefit from a French curriculum while at the same
time allotting time for the teaching of Islam as well. In this way, Muslim children would
come to see French society as both tolerant and superior and would thus gradually adopt
41
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it as their own. As many historians have recounted, this goal held no chance of success,
as nearly all Muslims in Algeria saw study of the Quran as the sole purpose of
education.45
MacMahon’s circular sparked the outrage of Lavigerie, who, however much he
desired to spread Catholic civilization to Algeria’s Muslims, had no intention of “decivilizing” Algeria’s Europeans by exposing them to Islamic beliefs and Muslim
customs.46 On 23 January 1868 the archbishop issued a circular of his own that drew on
the racialized conception of imperial rule to argue that the plan would have terrible
political repercussions for the colony. Lavigerie encouraged the government to uphold
the “freedom of belief” of colonial mothers and fathers that held specific importance “for
Algeria more than anywhere else.”47 He lamented that in MacMahon’s circular “the
Catholic priest, that is to say the French representative of the national religion, finds
himself placed on the same rank as the taleb or the rabbi.”48 Further, if Catholic and
Muslim students attended the same school then the state would have to exert “vigilant
surveillance over the Muslim children, whose corruption occurs at such a young age, in
order to prevent contact that would be devastating to our European children.”49 Lavigerie
attempted to turn his Catholic parishioners against the French government by telling them
that the regime asks those “who constitute here the superior and conquering race, to
sacrifice the dearest, most sacred interests of their children in favor of the heinous
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prejudices…and deplorable habits of Muslim children.”50 Finally, lest these fear tactics
failed to work, Lavigerie instructed his clergy to refuse first communion to any child who
attended the mixed schools.51
The competing circulars sparked a media frenzy that further divided the colonial
population. In the words of one frère, the circulars put “the whole city in an uproar and a
polemic began between the good and bad journals.”52 Meanwhile, a Lazarist priest wrote
to his superior that the archbishop’s “absolute, abrupt, and impetuous tone…will lead him
to difficulties that I fear he will never surmount.”53 The priest added that Lavigerie and
General MacMahon had a tenuous relationship and that “unfortunately they carry out
their public spats in writing and the press has a field day with it.”54 Indeed, in April 1868
Lavigerie published an article in Le Courrier Français in which he wrote of the necessity
that “France give religion to the Arabs, or, I do not deceive myself…they will retreat into
the desert, far from the civilized world.”55 In response, the journal Akhbar published an
“edited” version of the same article that quoted Lavigerie disapprovingly as saying that
“France must either convert the natives or expel them into the desert.”56 These polemics
sparked a worried letter from the minister of war, who saw a rift developing between
MacMahon and Lavigerie. The minister expressed his concern to the governor general
that Lavigerie wanted to “end freedom of belief for the Muslims of Algeria.”57 The
minister also wrote to Lavigerie to warn him of the danger of pursuing such a path, but he
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assured the archbishop that he had misunderstood the spirit of the governor’s circular and
that “the governor has always been sympathetic” to the Catholic religion.58
In the fall of 1868, MacMahon demonstrated his support for the Catholic teachers
by clarifying the intentions of his circular. This clarification came after a number of
municipal councils of Algeria moved to willfully misinterpret the circular and rid their
schools of any public religious influence whatsoever. MacMahon did not intend at all for
the circular to ban Catholic education from schools that taught almost exclusively
children from Catholic (or lapsed Catholic) families.59 And indeed, the schools that used
congregationist teachers in the European communes counted, with rare exceptions, only
European children among their students.60 Nevertheless, on 22 November 1868 the city of
Algiers took advantage of an internal change in teaching staff at the FEC’s communal
school on the Rue Doria to inform the frères that it would simply replace the outgoing
teachers with secular teachers (rather than other FEC missionaries). Further, rather than
following the orders of the circular and staffing ministers of different religions, the
council opted simply to use secular teachers to teach “issues of morality that applied
equally to all religions.”61 In making this substitution, the municipal council sought to
apply its own version of secular assimilation to European children by taking advantage of
a little-known ministerial circular of 2 March 1853 (henceforth amended to the Falloux
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laws of 1850), which allowed councils to unilaterally appoint teachers of their choosing
(without consulting the prefect first) upon the “dismissal, retirement, or resignation” of an
existing teacher in the middle of the school year.62 But as the FEC, Lavigerie, and
General MacMahon soon pointed out – and as the last chapter demonstrated in detail –
the Falloux laws and their later amendments remained unapplied in Algeria. As such,
Lavigerie and MacMahon continued to attempt to tie Catholic settlers to the colonial state
by providing specifically for their religious needs.
Nevertheless, other municipalities soon followed the lead of the council of
Algiers. In the town of Sidi-Noussa, the municipality voted to prohibit any priest from
entering the schoolhouse on any occasion whatsoever. Other communes informed their
secular teachers never to speak to children of matters of religion, while the council of
Oran voted to remove the crucifix from all public schools.63 We should note that these
attempts to secularize public schools in Algeria all occurred before any similar attempts
in France, where the authorities exerted tighter and closer control over sensitive matters
like education and where article 23 of the Falloux laws stipulated that “primary education

62

See the circular of the minister of public instruction of 2 March 1853 relative to the nomination of
communal teachers. Octave Gréard, La législation de l'instruction primaire en France depuis 1789 jusqu'à
nos jours. Vol V, 1848-1863 (Paris: impr. de Delalain frères, 1902), 517. See also the explication of this law
in, among many other documents, the petition redacted by Lavigerie in December 1870. FEC NL 460 No 1.
There is an extensive literature that deals with how French public schools replaced Catholic with secular
morality. The legal implementation of this change occurred with the Ferry Laws of 1880-81. In the end,
these different moralities, while important to actors at the time, actually possessed many similarities, as
both stressed the importance of labor, gender, and family roles, with secular morality simply replacing
worship of God with that of the fatherland. See Surkis, Sexing the Citizen; Stephen Harp, Learning to be
Loyal: Primary Schooling as Nation Building in Alsace and Lorraine, 1850-1940 (DeKalb: Northern
Illinois University Press, 1998); and Laura Strumingher, What Were Little Boys and Girls Made of?:
Primary Education in Rural France, 1830-1880 (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1983). For girls’
morality in particular see Linda Clark, Schooling the Daughters of Marianne: Textbooks and the
Socialization of Girls in Modern French Primary Schools (Albany: SUNY University Press, 1984).
63
FEC, NL 460 No 4. Recounted in the Circular from Monseigneur the Archbishop of Algiers to the Clergy
of his diocese relating to the proposal to establish mixed schools in Algeria, 23 January 1868.

138

includes moral and religious instruction.”64 Rather, the secularization campaign of 186768 stemmed from the peculiar exigencies of imperial rule – specifically the lack of
explicit legislation, which was withheld precisely to facilitate imperial rule – and the
juxtaposition of different religions in such close proximity.65 Further, the councils used
the rhetorical, and at most half-hearted, desire of assimilating Algerian subjects to French
culture to in reality pursue their anticlerical agenda. These anticlericals gave little thought
to indigenous beliefs, but used the religious diversity of Algeria to force through
secularizing reforms that they could not yet pursue in the metropole.
To be sure, MacMahon remained a military man, and he had no intention of
allowing civilian authorities to disobey his orders and remove the missionaries from their
teaching positions in purely European schools. He blamed the municipal councils for
wrongly applying the circular and wrote as follows to the prefect of Algiers: “I said that
purely religious education be given to children of diverse religions by a minister of their
religion, but it has been interpreted that the primary schools must not provide any
religious or Catholic education.”66 This problem continued to plague Algeria until the
1880s because at root it stemmed from the lack of any specific legislation over who had
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the right to appoint teachers in the territory. As a result, military, civilian, ecclesiastical,
and metropolitan officials all displayed confusion over who exactly possessed the
authority to govern these matters in the European communes of Algeria. MacMahon
further informed the prefect that:
Until special legislation for Algeria has been passed that states otherwise, it is
that of France which must serve as the basis of our rulings [and]…for the Catholic
students, the teaching of prayers and the Catechism must then in Algeria as in
France continue to form the first object of primary teaching and instruction.67
As we know, MacMahon’s reasoning was disingenuous at best, as his military
predecessors had failed to pass legislation with the express goal that the legislation of
France not necessarily serve as the basis for their rulings.
The municipal council of Algiers seized on this legislative confusion to assert its
own claim to authority and to forge a secular society in Algeria. The council argued
indeed that Algerian educational policy must follow that in use in France, specifically the
amendment to the Falloux laws that on 2 March 1853 (Article 89) gave the councils the
right to choose a new teacher themselves upon the “removal, resignation, or retirement”
of an existing teacher in the middle of the school year.68 The municipality used
MacMahon’s own argument to the prefect to justify applying (its interpretation of)
metropolitan legislation to Algeria and thus allowing the municipal councils to choose
their own teachers. This interpretation would have allowed the Algiers municipality
legally to prevent the appointment of new congregationist teachers at the school on Rue
Doria and to instead replace the outgoing missionaries with secular teachers.
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Faced with this argument, MacMahon backed away from his original stance and
instead moved to highlight the legislative particularities of the territory. Indeed, although
the Falloux laws and later amendments allowed municipalities to name their own teachers
in certain circumstances, article 81 of the law stated that “a ruling of the public
administration will determine the dispositions of the present law which are applicable to
Algeria.”69 This ruling never arrived. In 1850 and on many occasions afterwards the issue
had come up for debate in metropolitan circles, but as MacMahon recounted,
“circumstances did not permit it to have an immediate hearing and the status quo was
maintained.”70 The failure to issue a definitive ruling stemmed initially from the
administration’s desire not to impose an unfriendly teacher on the indigenous population.
At the same time, MacMahon now invoked it to prevent civilian officials from imposing
an antagonistic secular teacher on Algeria’s Catholic European population. Further,
MacMahon noted that municipal councils of Algeria had not chosen their teachers in the
past in part because they did not have any knowledge of the background or personality of
these teachers. He confided to the minister of public instruction that the failure to apply
metropolitan legislation resulted from the fact that “in general it had been difficult for the
municipal councils to give an enlightened opinion [on the teachers] because whether
secular or religious almost all the teachers came from France.”71
Between 1848 and 1870, however, much had changed in Algeria. First, while only
six municipal councils actually existed in 1848, by 1870 the councils “embraced all the
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civil territory of Algeria.”72 Second, years of settler occupation had created a local supply
of Algerian-born French teachers. To this end, an imperial decree of 4 March 1865
established the territory’s first teacher training school (école normale) at Bouzarea, on the
outskirts of Algiers.73 Not only did this local teacher training school allow the councilors
to better know their chosen teachers, but it also received most of its funds from their own
tax dollars. In December 1868, MacMahon himself admitted to the minister of public
instruction that “since they have become elective the municipalities of Algeria, those of
the large cities in particular, show themselves so impatient to exercise their authority that
they have sought to apply metropolitan legislation, and they impose on themselves the
greatest sacrifices in favor of their schools.”74
Although he kept his opinions from the municipal councils and the prefect,
MacMahon hoped to work towards a definitive solution by drafting new legislation. He
further confided to the minister of public instruction that “the dangers of this situation
have begun to reveal themselves with a certain gravity…and the superior authority lacks
the power to resolve them.”75 He encouraged the minister to articulate an administrative
ruling based on article 81 of the law of 15 March 1850. At the same time, MacMahon
hoped that this new legislation would work towards his long desired “fusion of the races”
by applying the directives first outlined in his circular. As we have seen, despite their
constant rhetoric of “assimilation” the municipal councils had no desire to actually
accommodate Muslim beliefs, teachers, or institutions. Indeed, by misinterpreting
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MacMahon’s original circular to banish all religious education schools the councils in
reality ensured no Muslim child ever set foot in a French public school. To be sure, this
outcome mattered little to the municipal councils because they placed their emphasis
rather on assimilating European Catholics to their own version of a secular modernity in
French Algeria.
MacMahon, on the other hand, told the minister of public instruction that the new
ruling must have as its aim to admit Muslim children to the new mixed schools “on as
large a scale as possible” and even “to plan for the case where the number of Muslim
students exceeds by a great deal that of Catholic students, and where the teacher will be
himself a Muslim, drawn from the école normale of Algiers.”76 MacMahon encouraged
the government in Paris to convene a special commission to draft this law. The
commission would have as its head the minister of public instruction supported by the
governor general, the prefect and mayor of Algiers, and two Muslim notables chosen by
the governor general himself.77 This proposal, however, proved utopian at best, for as this
entire episode has shown, the municipal councils and the mayor had entirely different
ideas on the purpose of education than did the governor general, without even taking
account the minister of public instruction, not to mention the two Muslim notables. As a
result, the government failed to enact any definitive legislation before the fall of the
Second Empire.
In the end, MacMahon solved the conundrum of the school on the Rue Doria by
having the minister of war inscribe an annual credit of 6,000 francs in the budget of the
governor general to skirt the law and fund the salaries of the FEC teachers at the school
76
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indefinitely. This act temporarily appeased both the municipal council of Algiers by
removing all financial responsibility from the city budget and Algerian Catholic families
by providing their children with a religious education.78 In other communes, the conflict
temporarily abated due to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War in July 1870, when
the government recalled MacMahon to lead the Army of the Rhine. Not long before his
departure, MacMahon still lamented the lack of “precise and definitive legislation” and
warned that such a “vague and precarious regime can only give birth to numerous
difficulties and conflicts.”79 This prediction proved well founded when the fall of the
Second Empire led to the ascension of radical municipal councils throughout Algeria.
These councils again attempted to enact their anticlerical legislation, but they went far
beyond previous efforts by attempting to dismiss missionary teachers from all publically
funded teaching positions in the territory without any pretext whatsoever. The chaos only
continued through the 1870s because a definitive ruling on public instruction in Algeria
would not arrive until the application of the Ferry Laws on 13 February 1883.
The Third Republic, Radical Municipalities, and Foreign Families
The fall of the Second Empire and the proclamation of the Third Republic on 4
September 1870 unleashed a power vacuum in Algeria. No longer recognizing the
authority of the military governor general, and encouraged by new Minister of War Léon
Gambetta, on 5 September leading colons formed a Republican Committee of Defense
that by October had succeeded in winning the recall of Bonapartist Governor General
Durrieu, setting in motion the progressive abandonment of the Arab Bureaus, and in
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holding elections for new municipal councils throughout the territory. Leadership in
Algeria then fell to the municipal council of Algiers and the Republican Committee of
Defense. Throughout the winter of 1870-71, a series of decrees passed by the
Government of National Defense in France aimed at removing all power from the
military in Algeria in order to attach administrative functions to the relevant civilian
ministries in France.80 Some colonists even went so far as to threaten secession from
France if the military retained the highest positions of authority in Algeria.81
The new leaders in Algeria desired a republican regime, but their idea of
republicanism differed in many important respects from that in France. Put another way,
many aspects of republicanism in Algeria reveal strains of exclusivity in republican
thought that remained latent in the metropole until quite recently.82 First, republicans in
Algeria had a very circumscribed conception of democracy, one that in no way implied
popular sovereignty. In October 1870, male French citizens in Algeria went to the polls to
elect mayors, prefects, and councilmen for all the European communes of the territory.
Although the politicians in Algiers claimed to owe their authority to “universal” suffrage,
they actually owed it to an electorate of just 5,000 people in a city whose population
totaled 70,000. Women, Muslims, and, most importantly for our context, European
foreigners remained politically powerless despite their overwhelming numerical
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majority.83 These disenfranchised elements did of course continue to bear the brunt of the
tax burden.
In addition to its circumscribed nature, republicanism in Algeria connoted a
hatred of the military, which republicans saw as an extension of the despotic regime of
Napoleon III and his Arab Kingdom.84 An article appearing in the journal Le Courrier de
Tlemcen in November 1870 helps illuminate this position. The author remarked:
It goes without saying that the elections could not fail to return republicans
[because] for us the [Second] Empire manifested itself under one of its most
odious forms: the Arab Kingdom, with a caste of French Mamluks [i.e. the army],
exploiting the indigènes and hindering colonization.85
Republicanism in Algeria meant an end to military rule and the Arabophile policies of
Napoleon III, embodied especially in the position of a military governor general and the
detested Arab bureaus. These latter held the responsibility for governing tribal affairs and
protected tribal lands from civilian speculators. As such, they allowed Muslims to
maintain their personal status under Islamic law and to continue to occupy tribal (that is
non-private) property. Civilians had for years called for the assimilation of indigènes to
French society and they blamed the military for preserving native institutions via a policy
of association.
In reality, this accusation served purely as a rhetorical device that allowed the
colonists to further exploit the indigenous population. Specifically, by reorienting the
purpose of the sénatus consulte of 1863 – which attempted to protect tribal lands from
colonial speculators – the civilian administration moved to impose French law on all
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property transactions between Europeans and Algerians. As a result of this effort,
between 1877 and 1920 the colonists would appropriate 1.75 million hectares of tribal
land.86 Finally, the colonists revealed the emptiness of their rhetoric by their efforts to
create a regime of exception to govern indigenous subjects in the form of a separate law
code (the indigénat), special native taxes (the impôts arabes), and the use of forced labor
on public works (the corvée).87
Thirdly, republicans in Algeria – like many of their counterparts in France –
despised the Catholic Church, to say nothing of Islam. As we have seen, this
anticlericalism stemmed in large part from the political clout accumulated by exiles of the
Revolution of 1848. It also owed much to colonists’ association of Catholicism with
Islam, as they repeatedly labeled adherents of both religions with the derogatory epithet
“fanatical.” On 23 June 1873, for example, the Spanish parish priest of the town of
Tlemcen “violently and insistently” accused the city’s “radicals” of delaying the
procession of the Fête-Dieu. This accusation led the mayor’s office to suggest to the
prefect that “it would be good to take measures in order to avoid any scandal that a
fanatical priest could incite among the population if he continued to act this way.”88
At the same time, republican colonists continued to employ the rather contradictory
argument that Catholics offended Islamic sensibilities and thus made imperial rule more
difficult.
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Finally, due to the historical ties between the military and the Church – especially
the patronage shown by military generals for missionary orders in Algeria – republicans
in Algeria quickly moved to cut public funding for all missionary work. In this struggle,
they had the loyal support of most organs of the press, which “adopted a language that
Marat would not have disowned.”89 To this end, as Yvonne Turin has briefly recounted,
on 15 October 1870 the mayor of Algiers informed all congregationist teachers in the city
that by the end of the year they must evacuate all the communal schools of Algiers.90 By
the end of 1871, the communes of Blida, Mustapha, St Eugène, Douera, Tènes,
Constantine, Bône, Philippeville, Oran, and Tlemcen had followed suit. Ultimately, these
municipalities hoped expulsion would help them to achieve “the complete separation of
church and commune.”91 Turin draws the astute conclusion that the communes failed in
their efforts because of the influence of the large Catholic population of Spanish, Italians,
and Maltese, the intransigence of Archbishop Lavigerie, and the panic caused by the
Kabyle uprising of 1871.92
Although Turin correctly concludes that the communes failed in the short term,
she neglects to tease out the wider implications that this failure held for the transition
from military to civilian rule in Algeria. Lavigerie’s success in convincing the governor
general to overturn the anticlerical actions of the communes reveals the continued
inability of civilian officials to overthrow military rule and to fully assimilate Algeria
with France on a juridical level. At the same time, however, by extending Turin’s
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analysis throughout the decade, we see that while the governor general may have won the
battle in the early years of the 1870s, by the early 1880s he and his successors had lost
the war. Indeed, despite an official decree by the counseil d’etat that aimed to reinstall
the congregationist teachers in 1872, radical municipalities stubbornly continued to
refuse to actually reinstate these missionaries. This conflict was exacerbated by the
metropolitan state’s failure ever to extend definitive legislation to Algeria in matters of
religion and education. Finally, in 1883 the intransigence of the councils forced the
government to apply the Ferry laws of the metropole onto Algeria.93 These laws rendered
primary education free, secular, and obligatory and, finally, marked the definitive legal
assimilation of the European cities of Algeria to France in matters of education. To be
sure, the desired aim of this assimilation remained elusive due to continued resistance
from below, as the territory’s foreign (and still disenfranchised) population still saw the
Catholic religion as a vital source of identity and belonging.
In the immediate aftermath of the expulsion of the congregationist teachers in
1871, Archbishop Lavigerie mounted a stern defense of their public utility. At this point,
he still hoped to get these teachers’ salaries re-inscribed in the municipal budgets in the
near term. He wrote to the FEC superior in December 1870, “my clergy and I have
decided to take all measures possible…to conserve your care over the children in our
schools.”94 Lavigerie told the frères that he and his clergy would provide resources to
allow the FEC to open new private schools (écoles libres) and he welcomed the frères to
lodge for the time being in his episcopal palace. Finally, Lavigerie created a Committee
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of Patronage of Catholic Schools, administered by him with the help of his clergy and the
faithful of the territory, to channel donations to the congregationist teachers.95
Lavigerie saw these measures as providing only a temporary stopgap during what
remained a chaotic political transition in Algeria and in France (he had no intention of
acting as a permanent financial patron for the schools of the FEC). In December 1870, he
appealed to the metropolitan government to overturn the decisions of the municipal
councils. He did so by employing the racialized rhetoric that had served him so well in
1868, informing Minister of Justice Adolphe Crémieux that colonists’ freedom of belief
“must not be trampled under foot in Algeria in the presence of the Muslims…as here
more so than elsewhere, Catholicism must be the national religion of France.”96 At this
point, however, the provisional government in France maintained a fiercely republican
bent, and the minister responded to Lavigerie that the juxtaposition of different religions
in Algeria meant that the Government of National Defense could not “force the
communes to conserve a mode of primary education that presents in their eyes a
monopoly for the benefit of one religion alone.”97 Crémieux – himself famous for the law
that granted automatic French citizenship to Algeria’s Jewish population – supported the
spread of secular education and championed the schools’ “absolute disinterestedness in
matters of religion.” And yet, he refrained from pursuing any definitive legislation,
writing that he would “leave to the future national assembly the problem of finding a
solution that conforms best with the interest and grandeur of the Republic.”98
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Lavigerie then resorted to what seemed to him a quintessentially republican
method of protest: an appeal to popular sovereignty. In December and January, Lavigerie
organized a petition that in the city of Algiers alone collected 7,000 signatures, a number
that exceeded by far the 5,000 citizens listed on the electoral ballot (though to be sure
many of Lavigerie’s signatures came from women and children).99 The petition claimed
that in the name of liberty and equality the governor general must overturn the “arbitrary”
rule of the municipal councils. The petition demanded that the government uphold the
freedom of belief and the right to education for the families that constituted a majority in
Algeria. Ultimately, it appealed to a different ideal of French belonging by claiming to
speak “for the colonists from Alsace and Lorraine who…have at heart Christian
sentiments, for the Maltese, Spanish, and Italian foreigners who are as numerous in the
colony as the French themselves and who do not have any political rights.”100 The
petition also claimed that the religious schools served the assimilating interest of
colonization as “the children of foreign colonists will only truly become Frenchmen
through the institution of the school, and they will only go to schools where their parents
can find their religious sentiments satisfied.”101
Lavigerie’s rhetoric resembles the “creole medievalism” described by Michelle
Warren that emerged in the thought of Joseph Bédier (1864-1938), a French colonial
from La Réunion. Bédier and a number of other creoles – by which Warren means the
white French colonial elite – located French identity in a medieval past, long before the
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rise of anticlericalism, and claimed that the creole community of La Réunion embodied
this identity better than did the French of the metropole.102 Lavigerie too appealed to a
rapidly disintegrating ideal of Catholic France in order to champion a version of
modernity that was denied him in the metropole. Unfortunately for Lavigerie, his
opponents also hoped to use Algeria to create their ideal of secular France, an ideal which
– rather than locating French identity in the medieval past – looked back towards the as
yet unrealized Jacobin ideals of the Revolution of 1789 in order to forge a modernity that
had not yet come to fruition in metropolitan France. Both groups grew out of a long
tradition of colonial actors, most notably the Saint Simonians, who saw Algeria as a
space in which they could create their ideal society, one they nevertheless both saw as
quintessentially modern.103
Secondly, Lavigerie’s argument in part recalls that of Governor General Bugeaud
and Minister of War de Soult in the 1840s (see Chapter Two), as the two generals hoped
to use Catholic missionaries to tie foreign colonists to the nascent colony. At that time,
the two military men pursued a policy of association by providing for the particular
religious needs of foreigners in order to cultivate their loyalty to the colonial regime. In
this instance, however, Lavigerie, while maintaining the importance of Catholicism,
claimed that religious schools would assimilate these foreigners to what he saw as a
normative French society. Again, however, he did so by appealing to an aspect of French
culture, Catholicism, that most French in Algeria and most members of the provisional
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government cared little for, and some downright detested. Indeed, throughout this period,
whether championed by the clergy or by the civilian regime, efforts of assimilation
repeatedly foundered due to ongoing struggles over what exactly it meant to belong to the
French nation. The petitioners thus drew on two previous, and previously contradictory,
strands of thought in colonial policy, rendering their argument fundamentally problematic
and difficult to implement.
By 1871, however, a confluence of events served to sway opinion in France
towards the side of Lavigerie and the congregationist teachers. First, as Lavigerie
predicted, many families refused to send their students to the newly organized schools.
Statistics for the city of Algiers show that before the secularization campaign a total of
2,633 students attended congregationist communal schools in Algiers, compared to 1,270
students in secular communal schools (for a total of 3,903 students). By July 1871, only
2,094 students attended the (now all secular) communal schools in the city, marking a fall
in enrollment by almost half.104 According to the prefect of Algiers “the establishments of
the congregations, having made themselves private, have not seen a noticeable decline in
attendance, and they still count today 2,158 students thanks to the favor they enjoy with
Spanish families.”105 The congregationists had lost public funding, but they now received
(much reduced) salaries and lodging either from voluntary tuition paid by wealthier
parents or from Lavigerie’s Committee of Patronage of Catholic Schools.
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Moreover, in cities where the clergy could not support the frères’ private schools,
many children ceased attending school whatsoever rather than move into the secular
schools. In Oran, the bishop argued that the lack of Catholic schools had begun to unravel
the fabric that held colonial society together. He wrote to the minister of justice that many
local children now sat “in the most dangerous idleness and most alarming vagabondage,”
thus situating them in the same conceptual framework used to denigrate and exclude
Algeria’s Muslim colonial subjects.106 He further expressed his fear that many families
who could no longer rely on Catholic education “will hasten to leave this country.” These
colonists, he argued, came to Algeria precisely because metropolitan and colonial
lobbyists ensured them they would “find the parish priest of their village and the sisters to
instruct their children.”107 The project of the municipal councils thus threatened their
entire existence. The bishop contended that the Catholic religion alone could “form bonds
between colonists of different nationalities…who only come together at the church.”108
Other clergymen expressed their fear that by specifically restricting the rights of
the Catholic population the administration threatened to overturn the colonial order of
things. In June 1871 the municipal council of Mostaganem passed a law prohibiting
traditional Catholic processions on holy days (specifically the Fête-Dieu) on the grounds
that they offended the city’s non-Catholic population. A local parish priest asked how the
councilors could prohibit this procession “while they suffer without a word all the noisy
public processions of the Muslims.”109 He further observed that Muslims and Jews have
offered public prayers in times of drought, and while he “did not blame them for this
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drought” he could not understand why city authorities allowed these prayers in public
while prohibiting Catholic ones. Finally, he asked why nobody had “ever prevented the
blacks from making in town their disgusting processions, leading a cow whose neck is
half cut off and whose blood soaks its shoulders, all accompanied by the tam tam and the
most lascivious cries and gesticulations.”110 In the eyes of the parish priest, the secular
policies of the municipal council forced France, the supposedly dominant nation, to
renounce its religious ceremonies entirely and subordinate itself to the superstitious
beliefs of its uncivilized colonial subjects.
The second event that helped tip the scales in favor of the missionary
congregations was the appointment on 21 March 1871 of Louis Henri, the Comte de
Gueydon, as the first “civil” governor general of Algeria. Despite his civilian title, de
Gueydon had previously served as vice admiral in the French navy and as military
governor general of Martinique. He had no intention of subordinating himself to radical
civilian municipal councils (de Gueydon would eventually win election to the national
assembly as a royalist in 1885).111 Upon arriving in Algeria, de Gueydon stated publicly,
“I have spent my life protecting Catholic missions around the globe. I cannot allow them
to be persecuted on French territory.”112 De Gueydon’s appointment stemmed from
another key event that hindered the transition to full civilian rule: the Kabyle insurrection.
Shortly before de Gueydon’s arrival, tribal leaders, fearful of the extension of civilian
rule over previously protected indigenous lands, rose up and began laying siege to French
towns and killing French soldiers. As John Ruedy has written, “the prospect of rule by
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the colons, who had made no secret of their program for Algerian society, filled the
country with fear” and itself contributed to the very uprising the colons claimed they
would prevent.113
On 5 May 1871, Muhammad al-Hajj al-Muqrani, the insurrection’s leader and an
erstwhile ally of the French military, died from a shot to the head. 114 But the rebellion
continued throughout the spring and summer of 1871, as de Gueydon moved to extend
martial law over much of Algeria, including the European communes. De Gueydon used
his extraordinary powers to, among other things, attempt to overturn the secular laws of
the radical municipalities. Turin has argued that the insurrection occasioned the
reconciliation of the squabbling colonists and the backing down of the municipal
councils.115 In April 1871, however, de Gueydon wrote to the minister of war that he had
thought the Kabyle insurrection would “calm the revolutionary fervor of the commune of
Algiers…but far from this the newspapers become each day more aggressive.”116 More
importantly, de Gueydon contended that the chaos surrounding the municipal councils
has “certainly contributed more than anything else to causing this insurrection and giving
the Arabs the spectacle of our weakness and disorganization.”117
Further, de Gueydon understood the political importance of the religious
sensibilities of both the rebels and the foreign colonists. As Ruedy has written, “most
Muslims pitied the minority of Frenchmen who were observant Christians and held in
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secret contempt those who were not.”118 De Gueydon thus began to see the
congregationists’ reintegration as a pressing political necessity. The general wrote to the
minister of war to ask if “one could protest that in suppressing the congregationist
schools the municipality of Algiers has harmed the sentiments of the majority of heads of
families?” He lamented the “moral violence committed upon colonial fathers,” which had
caused a further decrease in the number of students at an increased expense for the
government. “The question is serious,” he concluded, “a solution is urgent.”119 This
urgency to appease family fathers can also be understood in the context, described by
historian Judith Surkis, of a simultaneous attempt by the government in France to
mobilize a wide array of institutions and propaganda in the hope of using fathers to tie
families to the French nation.120 At the same time, while the secular school provided a
primary site for the transmission of this propaganda in France, military leaders in Algeria
saw the peculiar demographic situation of Algeria as requiring the continued use of
Catholic schools to achieve this same end.
To achieve this goal, de Gueydon preferred to implement a dictatorial solution
that entirely disenfranchised the municipal councils. He clearly expressed his vision for
the future of Algeria in a conversation with the Lazarist Father Doumerg, telling him that:
Many laws applied in France must not be in Algeria, and universal suffrage even
less so. Seeing as the indigènes, Jews, foreigners (and most French conservatives)
do not vote, the elections will always be unfailingly radical, since the voters are
political deportees or hardly better.121
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By “universal suffrage” de Gueydon meant suffrage by all male French citizens. Such
sentiments led other missionaries to try and curry favor with the governor general by
appealing to his undemocratic sentiments. In 1871, FEC superior Frère Aimarus wrote to
de Gueydon about his admiration for other colonies where education “instead of being
left to arbitrary passions of individuals is ruled by the higher administration…which
retains the exclusive direction over such an important question.”122 Aimarus went so far
as to contend that this divergence in educational policy could explain the failure of
Algeria to attract colonists to the same extent as other settler colonies, specifically the
English colonies of Australia and South Africa.
At the same time, the municipal councils still possessed great leverage and de
Gueydon sought to offer them a compromise that he secretly thought would ultimately
redound to the exclusive benefit of the congregationists. In the words of de Gueydon’s
ally, the superintendent of Algiers, this compromise consisted of “reestablishing in the
communal budget the congregationists’ salaries, without suppressing the lay schools
founded by the cities.”123 De Gueydon added that municipal councils could issue free
tuition reimbursement (cartes d’enseignement) to poor families to allow them to send
their children to the school of their choosing. De Gueydon surmised that in a territory
with so many foreign families this system would eventually lead to the closure of the
secular schools due to a lack of students.124 His “compromise” thus masked a solution
that he hoped would serve to reinstate the Catholic teachers everywhere in the public
schools.
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De Gueydon proved a valuable and willing patron for all missionaries in Algeria –
something they had lacked since the recall of Governor General MacMahon and the
political void left in his wake. In October 1871, De Gueydon’s successful suppression of
the Kabyle insurrection won him great sympathy and support in Paris. In France itself the
new government led by Adolphe Thiers had succeeded in brutally suppressing its own
radical communards in the capital.125 With relative stability finally on the horizon there
began to take shape the so-called government of Moral Order, led by former Governor
General MacMahon himself, and the new regime sought to distance itself from the radical
ideas of the communards by recovering France’s “traditional” values.126 In 1872, then,
circumstances converged to allow the governor general to work with the new government
in Paris to rein in the power of the municipal councils and to continue to thwart attempts
to institute full civilian rule in Algeria. Two years after the creation of the Third
Republic, Algeria still remained under military rule and this situation stemmed directly
from the importance of protecting the religious sentiments of the disenfranchised foreign
population of the territory.
As such, de Gueydon received free reign to reinstate the congregationist teachers
against the will of the municipal councils. Rather than passing any definitive educational
legislation, or even creating a compromise situation, on 22 February 1872 de Gueydon
informed the prefect of Algiers that “the minister of public instruction has delegated all
his authority to me and it is thus to me alone that you must henceforth address yourself
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for everything concerning this matter [of the schools].”127 On 21 and 27 March 1872, de
Gueydon issued two decrees that declared null and void the municipal councils’ decision
to secularize the communal schools. He instructed the prefects in the three departments of
Algeria to ensure that their municipal councils reinstated the congregationist teachers
immediately.128 Unable to solve the question based on the rule of law – as no law yet
existed – the military governor general issued an executive decision that superseded the
authority of the civilian municipal councils.
Although Turin concluded that the situation of the schools ended with the
decision of the governor general, in fact even this executive and fully authoritarian act
failed to tame the recalcitrant municipal councils, as they persevered in the struggle to
institute their own peculiar brand of republicanism in Algeria.129 In France, the
government had long since reinstated congregationist teachers expelled by radical
municipalities during the height of the Commune. In Algeria, however, the struggle
continued. In June 1872, the municipal councils of Algiers and Constantine filed a formal
appeal with the Council of State (conseil d’état) to overturn the decree of the governor
general that aimed to reinstate the congregationists. The appeal claimed that the governor
general had exceeded his authority and acted illegally by violating the laws of the
metropole, which as we have seen allowed the prefect to name communal teachers based
on the advice of the municipal councils. For his part, de Gueydon sought to influence the
Council of State by writing to the ministers of the interior and public instruction that the
issue “is a political question of the highest order and the administration must take it upon
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itself to decide the question authoritatively (autoritairement).”130 The Council of State
would take almost a year to issue its decision.
In the meantime, the situation continued to threaten the very foundation of
imperial rule. The municipalities openly flouted the decree of the governor general and
refused to pay the salaries of the congregationists. In the opinion of Frère Aimarus, de
Gueydon had “lost and lost without honor” in his struggle with the municipal councilors,
who called his decision “illegal” and pushed for his recall to France. Aimarus wrote to his
assistant:
I told [the governor general] with tears in my eyes that we all as Frenchmen
feel deeply humiliated by his conduct…because he is the highest authority in the
colony and he has allowed his most formal orders to be vilified, spat upon by
a horde of demagogues, and that in my eyes this is the ultimate degradation of my
unhappy country…But he said very painfully that he could not set the country
ablaze and spill blood over the question of schools.131
The governor general himself recognized the futility of his decree and wrote to the
minister of public instruction on 9 May 1872 that although his ruling returned all the
rights to the congregationist teachers, it “remains a dead letter and is attacked as illegal
by the municipal councils of Algiers and Constantine.”132
The conflict escalated throughout 1872 and even threatened to cause an
international incident. In May the prefect of Constantine wrote that the congregationist
teachers at the private school of Philippeville had run out of resources and had begun to
make plans to return to France. In response, the frères’ supporters drew up another
petition signed by 790 inhabitants, including 300 French, 490 Italians and Maltese, as
well as the English consul (representing the Catholic Maltese population) and the Italian
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and Spanish consuls. As Lavigerie himself later asked, what would France do “if we went
to war with one of these nations, Spain, for example? Do we not fear the 70,000 Spanish
colonists who populate our cities and farms?”133 The superintendent of Constantine wrote
that “the assembly still believes itself authorized to treat this mass of people as a minority
because the bulk of the children come from foreign families.”134 He pointed out, however,
that these families still provided half of the city’s tax revenue and thus felt they had a
right to help decide the religious orientation of the city’s public schools. In response, the
prefect wrote to the minister of public instruction that the French radicals “see a political
danger in favoring too much the foreigners,” adding that “the French of Algeria are
radical by their own standards, without being in any way egalitarian with the
foreigners.”135
In the town of Tlemcen, this rift between the foreigners and the French boiled
over into violence. On 7 June 1872, a petition published in the local newspaper claimed
to speak in the name of “the students in tears, the indignant masses, the frères pulled from
their houses, mistreated, beaten, trampled under the eyes of the fathers and mothers of
these families.”136 The local newspaper the Courrier de Tlemcen reported that when the
police came to take the keys from the schoolhouse “the frères chained themselves to the
benches and the tables. One of them tried to grab the neck of the inspector who, seizing
the frère by the arms, led him to the police station.” The paper reported that the next day,
when the police shut the classes with padlocks, “the police chief had hardly left when the
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padlocks were broken by the frères and the children were recalled.”137 Despite these
increasingly commonplace episodes, the metropolitan government continued to refrain
from issuing any definitive legislation, leaving everyone confused as to who actually held
authority in the colony.
Finally, on 23 May 1873, the Council of State issued its decision to reject the
appeals made by the municipal councils. The government informed the municipalities
that they must reinstate the congregrationist teachers on 1 October 1873, the first day of
the school year. Because even this ruling did not result in more definitive legislation,
however, unforeseen circumstances meant that many previously Catholic schools would
continue to lack congregationist teachers. As late as December 1873, the communal
schools in Tlemcen, Mostaganem, Bône, Philippeville, and Oran still employed the new
secular teachers. In these towns, preexisting contracts between the FEC and the
communes that dated from the 1850s had stipulated that in the case of removal of the
frères before the end of their contracts the communes must pay the equivalent of six
months’ salary for each frère and moving fees for the return to France. These communes
had agreed with the frères to pay these fees and thus the frères had renounced their
contractual right to their positions as communal teachers. The municipalities thus saw it
as their legal right to replace the departed frères with teachers of their choosing since the
congregationists had voluntarily left. At the same time, despite this voluntary departure,
settler petitions continued to circulate for the reintegration of the congregationist
teachers. The governor general thus found himself in the position of having to actually
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appoint new and different congregationist teachers.138 The petitions of the largely foreign
population thus forced him to go beyond even the text of the decree issued by the Council
of State: rather than “reappointing” the old frères he had to name entirely new ones and
thus assume for himself the authority to name new communal teachers in Algeria without
having any legal foundation for this act.
In the end, the council’s decision did not solve the fundamental problem of the
lack of legally conferred authority in the territory, a problem that continued to plague
Algeria throughout the decade. The failure to reinstate the religious teachers led the
governor general (now Antoine Chanzy) to write to the minister of the interior and
complain again of the “absence of all legislation in the matter of public instruction.” He
admitted that despite his act he had no actual legal ability to appoint new missionary
teachers, writing in near desperation in October 1873, “I am thus led to ask myself who
currently possesses the authority in Algeria to legally name a primary school teacher.”139
Presented with no precise legislation, with hostile municipal councils, and with unwieldy
foreign parents, Governor General Chanzy temporarily opted to assume himself all
expenses related to the reinstallation of congregationist schools, which now functioned
alongside lay schools funded by the communes. This precarious situation lasted for the
next two years until it began to drain the resources of the office of the governor general.
Finally, on 15 August 1875, the long-awaited decree on public instruction in
Algeria arrived. It granted temporary respite to the congregationists while pointing the
way forward for full civilian rule in the foreseeable future. The decree granted all
authority over education to the minister of public instruction, who would rule on the
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advice of an academic council in Algiers composed of the superintendent as president, his
academic inspectors, and the heads of the faculties of the secondary schools. In addition,
the law stipulated that the superintendent appoint primary school teachers – for both
public and private schools – from a list drafted either by the departmental council or by
the superior of an authorized religious association, respectively.140 The ruling stipulated
that the congregationists who currently worked in communal schools would continue in
their functions until the expiration of their individual contracts with the communes, at
which point “the municipal council will be allowed to express its opinion on the
continued employment of the congregationist teachers or their replacement by lay
teachers.”141
This ruling, while appeasing missionary orders and foreign families in the short
term, would only exacerbate their precarious position in the longer term. It also marked a
key moment in government policy towards the foreign population of Algeria, as from this
point forward the policy of assimilation to an anticlerical and universal cultural norm
would consistently win out over that of association based on particular (religious)
sentiments. This is not to say, however, that the policy would fail to encounter difficulties
in the form of foreigners who still desired that their children receive a Catholic education
and missionaries who continued to have a different conception of what French national
belonging entailed, especially in an environment as religiously and racially diverse as
Algeria’s.
Cardinal Lavigerie and the Decline of Ecclesiastical Patronage
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The ruling on public instruction in Algeria on 15 June 1875 marked the first step on the
path to full assimilation with the metropole in matters of public instruction. This path
culminated on 13 February 1883, when the metropolitan government opted to apply the
Ferry laws of 1880-81 to Algeria in full (for European inhabitants). The ruling of 1875,
however, did not solve the problems surrounding the foreign colonists of Algeria, who
would not gain the political rights of Frenchmen until the 1889 law of naturalization. As a
result, when congregationists’ contracts with municipal councils expired, the former
moved to open private schools to continue serving the Catholic inhabitants of the
territory. Although Lavigerie initially instructed his clergy to offer these schools their full
support, including substantial economic assistance, the rising anticlericalism and the
systematic defunding of the Catholic religion in Algeria put increasing strains on the
relationship between the archbishop and his secular clergy on the one hand and all the
missionary congregations on the other. At the same time, Lavigerie continued to divert
financial resources from other missionary congregations to fund his own missionary
order, the Pères Blancs.
Upon the expiration of contracts in the late 1870s and early 1880s, the fate of
publically funded Catholic schools in Algeria fell entirely to the discretion of the
municipal councils. Many municipal councils expressed the opinion that foreign parents
only sent their children to Catholic schools out of habit. As a municipal councilor of
Philippeville opined to the council in 1879, “the foreign parents [are] for the most part
illiterate and thus incapable of appreciating the value of one type of education over
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another.”142 Most municipal councils thus voted to install lay teachers in their public
schools in order to assimilate these foreign children to their ideal of French secular
culture. By 1881 the FEC could only count two remaining communal schools, those at El
Biar and Stora, with six frères alone continuing to receive salaries from local
governments.143 At the same time, the FEC still had 93 total frères in the colony (66 of
whom did not possess the brevet de capacité), and these frères worked to open private
schools in order to continue to meet the demand of largely foreign families for Catholic
education.144
To do so, the FEC had to rely on the largess of Lavigerie, his subordinate bishops
and appointed clergy, and individual families. Unlike in the early 1870s, Lavigerie now
began to recognize that FEC schools would have to rely on him as a permanent source of
funding for their continued existence. In many instances, Lavigerie and his clergy chafed
at this prospect. In Mostaganem, for instance, the FEC opened a private school funded by
the local clergy after the municipality had secularized the communal school in 1877. By
1879, however, the school’s director, Frère Ignatius, wrote to his superior that they would
have to close the school for a lack of funds. He claimed that while the clergy had offered
its support initially, “now that [the school] is open and functions as well as
possible…everyone seems to withdraw this support and abandon us.”145 He specifically
blamed the local parish priest who “has turned against us…[he] leaves us to struggle and

142

FEC NL 473. Deliberation of the municipal council of Philippeville, 1879.
To be sure, at this point female congregationists still enjoyed slightly greater acceptance, as many
municipalities continued to fund missionary sisters due to a lack of secular female teachers.
144
FEC NL 460 No 5, Letter from Frère Aimarus to his superior in Paris 12 June 1881. Since the Falloux
laws of 1850, secular teachers had to possess the brevet to teach at communal schools, while members of
missionary orders only needed a “letter of obedience” from their superior. This allowance ended with the
Ferry Laws.
145
FEC NL 471, Letter from Frère Ignatius to Visiting Superior Frère Aimarus, 13 May 1879.
143

167

makes it seem that we embarrass him.”146 The priest promised Ignatius a salary of 900
francs per month supplemented by another 500 francs from the bishop of Oran, but
neither payment ever materialized. Ignatius wrote that although the school counted nearly
100 students, these children comprised “the dregs of the city [and they] can give us
nothing.”147 By May 1879, Ignatius had to shut the school and return to Algiers. A similar
course of events unfolded in numerous European cities of Algeria.
Missionaries also suffered due to the continued growth of Lavigerie’s own
missionary orders. Reflecting on the situation in 1892, Lavigerie’s successor wrote that
the late cardinal, “preoccupied exclusively with his own missionary works [i.e. those of
the Pères Blancs], has channeled in their favor the vast majority of the credits that the
Propagation de la Foi has opened to this diocese.”148 Lavigerie’s own letters to the
Propagation de la Foi and the Propaganda Fide corroborate this accusation. As early as
1874, Lavigerie requested the unprecedented sum of 459,000 francs from the Propagation
de la Foi, all of which he designated for his own missionary societies, specifically in their
work in the Arab-Christian villages and in their attempt to penetrate deeper into the
Sahara and Equatorial Africa.149 Two years later, Lavigerie told the cardinal prefect of the
Propaganda Fide in Rome that “I very strongly request your eminence to reserve for [the
Pères Blancs] alone the new missions to found in all of North Africa.”150 When the
Propaganda Fide considered funding a second missionary society to aid the Pères Blancs
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in their mission in the Sahara, Lavigerie warned that “two missionary societies side by
side will lead to injurious competition and, ultimately, serious scandal for the church.”151
Thus, by 1880 most missionary orders in Algeria had largely lost the patronage on
which they had relied since the conquest in 1830. On an ecclesiastical level, Lavigerie
progressively shifted his focus away from the imperative of spreading Catholic
civilization to the settler population and toward converting the Muslim population, an
effort that would swallow hundreds of thousands of francs and yield very meager results.
Nevertheless, by ensuring that all funds flowed through his office and by channeling
those funds to his preferred missionary orders, Lavigerie emerged as the most powerful
bishop in the history of French Algeria, even if his ascension to power did little to help
the numerous missionaries who worked with the European population of Algeria. On a
secular level, 1879 saw the appointment of Albert Grévy – brother to President Jules
Grévy – as the first truly civilian governor general of Algeria.152 The arrival of a civil
governor general signaled the abandonment of the military’s policy of funding
missionaries to tie Catholic settlers to the colonial regime. Henceforth colonial officials
would pursue a strict policy of assimilation based on the conception of republican
universalism emerging at the same period in metropolitan France.
Although both the civilian leadership and Lavigerie represented two distinct and
opposed interests, the rise of both demonstrates the triumph of official networks of power
in Algeria. Specifically, it reveals the transformation of the territory of Algeria from a
place where renegade or opportunistic individuals could carve out their own realms of
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authority and autonomy deprived them in the metropole into a veritable extension of the
metropole itself. Whether arriving as lay settlers or as members of religious orders, those
who ventured to Algeria in an unofficial capacity to pursue dreams they found foreclosed
in metropolitan France increasingly found their efforts equally stymied in Algeria, as
legal codes and bureaucratic processes replaced the dense patronage networks that had
previously ensured their existence, reliant as they were on the individual whims of
powerful military generals or self-aggrandizing clergymen.
The case of the Jesuits in particular demonstrates this transformation’s impact on
missionary works. In the 1840s the Jesuits’ legal suppression in France in no way
prevented them from operating in and even expanding throughout the nascent colony (see
Chapter One). By the 1870s, and especially following their latest legal dissolution in
1880, the Jesuits could no longer count on friendly secular or ecclesiastical patrons to
provide them with protection. In 1874, a dire lack of resources (and orphans) had finally
forced the Jesuits to sell their property at Ben Aknoun, after which their secondary school
at Oran served as their last remaining establishment in Algeria. Further, Lavigerie then
moved to close the school in Oran because it competed with his new seminary in the city.
One Jesuit father recognized that “we will be sacrificed if the new seminary…[run by the
Pères Blancs] can continue without requiring our support.”153 Writing at the same time,
another Jesuit complained of “the difficulties we have in living in good harmony with the
archbishop.” He further feared that “we attempt the impossible in seeking to appease
Monseigneur, as however hard we try we cannot satisfy him.”154 In 1876, another Jesuit
got to the root of the matter when he wrote that the archbishop “always supports the
153
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parish priests and his congregation over the Jesuits.” He accused Lavigerie of only giving
the Jesuits missionaries work that his parish priests could not perform on their own and
claimed that the archbishop was “completely suspicious of the congregations of the
parish.”155
To be sure, Lavigerie’s persecution of the Jesuits largely continued the policies of
his predecessor, Bishop Pavy. Lavigerie, however, also far exceeded this precedent by
also attempting to dispense with Pavy’s handpicked missionary congregation, the
Lazarists. In 1874, Lavigerie drafted a new contract between the diocese and the
Lazarists in which he combined the posts of superiors of the senior and junior seminaries
into one position with a single salary. This combination allowed Lavigerie to suppress
what he saw as superfluous salaries of Lazarist priests. As Father Girard wrote, this move
“would reduce expenses for Lavigerie, but goes against our regulations that each superior
must remain master of his own house,” and added frankly that it “imposes on us the
obligation to spend a lot of money.”156 The new contract also required that the Lazarists
pay out of their own pocket for the teachers, domestics, and meals at their seminaries,
with Lavigerie funding the rent payments and the salary of one superior alone.
Three years later, Lavigerie went even further by threatening to close the senior
seminary entirely. The conflict stemmed from a circular issued by Lavigerie on 19 March
1877 that forced seminarians who received scholarships from the diocese (which
included nearly all of them) to swear an oath upon entering the seminary promising that
they would stay and work for their entire lives in the diocese of Algiers rather than
returning (or going for the first time) to France immediately after entering the priesthood.
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Lavigerie justified this decision by claiming the need “to retain the priests who come here
to steal their vocations from us and return to France without any pretext.”157 Realizing
that the measure might not go over smoothly with the seminarians, Lavigerie first
convened the senior Lazarists to inform them of his decision in order that they work to
make it more palatable to their students. Rather than the Lazarists helping to facilitate its
acceptance, however, Lavigerie complained that “everything I have said of the most
serious and the most confidential matters to the directors…they have entirely repeated to
the students, and they have even included their own criticisms and orders, which goes
beyond treason.”158
As a result of what Lavigerie saw as the treasonous disposition of the Lazarist
teachers, many seminarians refused to take the oath. Lavigerie informed the Lazarist
hierarchy in Paris that the actions of the faculty had “unleashed the open resistance of the
students and, due to the lack of a firm authority on the part of the directors, an open revolt
on their part.”159 Lavigerie accused the director of the seminary, Father Rouget, of
“contesting the legitimacy of the measure that I have taken by supporting the rebellion of
the students.” He told Rouget that the director of a seminary cannot maintain his position
by “turning the seminary against the bishop.” Ultimately, Lavigerie warned the Lazarist
hierarchy that the seminarians’ resistance to his authority had reached the point that he
might close the seminary entirely. Although he stopped short of this extreme measure,
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Lavigerie convinced the superiors in Paris to recall Father Rouget, whose “imprudence
and lack of virtue,” he wrote, “border on madness.”160
Without a powerful patron in the ecclesiastical hierarchy or among the civilian
administration, the works of the Lazarists began to crumble. In July 1877, the new
Lazarist superior, Father Doumerg, wrote to Paris to request that the mother house
provide them “with sufficient resources so that we do not need to rely on a salary from
the archbishop nor on outside aid.”161 These resources were not forthcoming, and in 1879
Doumerg warned that “the two seminaries are crumbling before our eyes.”162 The
Lazarist teachers there had only managed to survive the year with proceeds from the
grape harvest so that they could “live despite the penny pinching which continues to
burden us due to our archbishop.”163 On 10 April 1880 the government informed the
Lazarists that it would seize the house they occupied in Algiers (not to be confused with
the seminary at Kouba) in order to sell it at public auction. By August 1880, the Lazarists
only had the funds to support two priests in Algiers and two in neighboring Mustapha to
serve the orphanage run by the Filles de la Charité.
Nor were these sisters immune from the persecution. In September 1880, the
government temporarily expelled the Filles de la Charité from the orphanage at Mustapha
that they had directed since 1846 and moved to auction off this house as well. The sisters
employed a strategy that had served them well over the preceding forty years by again
looking outside of traditional ecclesiastical and civilian networks and instead turning to
the few remaining military patrons that existed. As such, they “took refuge in the military
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prison, though as of yet nobody there has actually loosened the purse strings.” Although
the sisters ministered to these prisoners for a year, in June 1881 the civilian government
seized the military prison and transferred the prisoners to the civilian prison, which it
refused to allow the sisters to enter. Faced with a dwindling number of patrons, Doumerg
complained that even the clergy withheld funds from missionary orders “based on the
absurd proverb that the congregations are rich enough.”164 Only in 1883, after the
anticlerical fervor surrounding the Ferry Laws had abated, did the civilian regime
partially reverse course and allow the sisters to resume their work at the orphanage of
Mustapha. The sisters after all still provided an immensely useful service by raising the
city’s large number of orphans at a very low cost to the state.
Finally, the financial situation even began to affect the Lazarists’ founding
establishment and its largest work in Algeria: the senior seminary at Kouba. In September
1880 the director wrote that “someone must help restore this vast seminary at Kouba
which the government has left to slowly deteriorate.” 165 In addition to water leaking
“from all parts of the ceiling” a wall on the building’s western side had apparently
crumbled entirely. When the superior asked the state inspector to make the necessary
repairs, the inspector responded that “it is not our responsibility to maintain the buildings,
as this falls under the authority of the archbishop.”166 Unfortunately, the Lazarist superior
wrote, the archbishop “is at this present time far from showing us favor.” He lamented
the days when Father Girard had established the grandeur of the seminary and had
“obtained all the money from a ministry that was less hostile and more favorable to
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us.”167 Although the senior seminary would continue to struggle along, the junior
seminary had ceased to exist entirely by 1890 owing to a lack of resources and a lack of
patrons.
Conclusion
The “long decade” of the 1870s represented the greatest period of transformation
for the colon population in nineteenth-century Algeria. This transformation comes into
full focus when viewed through the lens of missionary work in the territory. In 1867,
Archbishop Lavigerie bestowed on the FEC what he saw as the most important
missionary work in the history of French Algeria, the Arab agricultural orphanage.
Similarly, when faced with expulsion from their positions as public school teachers in
1868-69, the FEC could count on the support of both Archbishop Lavigerie and Governor
General MacMahon, who unilaterally moved to reinstate them against the wishes of the
municipal council of Algiers. The situation changed, however, due to the creation of the
Pères Blancs and the fitful onset of civilian rule. The transfer of the orphans to the new
Pères Blancs mission at the Maison Carrée marked the first step in the archbishop’s
attempt to consolidate his power over the territory by withdrawing his patronage from
outside missionary congregations. Separately, the rise of the Third Republic and the
empowerment of municipal councils in 1870 made it harder still for missionaries to
secure patrons from friendly authorities, as authority itself remained hotly contested in
the territory.
At the same time, the fact that the government in Paris spent the first half of the
decade coming to the aid of the missionary supporters, and that it only very reluctantly
167
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granted the municipal councils the rights of the metropole, reveals the logistical difficulty
it encountered in transforming Algeria from a colony into an actual extension of France.
This difficulty stemmed not from an attempt to incorporate the majority indigenous
population into the French body politic; few if any Frenchmen envisioned enfranchising
Algeria’s 2.1 million Muslims.168 The difficulty, rather, stemmed from the continued need
to satisfy the religious sentiments of the large European population of Algeria that itself
did not possess French citizenship or the political rights of the metropole. The affair of
the schools that wracked Algeria throughout the 1870s brings into stark relief the ethnic
and religious divisions that continued to afflict the settler population after forty years of
imperial rule.
The fact that both the Catholic clergy and the secular municipal councils wanted
to use their schools to assimilate these foreigners to their own ideals of French
civilization reveals that the contestation over French belonging that unfolded in the
metropole in the 1870s spread to the territory of Algeria as well. Unlike in the metropole,
however, these two camps continued to find themselves on opposite ends of the political
spectrum throughout the decade. Rather than working to mimic the political census that
slowly developed in the metropole, these two camps continued to polarize opinion and
only further radicalized their demands. This radicalization actually marginalized both
sides from the more moderate political culture that began to take shape in France.
At the same time, as a direct result of this marginalization both sides saw Algeria
as a space in which they could articulate their own version of Frenchness that remained
unattainable in France itself. Whereas Catholics looked to an idealized past – a “creole
168
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medievalism” in the words of Michelle Warren – to realize their vision of a religious
present, anticlericals aspired to an as yet unrealized future based on the principles of the
French Revolution in which they could turn the long-desired separation of church and
state into a social and political reality. The fact that these radicals finally won this
struggle stemmed less from political events in France than from the peculiar makeup of
French Algeria, where they could seize on the juxtaposition of different religions to
justify the removal of Catholicism from the public sphere. Throughout, any desire to
elevate Islam to the level of Catholicism remained mere empty rhetoric.
Finally, and as a result of this last effort, the decade of the 1870s demonstrates the
growing pains inherent in the creation of a self-styled republican regime in a society that
based its very foundation on a policy and principle of exclusion. Religious difference
could not be tolerated in Algeria because religious belief had for so long served as the
defining characteristic of a subjected people, and existing legislation specifically invoked
religious difference to deny this population French citizenship and legal protection. The
colon population that came to power in the 1870s increasingly defined the foreign
population in terms of religion and used this difference to deny them political rights as
well. In refusing to fund their Catholic schools the municipal councils told the foreigners
that they could enter the French community on an equal footing, in the public schools,
only after they agreed to subordinate their religious identity to the councilors’ peculiarly
Algerian version of a French universalist ideal. This new subjectivity entailed the belief
in a republicanism based on exclusion and a society based on a rigid racial and religious
hierarchy.
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To be sure, the foreigners were not yet ready to accept this new subjectivity. As
we will see in the next chapter, Catholic clergy and their followers in Algeria continued
to fight for the right to practice their religion. At the same time, the continued persecution
they felt from the authorities only further divided the colon community throughout the
period up to the First World War. Civilian authorities blamed foreign missionaries
especially for perpetuating these divisions. Authorities looked with particular suspicion
upon a new missionary order that arrived in Algeria in 1889: the Salésiens de Don Bosco.
Indeed, the Salésiens’ Italian origins rendered them especially odious to French colonial
officials, who began to create elaborate surveillance networks to monitor every move of
the Salésien missionaries and their followers. It is to these missionaries and their largely
Italian and Spanish supporters that we now turn.
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Chapter Four
Foreign Citizens and Foreign Missionaries in French Algeria, 1883-1914.
“If, in favor of the numerous foreigners who live in our Algerian colony, we welcome into
our congregation some priests of their nationality, there is nothing illegal in this. It is
rather a means to make foreigners esteem the taste of hospitality that is so liberally
practiced in France, and it shows that France knows how to grant to those who come to it
seeking aid the liberty to freely and easily practice their religion.”1
-Letter from the visiting superior of the Salésiens de Don Bosco to the prefect of Oran, 30
October 1895.
“Spanish monks have disembarked here as though in a conquered land and they are
impossible to control.”2
Excerpt from an editorial published in the journal L’éclair, 12 August 1898.

The practice of Catholicism, more than Islam, continued to divide the settler
community in Algeria up to the First World War. In this period, the association of
European “foreigners” with religious fanaticism in the minds of civilian officials and in
the words of the republican press only grew more intense. Although the law of 1889
granted French citizenship to all foreigners of European descent born in Algeria it did not
signal the definitive creation of a cohesive European community. Rather, the law
frequently provoked the anger and increased the insecurities of the French colonial elite
by transforming previously powerless foreigners into potent political actors. In many
European villages, especially in the Oran department, the ethnically French population
often no longer held the numerical majority in the electorate or the municipal councils
1
2
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and thus could not always enforce its anticlerical agenda on what it continued to refer to
as the foreign population of Algeria (despite their new status as French citizens).3 Finally,
during the period from 1901 to 1914, the piecemeal application of metropolitan laws of
laïcisation often went against the wishes of the newly nationalized settler population and
provided a further source of division amongst the colonists and anxiety for the colonial
regime.4 Because they continued to enjoy the support of what officials came to refer to as
the “neo-French” (néo-français) population, missionaries only intensified their efforts to
spread Christian civilization to Algeria’s Europeans despite their precarious and at times
illegal existence.5
Historian Oissila Saaïdia has argued that “a paradoxical situation dominated the
years from 1880 to 1914 [in Algeria]. While in the metropole the period was marked by
intense clashes between clericals and anticlericals, in the colony it was the search for a
consensus that brought together these two currents of opinion.”6 My findings complicate
Saaïdia’s depiction, which begins from the broader theoretical assumption that the
dichotomous difference between colonized and colonizer structured all aspects of
colonial society. In late nineteenth-century Algeria, colonial settlers often proved more
preoccupied with divisions within their own camp than with those between themselves
and native Algerians. As in metropolitan France, these divisions coalesced around the
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issue of Catholicism. The dangers that Catholicism supposedly posed to Algerian society,
however, differed in crucial ways from those it posed to French society in the metropole.
Clashes between clericals and anticlericals came to a head especially in debates
and discourses surrounding a missionary congregation new to Algeria in the 1890s: the
Salésiens de Don Bosco. As such, the Salésiens will constitute this chapter’s primary
object of analysis. Because of their Italian origin and their alleged use of foreign priests,
the Salésiens served as a touchstone for larger debates about the place of foreigners in a
territory that increasingly did constitute a fully assimilated extension of the metropole
(for the European population). The case study of the Salésiens further reveals the
unsteady foundations of imperial governance in a land where the division between ruler
and ruled was itself based largely on religious difference. The religiously devout portion
of the settler community – or “fanatics” as their enemies labeled them – continued to
constitute an intermediary group between the militantly anti-clerical settler elite and the
excluded mass of the native Muslim majority. On rare occasions the religious sensibilities
and social marginalization of the foreign population actually led them to seek out
indigenous healers and sorcerers, who readily took advantage of their credulity. Such
blurring of racial and religious boundaries preoccupied and puzzled colonial officials
until the eve of the First World War.
In the three decades between 1880 and 1910, civilian authorities in Algeria and
France expressed increasing anxiety over the large number of foreigners in the territory.
This obsession stemmed in part from a concern over the falling population in France
itself.7 In Algeria, however, it took on characteristics that stemmed directly from what we
7
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might call the ethnic demographics of empire. Although the 1860s saw the French
colonial population equal and eventually surpass in number the total foreign population,
by the 1880s the foreigners, especially those of Spanish descent, began to close this gap
due to their higher levels of reproduction. On 20 November 1884, Governor General
Louis Tirman (in office 1882-1891) gave a speech to the High Council of Algeria in
which he warned:
The last census, in 1881, noted that the French population…exceeds the foreign
population by only a mere 14,064 individuals. This gap, which consisted of
26,248 individuals in 1865, is getting smaller every year, and in the Oran
department the national element is no longer in the majority.8
According to historian Patrick Weil, the governor general and the metropolitan
administration began to fear that the large number of Spanish and Italian nationals in
particular might cause Spain or Italy to challenge France’s claim to Algeria. This fear
only increased in 1882, when Italy joined Germany and Austria-Hungary to form the
Triple Alliance, a move in part motivated by Italy’s anger over the new French
protectorate in Tunisia, which many nationalists hoped Italy would colonize for itself.9
Plans to grant French citizenship to European foreigners in Algeria dated at least
to the senatus-consulte of 1865. Although typically invoked by historians for its
application to the Muslim population of Algeria, the decree applied equally to European
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foreigners.10 It stipulated that non-French Europeans who had lived in Algeria for more
than three years could apply for French citizenship. As Weil writes, “The three categories
of Algerian inhabitants who were not fully French – 30,000 Jews, 3,000,000 Muslims,
and 250,000 foreigners – were dealt with separately but on almost the same basis in this
ad hoc nationality law that was applied henceforth in Algeria.”11 The law, however, did
not have the intended effects, as between 1865 and 1881 only 4,428 foreigners had
applied for and won French citizenship, or an average of 276 individuals per year. We
should note that the law had an equally negligible effect on Algerian Muslims, as it
forced them to renounce their personal status and their adherence to Shari’a law and
subject themselves entirely to the French civil code.12
The 1880s saw a renewed effort to nationalize the foreign, if not the Muslim,
population of Algeria. As the previous chapter demonstrated in great detail, the foreign
settlers’ religiosity proved one of the largest stumbling blocks to the institution of full
civilian rule. In 1884 and again in 1885 the civil governor general, Louis Tirman, lobbied
the metropolitan government to nationalize en masse Algeria’s non-French European
population. The government initially proved reluctant, because this effort would require it
to break with the conception of citizenship enshrined in the civil code and embodied by
the concept of jus sanguinis – which based acquisition of French citizenship on one’s
French ancestry. By nationalizing the foreigners of Algeria the government would have
to abandon this conception of nationality in favor of one based on jus soli, or citizenship
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according to place of birth. Only in 1889 did the metropolitan government finally adopt
the concept of jus soli and grant French citizenship to all foreigners born in French
territory once they reached the age of 21. Although this new policy stemmed in part from
French anger and jealousy that foreigners could avoid conscription in the metropole, Weil
has asserted that support from Algeria’s representatives in the National Assembly
“undoubtedly contributed to the adoption of the law.”13
Historians have depicted the law of 26 June 1889 as marking a turning point in
the history of French Algeria. Writing in 1961, Pierre Nora stated that the law of
naturalization “created the French of Algeria properly said.”14 Similarly, in 1968 the
preeminent historian of French Algeria, Charles Robert Ageron, called the law “the birth
certificate of the European people of Algeria.”15 More generally, David Prochaska,
perhaps the first historian to undertake an in-depth archival study focused solely on the
European community of Algeria, has written that “a ‘new race’ of hybrid Europeans, a
unified colonial society, began to take shape in the 1890-1914 period.”16 In sum,
historians agree that by the turn of the century a cohesive unit of colonial settlers had
emerged that would effectively assert its will until its wholesale expulsion from the
territory following Algerian independence in 1962.17
An examination of missionary work in the decades before and after the law of
1889, however, reveals that the law did little to attenuate the religiously tinged ethnic
13
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divisions that had plagued the settler community since the conquest in 1830. To be sure,
the law marked the final step in the progressive abandonment of the military’s policy of
associating the foreigners to the French state and the acceptance of the civilian
leadership’s policy of assimilating them to French society more broadly. But the policy
did little to alter the reality. Far from uniting the settler community, the law of 1889 only
sowed further and unexpected divisions – divisions that resulted directly from
disagreements over the place of religion in public discourse and civil society. Rather than
assimilating the foreign community to French secular sensibilities, the law actually
empowered these neo-French settlers to attempt to shape Algerian society according to
their own religious sensibilities.
Ultimately, an examination of foreigners and faith in the period of high
colonialism builds on Ann Stoler’s depiction of a colonial state based not on the rule of
reason, but rather one that accumulates “a discursive density around issues of sentiment
and their subversive tendencies, around ‘private’ feelings and their political
consequences.”18 At the same time, this analysis complicates Stoler’s portrayal in two
significant ways. First, it shows that such colonial governmentality did not only
necessitate a policing of relationships that blurred the lines between indigènes and
Europeans and the métis offspring such relationships threatened to produce. Rather, the
colonial state relied equally on surveillance of the nature of intra-European relationships
and daily behavior that often had little or nothing to do with France’s conquered colonial
subjects. Secondly, this analysis inserts faith and religiosity as sentiments that, in colonial
Algeria at least, held a subversive potential that was in some ways similar to that of
18
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deviant or otherwise non-normative sexualities. Faith too, like sexuality, turned out to be
a “dense transfer point for relations of power.”19

Faith, Foreigners and the Law of 1889
In the years leading up to the law of 1889, the government reluctantly tolerated foreign or
unauthorized priests because it did not have enough French priests to serve all the new
villages that popped up throughout Algeria. Even after the colonial regime applied the
metropolitan law dispersing Jesuits to Algeria on 30 October 1880, many foreign Jesuit
priests stayed in Algeria to work as individual missionaries or, where possible, as
members of the secular clergy, often with the benefit of state salaries.20 The use of
foreign priests proved especially necessary for the department of Oran, where foreign
settlers continued to outnumber French ones. As late as 1891 the department counted
98,724 French citizens to 102,453 Spanish nationals, not including the substantial number
of Italian and Maltese settlers.21
The lack of priests both threatened to unravel the ties that bound colonial society
together and to leave settlers in what church leaders described as a state of uncivilized
savagery. In March 1882, the bishop of Oran asked the minister of cults to pay for more
parish priests, as “the new European cities that appear every day do not have priests to
serve them.”22 The bishop tied the need for priests to the future of the colony by claiming
that “this state of spiritual abandon is one of the causes that contributes the most to
19
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discourage the colonists…I have heard them state loudly that if they had foreseen this
deplorable situation, they would have never come to Algeria.”23 As late as 1894, there
still remained 87 villages without parish priests, and the archbishop of Algeria warned
that the colonists who came from Europe did not want “to live and die without the aid of
a priest.”24 After failing to make headway with the minister of cults, he begged the
Propagation de la Foi to provide priests for the colonists. “This situation,” he warned, “is
1,000 times more trying than that of the most wretched missionaries who live amongst
the savages and barbarians of all the continents.”25 Without the aid of parish priests, far
away from the culture of the metropole, settlers themselves threatened to succumb to
barbarism.
It was such a state of affairs that led the government to allow one such Italian
Jesuit to continue to receive a salary for his services in the villages of Mers-el-Kebir,
Tamzourah, and Arbal in the Oran department. At some point in 1884, however, the
government had ceased to pay this Father Pollaci, telling him:
You have manifested overtly hostile sentiments to France and its institutions. You
travel to the villages of Oran…where under pretext of doing missionary work you
incite against us your compatriots the Italians...You have aroused the fanaticism
of the Italians of Mers-el-Kebir to the point of having them beat each other in
expiation (coups de discipline) in the chapel with the doors shut.26
Pollaci defended himself from each of these accusations in a letter to the prefect of Oran
on 15 February 1886. He admitted that he “said publically that today it is no longer
permitted to speak of Jesus Christ,” but he asked how the government could interpret
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such a statement as inciting the Italians against the French. He further blamed an
“impious press” for trying to have him removed by claiming wrongly that he hated the
Republic.
Whereas the prefect accused Pollaci of arousing the “fanaticism” of his
parishioners, Pollaci portrayed himself as a civilizer and claimed that he worked to
actively rid his parishioners of religious superstitions. Indeed, he readily conceded to
their so-called fanaticism, asking why the French should fear “these poor Italian fishers,
occupied day and night with their fish, no matter how great their fanaticism is.”27 He also
admitted that he directed them to beat each other while inside his chapel to atone for their
sins. He explained these actions by writing that:
For the French it is out of fanaticism that I want to give these disciplinary blows
in the church, but for the Italians it is not so. The Italians are used to doing and
seeing this in their country…If the Italians want to give disciplinary blows to each
other, what is there in this that is hostile to France?28
Pollaci explained that he intended the beatings to break the Italians of the superstitious
habit of “going to consult the Moor, the Moresque, the Jew to learn the cause of their
despairs.” Apparently the Italian settlers sought to improve their fortunes by taking
potions from indigenous healers. “With these people, ignorant to the point of believing in
this type of sorcery,” Pollaci added, “there is no other means of wholeheartedly
renouncing these acts of superstition.”29
In this instance the foreigners and the foreign priest proved a threat on two
accounts. First, the prefect saw the Italians as posing a potential political danger to
French rule; and he feared the foreign priest only worked to exacerbate this danger.
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Second, by their superstition the Italian settlers threatened to erase entirely the line that
supposedly divided European colonizer from indigenous colonized to the point that the
former actually sought out the latter for spiritual and temporal guidance. Whereas both
the prefect and the priest saw this crossing of racial boundaries as dangerous and an act of
“fanaticism,” the prefect saw the priest’s reaction to it as equally dangerous. Pollaci thus
failed to fulfill either of the primary purposes that justified allotting him a state salary. He
did not cultivate the Italians’ loyalty to the French state just as he did not provide them
with any sort of moral values that would assimilate them to French civilization. Indeed, it
was this fear that a priest could “turn his compatriots” against the French – morally,
culturally, and politically – that contributed in large part to the adoption of the law of
1889.
When the law did arrive, however, it did little to overcome these divisions. In
1895, six years after the law’s passage, officials continued to worry that foreign priests
manipulated foreign settlers for their own ends.30 In the village of Bou Sfer in the Oran
department one Father Pomarès, a priest of Spanish origin (though now a naturalized
Frenchman), drew numerous complaints from the village mayor, who alleged that
Pomarès had “occupied himself with politics and incited hostility towards local
functionaries.”31 The mayor also accused the priest of granting asylum to Spaniards
expelled from Algeria and of preaching in Spanish rather than French, even when French
parishioners attended mass. In October 1895, the bishop of Oran sent his vicar general to
30
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conduct an inquiry, during which he collected 44 depositions from among the town’s
inhabitants. The prelate concluded that the charges had little foundation and came only
from the mayor and a local notable, the village doctor. In one of the depositions, an
inhabitant reported that “if you were to put in Bou Sfer a priest who did not speak
Spanish the complaints would not cease to rain down on the prefect and the bishop. This
priest would find it impossible to work, and he would remain no more than 15 days.”32 As
a result of this inquiry, the bishop went against the wishes of the French mayor and chose
to keep the Spanish priest in the village. The prefect accepted this decision to appease the
Spanish inhabitants of Bou Sfer.
By June 1896, however, the problem had not gone away. The mayor again wrote
to the prefect and accused Pomarès of chanting in the public square, “Long live Spain,
down with France!”33 The prefect suggested to the governor general that they conduct
another inquiry, this time led by a secular official, rather than a member of the bishop’s
council. The prefect wrote that “whatever the explanations given for the attitude of
Monsieur Pomarès, one cannot deny that as a freshly naturalized Frenchman he remains
Spanish at heart.”34 The prefect feared that when surrounded by so many of his
compatriots the priest felt himself freer to express his “anti-French ideas and vengeance
against the mayor.”35 The letter from the prefect sufficiently worried the governor general
so that it caused him to pen an anxious letter to the minister of interior in Paris. On 15
September 1896 the governor warned the minister that “Pomarès occupies himself with
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questions incompatible with his ministry, notably during the elections.”36 He added the
now familiar refrain that the priest “remains a Spaniard at heart, despite his French
naturalization, and will inspire in his compatriots a hatred for our authority.”37
The equation of Spanish priests with anti-French sentiments in Algeria resulted in
part from the vastly different trajectories in church-state relations underway in
metropolitan France and Spain. Just as the French Third Republic had defeated its
royalist enemies and begun to consolidate its secular institutions, republicans in Spain
found themselves on the defensive. In 1874, a Bourbon restoration overthrew Spain’s
republican government and scrapped its secular-minded constitution of 1873. The new
conservative constitution of 1876 restored Roman Catholicism as the official religion of
Spain. As a result of these diametrically opposed religious paths, French civilian leaders
in Algeria saw Spanish priests and Spanish settlers as a direct threat to the republican
government.38 At the same time, Spanish priests looked admiringly in the direction of
Spain as its conservative leadership set about constructing its own religious modernity
(one that would culminate in the ascension to power of Francisco Franco in 1939).39
The situation remained threatening in the department of Oran in particular, where
as late as 1897 the ethnically French population still constituted a minority of the overall
European population in 43 of the 100 communes that comprised the department.40 On 2
September 1898 a local notable in the town of Mers-el-Kebir wrote to the minister of
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cults to inform him that the 373 electors in the village of Mers-el-Kebir included only 74
French voters, compared to 216 Neapolitans and 83 Spaniards. He warned the minister
that “the Crémieux decree [which granted French nationality to Algeria’s Jewish
population] is a great danger, but the law of ‘89 is also a source of serious peril.”41 Not
only did the law of 1889 allow “foreigners” to exert their political will over Frenchmen,
but these foreigners were “almost all fanatics who do not recognize any authority except
for clerical authority [and] they will only consult with the priest for their electoral
votes.”42 If “comparison is always both a strategic and a political act,” the village notable
in this instance used the method of comparison to highlight the dangerous consequences
that neo-French colonists posed to French colonial rule.43
The issue had geopolitical implications as well. The city notable reminded the
minister that Italy had never desired to recognize the naturalization of its subjects abroad.
“In the case that we go to war with Italy,” he wrote, “these children of foreign origin will
not respond to their call [to serve the French army].”44 He noted that Mers-el-Kebir would
very likely serve as a port of war in the near future, and yet one “administered by the
faithful subjects of Umberto who only obey orders emanating from a priest.”45 Less than
a month later, the mayor of Mers-el-Kebir wrote to the prefect to warn that the local
priest continued “to use his pulpit and confessional to make political accusations against
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the government and he is supported in this sad labor by the anti-French population.”46 He
further alerted the prefect that if the administration did not intervene “the French element
will disappear entirely from this commune” – the prefect underlined this phrase when he
forwarded the letter to the governor general.47 Nearly a decade after the law of
naturalization, two years before the turn of the century, and slightly more than a decade
until the outbreak of World War I, the fear of foreign priests and their influence over
foreign settlers had grown to the point that officials perceived them as threatening to
undermine French rule entirely.
The Salésiens de Don Bosco in Oran (1891-1904)
These anxieties coalesced around the Catholic missionary congregation known as the
Salésiens de Don Bosco, which arrived in Oran in 1891. The rigorous persecution and
intense surveillance directed towards the Salésiens reveals that, despite the famous claim
by Léon Gambetta to the contrary, metropolitan anticlerical laws could very much
constitute items for export.48 The reality of the situation better matches that described by
historian Claude Prudhomme, who observed that “the metropolitan vision of an imperial
France as an object of a uniform policy in matters of religion does not correspond to the
extraordinary diversity of the colonial world.”49 Even within a single colonial territory,
not all congregations received equal attention, surveillance, and persecution. The
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obsession over the Salésiens stemmed directly from their Italian background and their use
of both Spanish and Italian priests.
The government’s surveillance over the Salésiens and their followers reveals a
colonial state that both possessed an insatiable will to knowledge and continued to fail in
its quest to obtain such knowledge, which remained fragmented, disordered, and
insecure. In reality, as Stoler has reminded us, “colonial regimes were neither monolithic
nor omnipotent.”50 Throughout this time period, the state could never ascertain exactly
how many Salésiens were foreign, French, or neo-French; the same failure held true for
the identity of the Salésiens’ followers as well. Indeed, after the law of 1889, officials
remained dogged by confusion over what it even meant to be French or foreign. The
government’s very obsession over its own instability, however, only increased its desire
to classify and control the Salésiens and their supposedly foreign followers.
French Catholic congregations in Algeria, meanwhile, actually saw their fortunes
stabilize in the 1880s and 90s. The Filles de la Charité, Soeurs Trinitaires, and Frères des
Ecoles Chrétiennes all continued to work relatively undisturbed in this period.51 The
differing fortunes of the French congregations and the Salésiens are best revealed in the
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respective public responses to their use of orphan labor. In 1885, the sisters of the Filles
de la Charité rented a new four-story building in Algiers where they directed six classes
and a nursery for 500 to 600 children. They also oversaw a workshop (ouvroir) for 60
students in Algiers that provided “a source of great profit for the house.”52 In the village
of Boghat as well the sisters used money earned from the products of their orphanworkshops to fund their own private school. These establishments won the support, or at
least the tacit consent, of colonial authorities and the press. The workshops of the
Salésiens, meanwhile, only provoked accusations that they employed orphans for their
own profit and undercut the sales of the skilled laborers of Oran.53
Founded in Turin, Italy, in 1873, the Salésiens came to Algeria in 1891 after the
bishop of Oran invited them to open a primary and secondary school as well as an
orphanage in the city of Oran. The congregation’s superior, Don Rua, admitted that “no
land would be better suited by its standing, the ease of its relations with Europe, its
climate, its customs, its language, to become a sort of garden of acclimation [to Africa], a
practical novitiate for future missionaries.”54 On 1 January 1891, seven Salésien priests
led by their French visiting superior Charles Bellamy arrived in the city of Oran. Unlike
previous missionary societies, the Salésiens from the outset planned to focus primarily on
the European population of Oran. In the words of Bellamy:
We have not come here as explorers – the time has passed – nor as tourists – the
time has not yet come – but as converters! Because this Algerian people, a mix of
so many peoples, these French of all nations – ultra civilized in the natural sense
52
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of the word – has the greatest need to be converted to a true Christian life. Our
mission here is not to evangelize the savage peoples of the earth, but to…save
from damnation these civilized people who risk being submerged in a cloak of
false religions and superstitions.55
The Salésiens thus arrived with their own civilizing mission and felt that their multinational character, and especially their Italian origins, rendered them particularly suitable
to ministering to the diverse European settlers of Algeria.
Notably, however, although the Salésiens’ mission to civilize still envisioned a
society in which civilization entailed Christianity, the stated object of their proselytism
was not the lapsed Catholic or the anticlerical, but rather the practicing Catholic whose
knowledge of Catholic orthodoxy remained tenuous and whose religious practices had
begun to merge with those of France’s colonized subjects. This fear that living in close
proximity to native Algerians would create a form of syncretic religious practice only
echoes the Italian priest’s accusation, described above, that his Italian parishioners had
begun to consult native sorcerers and healers. As such, the blurring of religious
boundaries in Algeria perhaps constitutes a more widespread phenomenon of the
“decivilizing mission” described by historian Owen White in colonial Timbuktu.56 White
recounts the story of a Père Blanc missionary, Auguste Dupuis, who adopted the dress
and customs of members of the Muslim Songhay society and who eventually changed his
name to Dupuis-Yakouba, indicating his dual identity as at once French and African.
Although the Catholic colonists described here likely did not challenge the racial and
religious hierarchy to such an extreme extent, the fact that they threatened to constitute a
mass movement only heightened the anxieties of colonial officials and likely helped
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convince these officials to allow the Salésiens an initial foothold in Algeria – an act they
would come to regret.
Successive bishops of Oran as well proved valuable patrons for the Salésiens. In
1891, Bishop Géraud Soubrier secured for them the use of the old civil court building in
the center of town on the Rue Ménerville. The government had previously slated the
structure for demolition and upon arrival Bellamy found it “in a state of disrepair.” Still,
he noted that the space received plenty of light and fresh air and he and his fellow
missionaries immediately kneeled in the courtyard to pray for the criminals condemned
during the building’s previous incarnation. Within a few months the congregation
officially opened the Oratoire de Saint-Louis, the first Christian secondary school for
boys in the city of Oran since the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1880. In its first year,
enrollment reached 50 students.57 By 1899 the school taught 150 elementary-level
students, 22 secondary-level students in Latin studies (en route to ecclesiastical training),
and an additional 130 students who came from the lay schools to attend the Salésiens’
youth club (patronage des écoliers).58 The establishment also had its own chapel that
provided religious services for adults, including catechism classes in French, Spanish,
and Italian. Finally, the Salésiens opened an outreach program for soldiers (foyer du
soldat) that provided access to a library and mailroom.
In January 1893 the Salésiens opened a second school, the Oratoire de JésusAdolescent, in the neighboring town of Eckmühl, situated on the vast plateau that
overlooks Oran and the Mediterranean. A local widow donated the plot of land, which
included groves of olive trees that allowed the missionaries to supplement their meager
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income.59 Within a few years, the Salésiens also opened a boarding school (pensionnat)
and an orphanage that provided orphans with training in skilled labor, especially
carpentry. The school counted 41 children at the elementary level, 14 at the secondary
level, and 76 not yet of school age.60 The boarding school admitted free of tuition
students in “poverty or abandoned [but who had] an undoubted morality,” while
wealthier families paid what they could afford. According to Father Bellamy most
students paid nothing and very few paid the maximum tuition.
The congregation raised a portion of its funds from donations, but the majority
came from selling products made by the students and orphans in the apprentice
workshops (ouvroirs).61 The boarding school at Eckmühl aimed specifically to impart a
trade to orphans and poor children who, “left to idleness, become a danger to the
colony.”62 To this end, local artisans or skilled Salésiens helped train apprentices
primarily in carpentry, but also in blacksmithing, tailoring, cobbling, and locksmithing.
The Salésiens granted children weekly awards in equipment, clothes, linens or even cash
for the completion of finished products. They also directed the students to set any cash
awards aside as savings to use only after graduation. In order to graduate with a worker’s
diploma (diplôme d’ouvrier), students presented a masterwork to a jury composed of
skilled artisans from Oran.63
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By 1893 the number of Salésiens in Oran had risen to 28, and as their number
increased so did their public notoriety. Despite their success, the Salésiens began to court
controversy among certain politicians, organs of the press, and even secular clergy. Such
conflict occurred for four primary reasons. First, many settlers accused the Salésiens of
harboring “foreigners” and of imparting a non-French education to their students and
orphans. Two-thirds of the Salésiens’ students in 1892 came from either Spanish or
Italian families, and although the law of 1889 rendered these children French citizens
upon their age of majority, the republican press continued to identify these children as
foreigners.64 Second, most of the French children who attended the Salésiens’ schools –
and who constituted one-third of the student body – came from French military families.
The alliance between the military and missionaries continued even after the switch to
civilian rule, and civilian politicians viewed this alliance with suspicion, which only
intensified around the time of the Dreyfus affair. Third, many politicians denounced the
Salésiens for using their workshops to exploit orphans for their own profit and for
undercutting the labor of Oran’s skilled workers by selling their products at below market
value. Finally, by opening their own chapel the missionaries incited the jealousy of
Oran’s secular clergy as the chapel especially attracted a number of “foreign” families
who had previously attended mass and received sacraments at the larger cathedral of
Oran.
Suspicions over the Salésiens’ alleged foreignness began almost immediately
upon their arrival. In 1892, an article in the Echo d’Oran contended that “these Salésiens,
who have for a founder an Italian…are foreign immigrants in Algeria, and they want to
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impose their will on our fair city of Oran.”65 Similarly, in 1893 an op-ed in the newspaper
Le Républicain Oranais complained that the congregation includes “a certain number of
non-naturalized Italian priests.”66 The author encouraged the prefect of Oran to authorize
intense surveillance over the houses in Oran and Eckmühl, as “these Crispinien priests
would not hesitate to…send to their compatriots information dangerous to our national
defense.”67 The writer even went so far as to accuse the prefect of complicity with the
Salésiens and – in a thinly veiled threat of violence – warned that if the prefect could not
fulfill his duty then the republican citizens of Oran would expel the Salésiens on their
own. This accusation that the Salésiens represented a foreign, and thus dangerous,
element in the Algerian colony only gained momentum as the decade progressed.
Further, much like other missionary congregations, the Salésiens too encountered
opposition from the secular clergy of Oran. On 26 October 1895 the prefect of Oran
wrote to Bellamy to inform him to “absolutely prohibit access to your chapel to any
person from outside your congregation.” As the journal l’Union Africaine noted, “the
[secular] clergy had itself solicited the prefect to shut the chapel” because the chapel had
begun to take parishioners away from the existing cathedral.68 This attraction stemmed in
part from the Salésiens’ ability to preach in Spanish to the thousands of Spanish-speaking
inhabitants who resided in Oran. Moreover, the very next month the local military

65

Quoted in: Father Cyprien Bessière, 50 Ans d’Apostolat Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941
(unpublished manuscript from the Centre de Jean Bosco, in Lyon, France, 1941), Deuxième Partie, 2-3. I
am indebted to Monsieur Louis Pierre, librarian and archivist at the Centre Jean Bosco, in Lyon, France, for
discovering this memoir, typing it out himself, and then emailing it to me, four months after I had visited
his library, which was in the midst of a chaotic move at the time. As far as I know I am the only outside
researcher to view this document.
66
CAOM 1U/107. Published in Le Républicain Oranais, 29 December 1893. Letter to the editor, signed
“Georges.”
67
Ibid.
68
Quoted in letter from Charles Bellamy to l’Union Africaine, 12 November 1895. In 50 Ans d’Apostolat
Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941, Deuxième Partie, 7.

200

chaplain convinced the bishop to shut down the Salésiens’ recreational room for local
soldiers.69 The military chaplain had in the parish his own recreational room that
welcomed junior officers and soldiers and he saw the Salésiens’ establishment as “a
serious encroachment on his domain.”70 What is striking here is that the increasingly
beleaguered Catholic clergy did not close ranks in mutual defense, but rather continued to
compete with each other as they had done since the conquest of Algeria in 1830. Even as
late as 1900, missionaries and secular clergy alike saw Algeria as a space in which they
could pursue professional and personal advancement that remained closed off in the
metropole.
To be sure, throughout the 1880s and 90s a wave of anticlericalism overtook
metropolitan France as well. As we have seen, however, the persecution of Catholics in
Algeria took different forms. There was little mention in Algeria of Catholicism serving
as a bastion of monarchism or of the Catholic clergy putting allegiance to the pope over
the republic. Rather, anticlericalism in Algeria during this period stemmed directly from
the supposed ties between Catholic clergy and “foreign” settlers and, after 1889, the
political overtones this allegiance held in towns where the ethnically French population
constituted a distinct minority. It was this crucial difference that Bellamy failed to grasp
when he wrote to the prefect of Oran in October 1895 to bemoan that “our society…has
everywhere in France met with the benevolence of the civil administration [but] we are
the object of such scorn here in Algeria.”71 Only in Algeria did their alleged foreignness
connote a danger to French rule, which already rested on the flimsiest of foundations.
Although numerous Spanish and Italian immigrants worked and lived in France as well,
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nowhere did they constitute anything like a majority that threatened French political
power.72
Bellamy and the Salésiens employed three contradictory arguments to counter the
accusations against them. At times they contended that their works spread French
language and culture and thus facilitated the policy of assimilation. At other times, they
argued that they pursued a policy of association by using foreign priests to cater to the
particular religious needs of the foreign population and thus ensure that population’s
loyalty for France.73 Finally, when both these arguments failed, they claimed that
religious works by nature transcended ethnic and national boundaries. On 30 October
1895 Bellamy wrote in a letter to the prefect that as “true French missionaries we teach
all our children the language, history, and love of France.”74 In the same letter, however,
Bellamy backtracked and admitted:
If, in favor of the numerous foreigners who live in our Algerian colony, we
welcome into our congregation some priests of their nationality, there is nothing
illegal in this. It is rather a means to make foreigners esteem the taste of
hospitality that is so liberally practiced in France, and it shows that France knows
how to grant to those who come to it seeking aid the liberty to freely and easily
practice their religion.75
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After employing arguments that appealed both to strategies of assimilation and
association, Bellamy then changed gears entirely. On 16 November 1895, he published a
letter in Le Petit Africain in which he asserted that like virtue or truth, religious
congregations “have no fatherland.” He appealed to larger geopolitical sensibilities and
asked what the minister of the interior would say if foreign governments elsewhere,
inspired by the comments made in this newspaper, took reprisals and expelled French
congregations from their territories.76
Finally, Bellamy resurrected a strategy used by missionaries before him and
invoked the danger that persecution of Catholics posed to the larger colonial order of
things. He wrote to the prefect of the profound “humiliation” he felt when he had to close
his chapel while at the same time the government actively protected numerous mosques
in Algeria. He further noted that the governor general had just pledged funds for the
construction of a grand synagogue in Oran, while the metropolitan government had even
proposed to construct a grand mosque in Paris itself. Casting himself in the role of
beleaguered Frenchman, Bellamy demanded to know “why our national pride should
suffer thus.”77 In a colonial society supposedly based on the monopolization of privilege
by Europeans, Bellamy hoped to convince the prefect that by extending religious
freedoms to the indigenous population and offering moral support to their religious
sensibilities alone the government threatened to turn the colonized/colonizer relationship
on its head.78
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These arguments made little headway, and local authorities and organs of the
press continued to denounce the Salésiens. After placing restrictions on the
congregation’s chapel and closing its recreational room for soldiers, the authorities then
moved to close the Salésiens’ school in Oran. In November the academic inspector
accused the school of having a “clandestine character and illegal existence,” as many of
the Salésiens taught without the required license (brevet de capacité).79 By the end of
1895, the inspector ordered Bellamy to restrict education to orphans alone. A letter from
the inspector noted that in order to avoid such restrictions Bellamy claimed to no longer
direct an educational establishment, but that he rather “has become the boss of an
industrial establishment” and that he continued to lodge all his apprentices near his
workshops. The inspector did admit that this state of affairs was “perhaps legal.”80
Ultimately, the shift from academic education to the teaching of skilled labor
engendered accusations of a new nature. After four years overseeing carpentry
workshops, the Salésiens began to appear more as private entrepreneurs than as
missionary priests. In 1899, Oran’s representative in the Chamber of Deputies, Marcel
Saint-Germain, alleged that the missionaries capitalized on cheap orphan labor to sell
their products at a low price, thus undercutting the business of the city’s skilled workers
and then pocketing the profits for themselves.81 Saint-Germain told the general council of
Oran, “we must close these workshops, which attract a large clientele and create
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disastrous competition for skilled workers and middling shop owners.”82 A police report
from 1899 further noted that “the larger business owners in the city say that the Salésiens
sell their goods for prices below those considered as official in the world of workers.”83
Although the Salésiens ran similar workshops throughout France, both the missionaries
and their opponents readily admitted that only in Oran did such establishments court
controversy.84
The claim that orphan labor threatened the livelihoods of skilled workers resulted
from class and racial politics peculiar to Algerian society or, as Ann Stoler has argued,
from the (always unsuccessful) desire to prevent the emergence of an indigent European
underclass in the colonial world.85 In the city of Oran, however, the imperial hierarchy
that concerned the French did not – or not so much – involve maintaining the social
marginalization of the indigenous population; rather it entailed allowing a class of skilled
French laborers to remain economically superior to their lesser skilled Spanish and Italian
neighbors. In Oran, these foreign migrants worked almost entirely as fishermen or
“itinerant day laborers” in the industries of sanitation, construction, land clearance, or
transportation. As one historian has written, Spanish migrants often arrived with nothing
but the possessions on their back “so that the French typically referred to them as snails
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(escargots).”86 The French elite put in considerable effort to maintain such ethnic and
class distinctions.
The law of 1889 only increased French anxiety over the instability of this
hierarchy and led the colonial administration to establish quotas in fields such as cork
production that restricted the number of foreigners who could legally work in the
industry.87 Further, in 1898 the Ligue Algérienne des Travailleurs Français addressed a
petition to the national assembly in which it called for a special tax on foreign skilled
laborers and the abrogation of the law of 1889.88 French skilled laborers saw the
Salésiens’ workshops as yet another manifestation of the “foreign peril” that had allowed
neo-French settlers in Algeria to encroach on their political and economic supremacy. It
seems that economic policy towards the foreign population mirrored “the paradoxical
tendency of colonial policymakers to find order in [the] economic insecurity” of the
conquered Muslim population, as described by Benjamin Brower – a policy which he
adds “was profoundly flawed [as it] unleashed a host of social tensions and crises that
created conditions for conflict.”89 The orphan workshops posed the double threat of both
lowering the standard of living for French skilled labors and of allowing foreign or neoFrench children to climb the social hierarchy and bridge or even erase the ethnic and
class divide. At the same time, shuttering the orphanage only antagonized the Salésiens
and their foreign followers.
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For their part, the Salésiens too played on fears of a European, if not French,
underclass by arguing that their workshops helped the colony by training abandoned
orphans to work as useful artisans. As Bellamy wrote to the editor of L’Echo d’Oran, the
workshops inculcated in young workers a respect for labor, property, and religion and
thus helped orphans “to escape the seductions of vagabondage and all its
consequences…all too common here in Algeria.”90 Somewhat dubiously, Bellamy also
claimed the workshops served a patriotic purpose by helping France regain its “former
supremacy in hand labor that has recently been taken from us by the disastrous
competition of Germany, England, and Belgium.”91 More realistically, he asked how a
mere five workshops with 51 apprentices could undercut the labor of a city of 80,000
people. Rather than competing with the working class, Bellamy wrote, the Salésiens
actually aided the working class, as the orphans themselves came from lower class
families. He concluded that the Salésiens desired only “to raise Christian citizens useful
to France, to Algeria!”92
Unsurprisingly, these arguments continued to founder due to the anticlericalism
and national chauvinism of Oran’s colonial elite. More surprisingly, even self-identified
French Catholics began to question the loyalty of the Salésiens and other foreign priests
in Oran. This suspicion soon spread to the Salésiens’ patron, Bishop Géraud Soubrier,
who had first invited the Salésiens to come to Oran in 1891. This bishop owed his
appointment entirely to the late archbishop, Cardinal Lavigerie. Since Lavigerie’s death
in 1892 many commentators had begun to see Soubrier as, unlike Lavigerie, dominated
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by foreign priests. In August 1898, an article appeared in the journal L’éclair that accused
the bishop of allowing foreign priests to undermine his authority. The author wrote:
These Spanish priests have surrounded [the bishop], suffocated him, suppressed
his authority, and when this old man took the route back to the country of his
birthplace, he very much resembled a maroon in his own country, chewed up,
emptied of all substance so that only his skin remained.
In another example of the “creole medievalism” described by Michelle Warren, the
author wrote that “the pious convert Clovis” would no longer recognize his realm if he
returned today to find so many foreigners.93 Though Catholic himself, the author did not
turn his pen against the anticlerical republic, but rather against anti-French elements
within the church. He warned his readers that “Spanish monks have disembarked here as
though in a conquered land and they are impossible to control.”94 He also linked the
danger specifically to the law of 1889, writing that “many Spanish in Algeria are priests
or abbés, but they have had to gain naturalization. We must hope that these brave sons of
El Cid have not considered their entry into the French nation as a simple formality.”95
Again, rather than assimilating foreigners to French culture, the law of 1889 threatened to
allow foreigners to exert their own will on ethnically French citizens.
The incoming bishop, Monseigneur Cantel, proved equally solicitous toward
foreign priests. In October 1899 the prefect of Oran asked the bishop to gather the name,
date and place of birth, and naturalization status for all the priests in his diocese in order
to ascertain “what measures the government must take to remedy the very preponderant
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situation of all the foreign priests in the department.”96 The bishop responded, “I have
given you exact information on this topic and you can see from it that the ‘scandalous
situation’ in fact does not exist.”97 He counted in Oran eleven priests of Spanish origin,
six of whom were born in Spain, the others in Oran, all naturalized Frenchmen, to which
he added one priest born in Naples, one in Syria, two in Metz, and two in Strasbourg
(though we should take these figures with a grain of salt). “Should we even count these
last four as foreigners?” the bishop asked, adding that “obviously, it is above all the
Spanish that you had in mind.”98 Spanish priests in particular incited the anxieties of
colonial officials as the settlers of Spanish descent continued to outnumber those of
French descent in the city of Oran.99
The bishop defended the use of foreign priests for their ability to spread
civilization to “savage” foreign colonists. “If some [foreigners] have been named vicars
in large cities, it is because their services are necessary there, precisely because of their
knowledge of the Spanish language,” he noted. He assured the prefect that everywhere
priests gave mass first in French and only afterwards in Spanish, adding:
A great number of people, children above all, do not understand this language; so
we must use Spanish if we don’t want them to languish in the most complete
religious ignorance. Do you not know that in the Midi of France priests preach
often in patois? To an even greater extent this practice is necessary among us,
where the foreigners are so numerous.100
The bishop’s argument, of course, failed to invoke much sympathy, as at that very
moment metropolitan policy aimed to root out local patois and replace it with
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standardized Parisian French.101 Like officials in the metropole, the bishop in Oran hoped
to lift the Spanish out of ignorance by imparting French culture; unlike them, however, he
hoped to impart this culture by using a policy of association, rather than assimilation, and
thus to employ the particular language of the Spanish colonists.
A Tenuous Separation: Applying the Laws of Laïcisation to Algeria
For all missionary congregations in Algeria, as in France, persecution to varying
extents was enshrined into law with the so-called lois Combes of 1901 to 1904.102 In
France, this legislation began with Prime Minister Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau’s law of 1
July 1901, which required all “associations” to apply to the government for official
authorization (section III dealt specifically with religious congregations).103 Three years
later, on 7 July 1904 new Prime Minister Emile Combes drafted a second law more
explicitly designed “for the suppression of congregationist teaching.”104 The law
prohibited all members of religious congregations from teaching in France and forcibly
shut down congregations exclusively devoted to teaching.105 This law dealt with all forms
of education: primary, secondary, artistic, agricultural, professional, and industrial.
Nevertheless, if the congregation worked in both teaching and nursing or devoted itself
strictly to the education of orphans, the law provided enough room for interpretation to
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allow some of these establishments to stay open.106 On 9 December 1905 a final law
officially separated Church and State, definitively ending government funding for any
religious activity.107
Claude Prudhomme has written that the laws of 1900-05 did not fundamentally
alter the status of missionaries in the empire but that they did accelerate a long-standing
trend of missionaries leaving France to go abroad.108 In Algeria, however, all religious
congregations eventually felt the force of these laws, with different congregations
suffering to different extents. Many congregations – including the Soeurs Trinitaires, the
Filles de la Charité, and the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes – would continue to operate in
some type of legally recognized capacity, often even in the field of education, up to the
First World War and beyond. Others, however, were not so lucky. Out of all the
congregations in Algeria to apply for authorization under the law of 1901, only the
Salésiens failed at this first hurdle and did not obtain initial legal recognition. Their
failure stemmed directly from their perceived status as foreigners, even if, as we have
seen, nearly all the Salésiens had obtained naturalization as French citizens (while their
visiting superiors in Algeria were all ethnically French).
Oissila Saaïdia and Pierre Soumille have recently written that “with the current
state of our research we cannot say when the law of 1901 was actually applied [in
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Algeria].”109 Drawing from documents in the French overseas archives and various
missionary archives, however, I have found that early on the government sought to apply
the law of 1901 to Algeria. Four months after the law’s application in France, the
governor general requested all congregations in Algeria to apply for authorization as
well. A chart drafted by the governor general on 8 October 1901 listed all the
congregations that needed to apply and included notes on whether or not to grant
authorization.110 The archives of the Soeurs Trinitaires reveal that in 1901 the sisters
applied for authorization and the minister of interior informed their superior in Oran that
he would “leave us to continue peacefully in our work.”111 Indeed, the government also
agreed to grant authorization to allow the Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes, the Filles de la
Charité, and the Lazarists all to continue working in Algeria for the time being.
Despite their continued difficulties with the colonial government, the Salésiens
too set about applying for authorization to comply with the law. On 10 December 1901, a
special report written jointly by the governor general and the Special Commissioner on
the Safety of Railroads and Bridges urged the government to reject the Salésiens’
application. Although it noted that these missionaries had a “secret role of
[disseminating] religious propaganda” in both their workshops and youth clubs, it
focused more on matters of national origin than religion.112 The authors warned that a
foreign congregation with a large number of foreign personnel
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constitutes a danger because of the spirit in which they instruct children…a large
number of whom are of Spanish origin, but destined to become French
subjects…and yet these children are under the authority of non-French teachers
and are perhaps poorly prepared to receive the benefits of the law of
naturalization.113
Finally, the report noted that “the entire city of Oran does not fail to complain” about the
competition of the Salésiens’ workshops. Again, only the Salésiens, of all the
congregations in France and abroad, encountered such accusations of providing
competition to lay skilled laborers.114 To be sure, the workshops run by the Filles de la
Charité probably failed to encounter opposition because they taught the trades of sewing
and needlework to orphaned and poor girls, and thus did not present competition to male
skilled laborers, as the Salesiens’ woodworking shops did.
The Salésiens initially found an unlikely ally in the form of the municipal council
of Oran. As part of the 1901 law, the government invited local municipal councils to give
their opinion on whether to grant authorization to congregations that worked within the
councils’ jurisdiction. On 20 January 1902, the municipal council of Oran opened its
meeting to discuss authorization of the Salésiens. Surprisingly, the once-anticlerical
council expressed qualified support for the Salésiens. Various councilmen noted that the
Salésiens offered a useful service by imparting trades to orphans, and one councilman
stated that, “leaving the religious question to the side,” he supported granting
authorization to such a “humanitarian” association. Another councilman added that
seeing as “the government which voted on the law of 1901 did not consult the municipal
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councils then, [I] do not see why it is consulting them today.”115 In the end, the council
opted to waive its right and not to express any opinion whatsoever.
As later documents and debates make clear, the municipality’s support for the
congregation stemmed from widespread anti-Semitism amongst the newly elected
councilors. Historians have documented the violent wave of anti-Semitism that swept
Algeria in the period between 1896 and 1903. This outbreak stemmed in part from the
economic depression that hit Algeria in the 1890s and it combined with calls to revoke
the Crémieux decree of 1870 – which many Europeans saw as unfairly favoring Jewishowned businesses to the detriment of their own – culminating at the time of the Dreyfus
Affair in France.116 In the 1890s, a number of anti-Jewish leagues appeared in the
territory and many called for full-scale independence from the metropole.117 In 1898,
Algerian voters elected the leader of the anti-Jewish league of Algiers, Max Régis, as
mayor, while in the same year the notorious anti-Semite Edouard Drumont won election
to the Chamber of Deputies for the department of Algiers.118 In the city of Algiers alone,
1898 saw two Jewish citizens murdered, 87 Jewish-owned businesses ransacked, and the
town’s synagogue entirely destroyed.119 Although the anti-Semitic campaign was led by
the French elite, they often appealed to, as one historian has noted, the “more pronounced
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religious anti-Semitism of the Spanish and Italians” to gain support for their cause [my
italics].120
In Oran this campaign sparked a brief and incongruous alliance of anticlerical and
anti-Semitic French “republicans” with Catholic and anti-Semitic Spanish clergy and
colonists.121 Guignard recounts that republican politicians simply used anti-Semitism as a
political tactic and that they quickly abandoned it after it had served its purpose.122 This
temporary alliance helps explains the municipal council’s lack of hostility toward the
Salésiens and their religious works. In 1902, the prefect of Oran contended that the
bishop, all his clergy, the seminary, and the Salésien missionaries voted in the municipal
elections for a mayor who nonetheless passed himself off as at times an anticlerical
republican.123 The prefect later alleged that the councilors who rose to power on an antiSemitic platform had received loans from the bishop of Oran as well as many members of
the local Catholic clergy, including the Salésiens. The municipal council actually hoped
to remove the prefect of Oran and enlisted the Salésiens to tell their parishioners not to
vote for his reelection. As a countermeasure, the prefect enlisted other inhabitants of
Oran to agitate against the Salésiens and to push the council to reject their authorization.
In the end, the council spited the prefect and (half-heartedly) repaid the support of the
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Salésiens by refusing to vote on their authorization whatsoever, knowing that, regardless
of its vote, the application would be rejected in the French Senate.124
Numerous police memoranda and letters from the prefect further reveal that a
number of Catholic clergymen supported anti-Semitic candidates and attempted to rally
their “foreign” parishioners behind their electoral cause. On 11 May 1902 a confidential
police report recounted that a Spanish priest used his pulpit to encourage his Spanish
parishioners to vote for the church’s candidates in the coming elections. On the same day,
a police spy reported overhearing the same priest tell a friend: “Down with the Jews.”125
One month later a second police report noted that many local clergy had encouraged their
parishioners to vote against the freemasons and for the “anti-Jewish” candidates of the
church. The report claimed that these voters were nearly all neo-French, or naturalized
citizens of foreign origin.126 Similarly, on 17 May 1902, the prefect of Oran wrote that the
new bishop, “although chosen by a republican government from among the priests of
Paris, has given very strong support for the religious congregations.”127 He stated that the
bishop used the religiosity of the Spanish to further his own political ends by encouraging
his clergy and their followers “to take part in all the elections, even the municipal ones,
and give overt support to the anti-Jewish candidates, with whom they have very quickly
formed an alliance.”128
On 3-4 July 1903, the French Senate held its official hearing to decide whether or
not to grant the Salésiens authorization. The debate’s significance lies in the particular
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imperial dangers of allowing foreign missionaries in a French territory. Although the
hearing covered the Salésiens’ houses in France and Algeria, commentators on both sides
readily admitted the issue primarily concerned the establishments in Oran alone. Not only
was the Senate’s argument to reject authorization led by now-senator of Oran Marcel
Saint-Germain, but the Salésiens’ spokesman, M. Bérenger, also began by noting that
while seven Salésiens who worked in France did not possess French citizenship, “in
reality this [concern] is really about the house in Oran.”129 Bérenger further noted that
while the Salésiens ran a number of orphan workshops in France, “it is only the house in
Oran that is complained about. Hardly anything is mentioned of the houses in Paris, or
Dinan. But in Oran the dossier of this commission is full of a number of allegations…that
this school presents the most serious competition to commerce.”130 The handful of
Salésiens of foreign origin in metropolitan France did not figure at all in the debate to
grant them authorization.
The Salésiens had support in the form of conservative senator Gustave de
Lamarzelle, who expressed surprise that deputies from Algeria in particular refused to
accept the French identity of Salésien priests naturalized through the law of 1889. “The
number of these neo-French is considerable,” he asserted, asking if “it is not very
dangerous to tell them that the naturalization they have acquired…does not give them a
quality of Frenchness equal to our own?” If this denial showed a lack of prudence in
France, he added, “is it not even more imprudent in Algeria?” Lamarzelle argued that by
denying the Frenchness of the naturalized Salésiens, their opponents also denied the
Frenchness of all the naturalized foreigners in Algeria, and thus only contributed to
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sowing these foreigners’ disloyalty for the French government. He contended that as
naturalized foreigners who spoke French, Italian, and Spanish, the Salésiens more than
anyone else could help integrate neo-French settlers into the French community.131
Lamarzelle thus argued for the Salésiens’ utility by appealing to the increasingly bygone
policy of colonial association for the foreign population.
It thus comes as little surprise that on 5 July 1903 the Senate ruled by a vote of
158 to 100 not to grant authorization to the Salésiens’ establishments in Oran. This ruling
stemmed in part from the Salésiens’ continued refusal to accept and further the policy of
assimilation that the colonial government had worked so hard to enact. On 1 September
1903 the colonial authorities ordered the Salésiens to evacuate their establishments at
Eckmühl and at the Rue Ménerville. When the missionaries refused to leave their schools
the police arrived on 16 October to arrest them. A number of people attended the ensuing
trial and, as one of the missionaries later recalled, “protests in favor of the Salésiens
became so vehement that the judge threatened to force the audience to leave the room.”
When the judge ultimately upheld the ruling and fined each of the priests 25 francs, the
crowd began to chant, “long live the Salésiens, down with the three points [i.e. the
freemasons].”132 After the appeals court of Algiers upheld the ruling on 7 June 1904, the
government seized the Salésiens’ property and put it up for sale on public auction.
Conclusion: After the Dispersion
Unlike the Salésiens, the other congregations examined here all won initial
authorization to continue working in Algeria. To be sure, this authorization would prove
only a temporary respite before the application of the 1904 law began the long process of
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closing missionary schools throughout Algeria. Nevertheless, many of these
congregations would continue to work with the government’s consent with orphans, in
hospitals, or even in rare cases as congregationist teachers. The law stipulated that all
teaching congregations must evacuate their schools within a ten-year period; in a handful
of instances missionary schools in Algeria continued to operate until 1914, when a decree
from the minister of interior revoked the law of 1904 in order to allow secular teachers to
report to the warfront. In Philippeville, this decree arrived the day before the Frères des
Ecoles Chrétiennes had planned to leave their school and open another in Casablanca.
Not only did the city reinstate them, but for the first time since 1881 it provided them
with salaries from the municipal budget.133 Elsewhere, the Filles de la Charité continued
to direct three schools in the department of Algiers – at Miséricorde, Cité Bugeaud and
Bab-el-Oued – until on the eve of expulsion in 1914 they too “were saved by the Great
War.”134 The Soeurs Trinitaires also directed a handful of private schools up to the First
World War and beyond.135 In sum, the secular laws of the metropole proved slightly less
onerous for congregations in Algeria than for congregations in France.136
Unauthorized to even exist in Algeria, the Salésiens more than any other
congregation continued to attract the close attention of colonial officials, who employed
police spies to gather information on the congregation and report back to the government.
At the same time, the Salésiens continued to enjoy the support of a large number of
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Oranais youth, most of whom belonged to so-called foreign families. After they failed to
gain government authorization, all but three Salésiens opted to return to Europe or move
elsewhere abroad. The law prohibited two or more unauthorized congregationists to
inhabit the same dwelling, but it could not prohibit two literal brothers, Léon and Cyprien
Bessière, from doing so. In 1904, the two “ex-Salésiens” and four lay supporters moved
to a building on 18 Rue de l’Arsenal in Oran and opened a youth club (patronage)
consisting of 150 of their former students. The club met every Sunday to stage plays that
reenacted scenes from the Bible or from the lives of saints. These plays were by
invitation only and gained upwards of 200 attendees, including many members of the
military as well as a number of city notables.137
Despite the persecution, the ex-Salésiens continued to see Algeria as a place to
enact their own version of a religious present, but one that consisted largely of reviving
an increasingly distant religious past. On 25 January 1906, a local priest purchased the
Salésiens’ old building on Rue Ménerville and invited the two brothers, plus a third exSalésien who remained in Oran, to work as teachers in his new private school. While not
explicitly Catholic, the school gave secular education in the daytime and religious
education in the evening and quickly reached enrollment of 200 students. The priests also
continued to run the musical Society of Joyous Harmony in Oran. In another example of
the phenomenon of “creole medievalism,” Cyprien Bessière later recounted that these
works allowed the ex-Salésiens to “rejoin their ancestors from the Middle Ages” and to
“practice their faith like Christians of earlier centuries.”138
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The ex-Salésiens continued to rely on the non- or neo-French population in their
attempt to remake a medieval France in modern Algeria. After the closure of the
orphanage at Eckmühl, Léon Bessière rented a neighboring villa from the mayor of St
Denis du Sig, where he opened an auditorium, a gym, a woodworking shop, and a chapel.
In 1907, a police report noted that the house continued to stage plays, sporting events,
and musical concerts that attracted as many as 300 people, again by invitation only. The
workshop employed seven apprentices to build furniture for both religious and private
establishments and provided crucial income for the cash-strapped ex-Salésiens. The
report observed that the children in these establishments primarily comprised “young
men of Spanish or Neapolitan origin.”139 As late as 1909, the chief of police commented
that Bessière focused his work “above all on people of Spanish and Italian nationality”
and that the brothers “have thus maintained an incontestable influence…on their old
students and on the families of those students.”140
This influence continued to serve as a source of division for the settler population
and confusion for colonial officials until the eve of the First World War. A police report
from 1910 stated that the Bessière brothers used their youth club on Rue de l’Arsenal to
encourage their children, “almost all Spanish or Neapolitan in origin,” to burn school
textbooks condemned by the clergy. The same report noted:
The population of many neighborhoods of Oran is in large part of foreign Spanish
origin. This group, clerical by tradition, submits without questioning to the
influence of the clergy, all the more because the clergy of Oran is in part
composed of Spanish priests [the strikethrough is in the original].141
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The language of the report reveals the continuing limits of imperial knowledge, control,
and classification and the “ambiguous nomenclature” that “cleaves into the conceit that
more knowledge secures a more durable empire.”142 Despite legislation to the contrary
and constant surveillance thereafter, the ex-Salésiens continued to ply their trade and the
reporting officer no longer even knew how to classify their followers. Indeed, as a direct
and unintended result of the law of 1889 the police struggled to identify exactly who
constituted the political danger in the territory of Algeria (demonstrated by the
strikethrough of the word “foreign”).143 Despite nearly a half-century of government
policy of assimilation and efforts to shape religious sensibilities, the Oranais population
of Spanish descent continued to practice their religion in their own language.
The influence of the Salésiens remained considerable and only increased
throughout the first half of the twentieth century thanks to the continued support they
received from the settlers of foreign origin. Léon and Cyprien Bessière would remain in
Oran until at least 1941, when the latter decided to chronicle his experiences in a
memoir.144 In this document Cyprien fondly referred to the period between 1901 and
1914 as “the golden age of our dear society in Oran.”145 It was only after their legal
dispersion that the remaining Salésiens really began to expand their influence among the
youth of Oran, an influence that only grew in the interwar years. In his memoir, while
lamenting the laws of laïcisation, Cyprien included the following passage:
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At the very moment I write these lines, I hear that Marshall Pétain, who
presides over the reconstruction of France, has…proclaimed the abrogation of the
laws of 7 July 1904 and 1 July 1901…Finally, Providence has returned our past to
us, or even improved on our past, and justice has smiled upon us…Henceforth the
religious congregations will resume their task, in the words of our Head of State,
of ‘diffusing and applying these great Christian truths which serve as the base of
our civilization.’”146
In 1940, with the fall of the French Third Republic, it appeared that the policies of the
Vichy regime would finally allow these missionaries to fully implement their own
version of creole medievalism, and everything that it entailed.147

146

Quoted In 50 Ans d’Apostolat Salésien en Afrique du Nord: 1891-1941, Deuxième Partie, 26.
For the policies of the Vichy regime in the French colonies (though not Algeria), see Eric Jennings,
Vichy in the Tropics: Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-44
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

147

223

Conclusion
The Paradox of Settler Colonialism
“Europe’s ambivalent conquests – oscillating between attempts to project outward its
own ways of understanding the world and efforts to demarcate colonizer from colonized,
civilized from primitive, core from periphery – made the space of empire into a terrain
where concepts were not only imposed but also engaged and contested.”1
-Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question.
This dissertation has described in detail the lives of Catholic missionaries in
Algeria between 1830 and 1914. In doing so, it has taken seriously Frederick Cooper’s
call that scholars focus on the specificity of empire. Cooper urges us to analyze the
colonies not just as abstract and uniform receptacles for the application of metropolitan
ideologies. Rather, he calls for a more nuanced study of colonial particularities, where
power is not just unilaterally applied from above and outside, but rather negotiated,
contested, and subverted from below and within. At the same time, Cooper at times
perpetuates the very dichotomies he seeks to break down by viewing such struggles for
power as occurring between colonial rulers and colonized subjects alone. By applying
Cooper’s methodology to missionaries, their allies, and their opponents, we can go even
further in his effort to “reveal the limits of colonial power and define alternative modes of
living and working in the crevices of authority.”2 These crevices emerged not only in the
extension of authority over the indigenous population, but also in the equally important
1
2
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attempt to mold the settler population in order to differentiate it from the indigenous
population. It was within these very crevices that missionaries learned to thrive. They did
so by posing as potential mechanisms that could transmit relations of power into the tight
and narrow confines – confines of colonial sentimentalities and subjectivities – that
colonial authorities had not yet figured out how to penetrate. Because of their very
existence outside of authority, however, these crevices remained hotly contested and
missionaries constantly struggled to portray themselves as transmitters rather than
destabilizers of power.
In addition to reconceptualizing the thrust of colonial authority and the sites of
tension that threatened to destabilize colonial rule, this study has sought to tease out the
broader implications that an analysis of missionaries holds for the larger history of
French Algeria on political, social, and cultural levels. Politically, a study of missionaries
provides a new periodization for the ever-changing legal relationship between civil and
military authorities in the territory and between France and Algeria as a whole. Socially,
this analysis reveals much about the wider settler community – about the ambitions that
led them to migrate to Algeria, the opportunistic nature of their multifaceted relationships
once there, and the unexpected successes and failures that these relationships engendered
on the ground. Culturally, a study of missionary work uncovers a colonial society not
only shaped by racial difference, but one also and equally shaped by religious, ethnic, and
national differences. Despite the immense effort and resources that went into monitoring
missionaries and settlers throughout this period, the discourses surrounding all of their
complicated relationships remained remarkably confused right up to the eve of World
War I.
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The historical trajectory of French Algeria corresponded less to major political
upheavals in the metropole and legal impositions in the territory than to the particular
necessities of imperial rule. Similarly, changing political structures in Algeria owed less
to an evolving relationship between the state and native Algerians and more to the
continuing need to police a nebulous and always potentially dangerous settler
community. In the first two decades of the conquest, the appointment of the first two
bishops of Algiers in 1838 and 1846, respectively, served as the two events that most
altered and disrupted missionaries’ lives on a daily basis. By keeping our focus on these
missionaries, religion, and religious education, we see that the Revolution of 1848 did not
bring missionaries or other settlers under the metropolitan and civilian rule of law. Rather
missionaries and settlers continued to rely on personal patronage of bishops or military
generals, and this reliance held implications for every European child, parent, or civilian
official in the colony. In fact, the political decision that had the most impact on European
families in Algeria in this period was the decision not to apply the Falloux educational
laws of 1850 to the European community of Algeria. We can even say that this failure did
not result from an actual decision, but rather from the inability of metropolitan and
colonial officials to even agree on how to frame the question. This inability stemmed
from officials’ continued uncertainty over how to govern the settler population, and it
further reveals the ad hoc and entirely spontaneous nature of imperial governance.
The next significant change for missionaries in Algeria arrived not with the fall of
the Second Empire in 1870, but with the arrival of Archbishop Lavigerie and the circular
of Governor General MacMahon in 1867. By centralizing religious authority around
himself and his congregation Lavigerie disrupted the extralegal networks of patronage

226

that missionaries had relied on for success during the preceding forty years. The rise of
the Third Republic did little to change this relationship. On a purely secular level, it was
MacMahon’s desire to create mixed schools for native Algerians and Europeans that
allowed civilian authorities to begin their attempt to secularize the public schools of
Algeria. Significantly, although MacMahon intended the circular to alter the relationship
between colonial settlers and native Algerians, the decision of the municipal council of
Algiers to purposefully misinterpret the circular and apply it only to Catholic
missionaries and schools again reveals that a preoccupation with creating a utopian settler
community repeatedly trumped the ideal of assimilating conquered Algerians to French
civilization. Indeed, colonial rule rested entirely on the requirement that this latter
assimilation not occur. As Cooper has written, “the extent to which difference across
space is institutionalized is important to constituting empire…for if incorporation ceased
to entail differentiation, it could result in a relatively homogenous polity that becomes
more nation-like and less empire-like.”3 To complicate even this nuanced appraisal, we
can assert that civilian officials failed even in their attempt to mold a homogenous polity
of Europeans – one that would have constituted a nation within a more heterogeneous
polity that they hoped would continue to exist as an empire.
The proclamation of the Third Republic on 4 September 1870 and the nominal
institution of full civilian rule in Algeria did not mark a decisive shift for missionaries in
Algeria. Rather, it accelerated two previously existing trends without allowing either to
come to full fruition. First, in a brief period between 1870 and 1872 civilian municipal
councils sought to build on previous efforts of the council of Algiers and continue the
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trend of secularizing the public schools. Second, and as part of this first trend, these
councils aimed to consolidate civilian authority over Algeria and bring the territory fully
in line with the metropolitan rule of law. In neither case did they succeed. They failed
because the advent of the Third Republic did little to clarify the position of (religious)
foreigners in French Algeria – foreigners who, much like native Algerians, continued to
“build lives in the crevices of colonial power, deflecting, appropriating, or reinterpreting
the teachings and preachings thrust upon them.”4 The continued impotence of colonial
authority led even staunchly republican officials in the metropole to continue to empower
a military governor general to ensure he continued to meet the religious needs of these
colonists. As such, the governor general cited the failure to fully transition to civilian rule
– that is to enfranchise all the Europeans of Algeria – to justify his continued, always
contested, position of authority and to unilaterally reinstall the missionary teachers.
The real legal transition from military to civilian rule in the European communes
of Algeria came in 1883 and 1889; but this transition failed to have the desired effect of
uniting the settler community. In 1883, the government rendered public education free,
obligatory, and secular for all Europeans of Algeria and in 1889 it granted citizenship to
all Europeans born on French territory, including Algeria. The 1883 law had a profound
effect on missionaries, as it forced them to open private schools; and without a willing
bishop to serve as their patron they drastically curtailed their activity. At the same time,
missionaries continued to work due to the ongoing religiosity of the non-French
population. As a result, the law of 1889 only proved a boon for missionary work and a
source of further division for the settler community. It empowered the previously
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disenfranchised religious element of the territory to use their new political rights to
provide support for Catholic missionaries. Further, the law even had the totally
unexpected effect of allowing a congregation of foreign missionaries to arrive in Algeria
and further divide the foreign and neo-French settlers from the ethnically French settlers.
Finally, although the official legal assimilation of Algeria to France was finalized with
the application of the Combes laws of secularization in 1904, the creation of a united
settler community remained elusive up until the First World War.
As this re-periodization shows, these changes and continuities enveloped many
more colonial actors than just missionaries alone. In many ways the history of
missionaries in Algeria is the history of the settler population on a more general level, a
history that, Jennifer Sessions has written, “remains the least known aspect of the decades
of the conquest,” or indeed beyond.5 Like missionaries, settlers saw Algeria as a land of
opportunity in which they could achieve levels of autonomy and professional
advancement unattainable in the more constraining legal confines of the metropole. Both
secular and religious settlers exhibited traits of ambition and opportunism, and held
grandiose visions of success.6 At the same time, missionaries and civilians alike often
found a rude awakening upon their arrival as they encountered unexpected obstacles in a
territory where competition served as the rule, and collaboration the exception.
Historian Pierre Nora has argued that “the history of Algeria cannot be written
according to its laws: its history is the manner in which the French of Algeria have gotten
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around them.”7 The most successful European migrants to the southern shores of the
Mediterranean understood quickly that professional and personal advancement did not
entail working within the rule of law. Rather, it resulted from the ability to cultivate
relationships with powerful authorities. At the same time, these relationships were
constantly shifting, and settlers and missionaries had to remain cognizant of the fact that
the personal preferences of one holder of authority did not necessarily extend to his
successor, or even to his own allies. Settlers thus had to constantly recalibrate their
strategies based on the very specific historical moment they inhabited and the individual
personalities of their chosen patrons. As such, more than in the metropole, alliances and
rifts among European settlers did not divide neatly between a secular and clerical camp.
These allegiances cut across the entire settler population, and often one’s staunchest
source of opposition came from one’s closest acquaintance, who also provided the most
direct source of professional and personal competition. As such, missionaries frequently
courted secular, typically military, officials to eliminate their closest competitors. As the
Catholic clergy as a whole became more embattled, this competition in no way abated.
Finally, for missionaries and lay settlers alike, the opportunity for extralegal
advancement diminished as the nineteenth century progressed and the metropolitan rule
of law slowly, fitfully, and haphazardly came to apply to Algeria. At the same time, the
discourses surrounding missionaries, their supporters, and faith in general only exhibited
increasing confusion. Indeed, throughout the nineteenth century these discourses proved
especially dense and, as a result, especially variegated. Their incoherence resulted in part
from their seemingly incongruous strategic invocations of a population that often seems
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absent in this analysis just as it often seemed absent in the words of contemporaries
themselves: the overwhelming majority of the marginalized Muslim subjects of French
Algeria. If explicit mention of native Algerians rarely figured in the colonial discourses
examined here, it is because the colonists wanted them not to figure in the larger social
and political landscape of Algeria. If this study demonstrates anything about the native
population of Algeria it is that, despite any rhetoric of assimilation or association, they
remained throughout the period up to the First World War utterly and completely Other.8
At the same time, they stubbornly continued to exist. As Oissilia Saaïdia has
written, “whether invisible or visible, [Algeria’s Muslims] were always present.”9 When
we do catch glimpses of native Algerians in colonial discourses about or by missionaries
they primarily served as inanimate and eternal objects of strategic invocation, conjured
up to justify a particular argument for or against a certain ideal of settler society.
Missionaries claimed that Algerians would never respect a colonial state that did not
respect its own national religion, while civilian officials countered that French Algeria
must remain entirely secular so that Catholics did not offend Muslims with their religious
ceremonies and sensibilities. In neither case did such discourses reflect the real concerns
of their authors. In practice, neither civilian officials nor missionaries exhibited respect
for the Muslims of Algeria or the Islamic faith. Missionaries wanted only to convert
them, while civilian officials wanted only that they remain invisible. As such, an analysis
of these discourses draws upon historian Mary Lewis’ methodological framework already
8
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described in the introduction to this dissertation. Lewis calls for an approach that looks
for power differentials within colonial society while still recognizing unequal relations of
collective power between colonizer and colonized.10 For in the end, despite the divisions
between and among secular and religious settlers, they continued as a collectivity to
wield a degree of authority largely unattainable for native Algerians.
Finally, as the dissonance between these discourses and practices reveals, official
policies of assimilation and association towards the Algerian population remained
stillborn in the realm of metropolitan ideologies. The same was not the case, however,
when applied to the European settler community. Although rarely articulated as such,
military, civilian, and ecclesiastical officials understood the urgency in the need to
somehow spread civilization to this horde of often poor and ignorant Europeans. As the
earlier remark by Frederick Cooper demonstrates, assimilating or associating indigènes to
French society would completely obviate the very raison d’être of the entire imperial
enterprise by creating a homogenous polity that was more “nation-like” than “empirelike.” At the same time, Cooper leaves unarticulated the other side of this equation: that
the application of such policies to the European community would help perpetuate the
very ideological justification of imperialism. Only once the European settlers possessed
the civilized habits of the universal French citizen could they then justify their alleged
desire to spread this civilization to conquered colonial subjects. Without this civilization,
settlers themselves threatened to assume the uncivilized traits of the supposedly inferior
Algerians.
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Ultimately, settlers and missionaries could not agree on a common definition of
civilization or even in which direction to look to locate its ideal manifestation. David
Prochaska has written that “perhaps the single most characteristic feature of the colonial
city is its plural nature, the fact that it is comprised of a mixture of ethnic and racial
groups.”11 Although the arguments put forth in this dissertation support this contention of
Prochaska’s, they contest his corollary argument that “we should not lose sight of the
primary fact…[that] the Europeans were never so isolated [from each other] as to
preclude assimilation and acculturation.”12 In making this argument, Prochaska applied
Eugen Weber’s analysis of the assimilating influence of French public schools in the
metropole onto colonial Algeria.13 Prochaska wrote specifically that “this amalgamation
[of the European population of Algeria] was itself effected by the school, by the street, by
the barracks.”14 Even if we accept Weber’s analysis as unproblematic, an in-depth
examination of alternative sites that held the potential to effect assimilation and
acculturation reveals that another, nearly equally pervasive set of institutions in Algeria –
as in France – continued to hinder such efforts of assimilation.
If we take as the objects of our analysis the Catholic school, the parish church,
and the religious orphanage, we can identify a powerful counter current that, rather than
assimilate and acculturate, sought to associate and to impart a particular religious
subjectivity that deviated from the universalism of French republicans. Moreover, more
than in France, this particular subjectivity provided a political danger to colonial rule
because of the very numerical inferiority of ethnically French citizens and the numerical
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preponderance of their foreign or neo-French European neighbors. In Algeria, the
universal ideal of French citizenship was in fact embodied in a very small proportion of
the population. Paradoxically, this group’s very standing as a minority only radicalized its
universalist discourses and sentiments, just as it in turn radicalized the religious
sentiments of Algeria’s Catholics. The French elite feared that their authority rested on
ultimately tenuous foundations and that, especially as geopolitical tensions rose around
the turn of the century, the Catholic foreigners represented a fifth column waiting to ally
with the government of their homeland and undermine imperial rule from within.
The question of whether or not this fear was well founded is less important than
what it reveals about the anxieties, uncertainties, and confusion that beset imperial rule in
any context. These ambivalences get to the heart of the fundamental paradox of settler
colonialism. Colonial states desired ardently that settlers serve as their representatives on
the ground – that in their superior economic status, their superior rationality, and their
superior culture they could demonstrate the incontestability and inevitability of European
dominance. As this analysis has shown, this dominance was never incontestable or
inevitable. We can see its fictive nature in the reams of government documents that
questioned whether to subject this settler population to the rule of law, or whether to
maintain a more authoritarian regime in order to force the settlers to adopt and exhibit
their superior sentiments and their superior rationality. We can see it in the stubborn
refusal of Algeria’s Catholics to shed their own “fanaticism,” to accept French secular
culture, and to differentiate themselves from Algeria’s colonized subjects. Far from
diminishing over time, the anxieties caused by the very fictitiousness of European
supremacy only grew throughout the nineteenth century as European inadequacies came
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clearly and incontestably into view. Nowhere were these anxieties more apparent than in
officials’ repeated attempts to channel and control the faith of missionaries and their
Catholic adherents in French Algeria.
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